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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
School law, as well as Supreme Court decisions, is an 
area which is worthy of increased attention from both teacher 
and administrator. According to Hamilton and Mort (31, p. 3), 
"Constitutional provisions, statutory enactments, and judicial 
decisions determine the structural pattern of education and 
the mode of its operation," Formerly each state was con­
sidered sovereign, recently this has been modified by United 
States Supreme Court decisions, therefore it becomes in­
creasingly important to study State Supreme Court decisions 
in order to determine more accurately the origin and extent 
of numerous principles and practices in the field of educa­
tion. 
Public schools are educating more pupils than ever 
before, for longer periods of time, and at a greater cost to 
the public. Litigation involving public schools is at an 
all-time high. 
2 
The Immunity Doctrine and Its History 
One of the time honored concepts of the common law in 
the United States is the doctrine which holds that govern­
mental agencies are not liable for their torts. The field of 
torts is that branch of law which protects the rights of a 
person against injury to his body, reputation, character, 
conduct, manner, and habits. In brief, a tort is a private 
injury, Cooley indicated the ways in which one may become 
liable for torts (16, p. 85): 
"1. By actually doing to the prejudice of another 
something he ought not to do. 
2. By doing something he may rightfully do, not 
wrongfully or negligently but doing it by such 
means or at such time or in such manner that 
another is injured. 
3. By neglecting to do something which he ought to 
do, whereby another suffers an injury." 
While it is a general principle of law that a school 
district is not liable for injuries resulting from the 
negligence of its employees in the absence of a statute 
making it liable, the individual employees are not covered 
by this cloak of immunity. The question of what constitutes 
negligence is moot and must be answered anew in each case in 
light of the pertinent facts. Immunity from liability is 
based on the theory that the state is sovereign and cannot be 
sued without its consent. Bochard, in his study, Governmental 
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Liability for Tort, points out that the doctrine had its 
origin in the maxim that "The King can do no wrong." He 
states that how it came to be applied in the United States is 
one of the mysteries of legal evolution and seriously 
questions the validity of the doctrine (32, p. 279). 
While the immunity of the state governmental units from 
liability in tort is said to be based upon the concept of 
sovereignty, many courts have assigned other grounds to 
support the rule. Some authorities sustain that the result 
reached on the grounds that the relation of the master and 
servant does not exist, hence, the rule that a master is 
liable for the acts of his servant or agent while acting 
within the scope of his authority is not applicable. Others 
point out that no liability is attached due to the fact that 
the law provides no funds for the payment of such claims 
against the school district or governmental unit. It is also 
said that funds raised for school purposes may not be 
legally diverted to the payment of tort claims against the 
school district or governmental unit, the assumption being 
that payment of such claims is not an expenditure for educa­
tional purposes. 
The soundness of the reasoning in all these cases may 
well be questioned. There is nothing inherent in the nature 
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of municipal or quasi-municipal corporations which prevents 
the operation of the rules which holds a master liable for 
the acts of his servant while acting within the scope of his 
authority. The argument that there is no liability because 
the law does not provide a means for raising funds to pay 
judgments if they are obtained is not sound. The fact that a 
judgment may not be satisfied is not a legal basis for non­
liability. The courts taking this view have apparently con­
sidered it useless to render judgments against districts 
since they cannot be satisfied. 
Chief Justice Taney of the United States Supreme Court 
in 1875 stated (4): 
"It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all 
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in 
its own courts, or in any other without its consent or 
permission, but it may, if it thinks proper, waive this 
privilege and permit itself to be made a defendant in a 
suit by individuals or by another state. And as this 
permission is altogether voluntary on the part of the 
sovereignty, it follows that it may prescribe the terms 
and conditions on which it consents to be sued, and may 
withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that 
justice to the public requires it." 
The common law rule of immunity persists in the United 
States through stare decisis. not reason. 
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The Background of the Study 
The tort liability of school districts in recent years 
has become a matter of growing concern in Public Education. 
The great increase in the number of pupils entering and 
remaining in the public schools, and the broad expansion of 
school activities in past decades has been accompanied by 
liability implications. Pupil transportation operations have 
become magnitudinal in scope; interscholastic athletic events 
have drawn large numbers of persons into stadiums, gymnasiums, 
and other school facilities; the public in many areas has 
responded to the encouragements of school officials to 
participate actively in school functions; and the schools 
have generally broadened the scope of their educational 
offerings to meet the needs of an expanding pupil population 
with a wide range of interests and abilities. The potenti­
ality for accidental injury to participants exists in every 
school activity; and in some areas, such as pupil transporta­
tion, interscholastic athletics, and vocational education, 
risks of injury to pupils and other participants abound. The 
responsibility for safeguarding from personal harm or injury 
pupils and others who may be in or about the schools rests 
heavily on the school districts. 
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Injuries to pupils and others have occurred in many 
instances in the course of school activities, and out of 
these occurrences, questions concerning the legal liability 
of school districts for the torts of their officers and 
employees have risen. The courts on occasion have been 
called upon to determine the legal liability of school 
districts. Legal principles derived from their decisions 
have had and will continue to have a great influence on the 
manner in which school activities are conducted. 
Until several decades ago, boards of education could be 
reasonably certain of the school district's position in 
regard to tort liability. Judicial opinions were almost 
unanimous in holding that the school districts were immune 
from liability for the negligent acts of their employees and 
officers which caused injuries to others. The decisions of 
the higher courts supporting this principle were based 
largely on the rule of governmental immunity—an inheritance 
of the English common law which dictated that the courts 
hold immune from tort liability the state and subdivisions. 
Applied to tort law, the principle of governmental 
immunity acts as a shield to protect governmental units from 
liability in tort. It nullifies the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. which requires a master or employer to respond in 
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damages for the torts committed by his servants or employees 
while acting in the scope of their employment. It disregards 
the rule, applicable to all other persons and corporations 
other than governmental units, that one who is proven negli­
gent or otherwise guilty of tortious conduct is liable for 
the damages and for injuries to others resulting from such 
conduct. Theories usually applicable in tort cases, such as 
standard of conduct of the "reasonable man" and proof of 
negligence by means of showing proximate cause, are of no 
avail against the rule of governmental immunity. Indeed, by 
demurring complaints charging them with tortious acts in 
order to invoke application of the immunity doctrine, govern­
mental units admit as a matter of law that they are guilty 
of the torts alleged. 
The immunity doctrine has received much advance criti­
cism from writers of legal articles and textbooks, from 
educators, and from jurists, some of whom have reluctantly 
adhered to the doctrine in rendering decisions. It has been 
said that the doctrine is unjust; that it rests on the rotten 
foundation of the divine rights of kings; and that it has no 
place in the modern society. In regard to its application to 
the tort liability of school districts, it has been thoroughly 
condemned. Edwards wrote in the Encyclopedia of Educational 
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Research following his summary of the status of school 
districts to tort liability, "...the doctrine of governmental 
non-liability in tort is indefensible and should be super­
ceded by statutory enactments" (1 , p. 1096). Hamilton 
termed the immunity doctrine "old, obsolete, and unjust", and 
called for "the abolition by appropriate legislation " (29, 
p. 5), Rosenfield set forth his opinion of the rule in the 
following words (83, p. 110): 
"From the point of view of a realistic analysis of the 
modern social scene, the doctrine that 'the King can 
do no wrong,' is utterly untenable and indefensible 
and simply is not true. Sentiment alone, not reason, 
can justify the retention of the rule of governmental 
immunity upon the authority of this justification." 
Recently authorities in school law heralded the appear­
ance of a trend away from the application of the rule of 
governmental immunity in regard to the tort liability of 
school districts. In 1957, Remmelein reported both legis­
lative and judicial trends away from the rule (27, p. 192-
217). Reutter reported in 1958 that legislative enactments 
and court decisions reflected a decline in the immunity 
doctrine (84). Discussing the implications of a 1959 court 
decision involving the tort liability of a school district, 
Bolemeir wrote, "There can be no doubt...that the armor of 
immunity has been severely cracked" (8, p. 38), 
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Statement of the Problem 
The problem of this study is to determine the extent to 
which the patterns of court decisions and statutory enact­
ments are changing awav from the legal immunity of school 
districts and to identify implications these patterns have 
for : 
1. Iowa public schools 
2. Teacher preparation institutions 
3o School officials 
4. Taxpayers. 
To clarify and provide direction for the study, the 
following questions have been posed: 
1. What do school officials do when faced with the 
possibility of greater vulnerability under liability 
laws? 
2. Do school officials, upon clashing with the apparent 
liability risk, circumscribe the activities of the 
pupils and parents? 
3. When confronted by apparent liability risks, what 
measures are taken by school officials to protect 
the school district and its employees from possible 
hazards ? 
The question of whether liability or non-liability 
results in any differences in the standard of care provided 
children also needs to be investigated, for the interest of 
the children is of primary importance. This factor should be 
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of interest to those responsible for changes in the law. 
The problem of liability is frequently approached from 
a study of the statutes, judicial opinions, and court cases 
which tend to offer solutions in terms of legal cause and 
remedy. This approach has been effective in identifying 
dangers, pointing out relative importance, and establishing a 
general awareness of liability. 
The problem of liability is one of growing importance 
due to general trends to be found in the area of liability 
cited previously, and those trends concerning the probable 
future direction of the modern school programs. Risk of 
liability could possibly impede progress in the future 
expansion of the school program for the very activities most 
likely to be found outside the scope of immunity protection. 
The personnel to operate these activities have the least 
defined legal roles regarding their legal position and 
responsibility. The activities engaged in are likely to be 
those most prone to divided responsibility, to lack of close 
organization, to distant supervision, and to accident; all 
factors increasing the hazards of liability risk. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to present an analysis of 
Iowa Supreme Court decisions and Iowa Attorney Generals' 
Opinions which have been rendered in the area of public 
school law, as related to pupil injuries from 1846 through 
1964. It is hoped in so doing, specific guide posts can be 
suggested for more efficient school administration based on 
an understanding and an awareness of principles as estab­
lished by the courts. More specifically, the purposes of 
this study were: 
1. To study past judicial thinking and action in order 
to better understand the present statute of school 
law for pupil injuries. 
2. To make recommendations for better school administra­
tion as a result of knowledge of the development of 
case law in regard to pupil injuries. 
3. To point out possible implications for the future 
as related to public school administration. 
4. To present certain guiding principles in the court's 
rationale as a result of the study of case law. 
Every administrator, at some time or another, has real­
ized his limitations in dealing with everyday problems which 
have arisen in school, or has been asked by a member of the 
staff for guidance in dealing with serious problems which 
have arisen within the realm of his jurisdiction. Such 
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problems as the avoidance of pupil injuries need to be 
handled wisely and in accordance with existing law and the 
interpretation of the courts. 
E. C. Bolemeir has wisely said (6, p. 3): 
"A judicial interpretation of a school law is the origin 
of a legal principle. Until it is overruled, it serves 
as a precedent for subsequent court decisions. The more 
court cases that are decided in accordance with the 
precedent, the more firmly the legal principle is 
established. Therefore, the accumulation of court 
decisions regarding educational issues serves as a set 
of legal principles to guide school principals and 
other school personnel in the performance of their 
duties." 
The Need for the Study 
The effect of liability, both corporate and personal, on 
school practices, policies, and programs is of concern to the 
teaching profession, school officials, teacher preparation 
institutions, and to the public at large. The extent of the 
problem and relative urgency has engaged the attention of 
numerous professional writers in the field of school law and 
the subject has become increasingly popular as a topic of 
research by educators as the review of literature will 
verify. 
At a first glance liability may appear unrelated and 
unimportant as far as the school program is concerned. 
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Reflect carefully on one fact only: the possible liability 
of the teacher in event of injury to a child in or out of the 
classroom appears as not merely incidental to the teacher's 
environment but rather as a factor which may modify and con­
dition the pupil-teacher relationship. 
Certainly teachers do not wish to become involved in 
liability suits nor would they choose to perform knowingly an 
act causing a suit to be brought against the school district. 
On the other hand, the school's curriculum and the program 
within any particular area or classroom may be limited by 
the deliberate cautiousness of teachers in their efforts to 
keep out of harm's way. 
Even though the possible effect of liability on the 
school's program be disregarded, a study of the topic is 
justified by the increasing interest and attention being 
given the uncertain perplexities of liability connected with 
school operations. A growing interest nationally is evi­
denced by the increasing number of publications and articles 
in professional journals devoted to the subject. This 
greater concern has developed because of (1) a more liberal 
attitude in favor of the injured party by the courts, (2) an 
increased tendency by society in general to expect compensa­
tion for injury, accompanied by an apparently greater will­
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ingness to seek compensation for damages through the courts; 
and (3) the successful liability suits (though limited to 
certain states) in which the injured have been awarded 
damages, in spite of school immunity, through court-declared 
exceptions. The partial abrogation of the immunity doctrine 
statute, statutes which appear to nullify school non­
liability, and general dissatisfaction of governmental 
immunity by the courts are also factors. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently made legal 
history when it overthrew the doctrine of governmental 
immunity as applied to school districts in actions for 
damages for tort. This nullified a 61-year old immunity 
that school districts in that state had enjoyed for damages 
suits arising out of negligence of their employees by saying 
( 5 6 ) :  
"The doctrine of school district immunity was created 
by this court alone. Having found the doctrine to be 
unsound and unjust under present conditions, we con­
sider that we have not only the power, but the duty to 
abolish that immunity. We close our courtroom doors 
without legislative help and we can likewise open 
them." 
This case is particularly significant because, as well 
as can be recalled, this is the first time that the highest 
court of any state has taken such summary or precipitate 
action (26, p. 70). 
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As in Illinois before the quoted decision, immunity from 
tort liability of Iowa School districts has been based on the 
common-law rule, "The King can do no wrong." Recently the 
Iowa Supreme Court by the narrowest of margins refused to 
alter the doctrine of governmental immunity which bars 
attempts by citizens to bring suit against local units of 
government for injuries suffered as a result of negligence 
(9). The case before the Iowa Supreme Court involved an 
attempt by two spectators at a high school boys' basketball 
tournament game to recover damages from the Mason City 
Independent School District and the Iowa High School Athletic 
Association for injuries suffered when bleachers collapsed. 
The court ruled, in a five-to-four decision, that it should 
not overturn the doctrine of governmental immunity, "that 
abrogation of the doctrine should come from the legislative, 
not the judicial" (9). 
A sharp dissent, written by Justice C. Edwin Moore, 
said, "the immunity rule is unjust, unsupported by any valid 
reason and has no rightful place in modern society" (9). The 
minority opinion further declared (9), "The injustices result­
ing therefrom caused by our rule....It is our responsibility 
and duty to alter decisional law to produce common sense 
justice....We have already waited too long." More details of 
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this case will be given in Chapter IV. 
In Iowa, there is little doubt that a primary component 
of current concern is rooted in the recent decisions handed 
down by the Iowa Supreme Court which appear to have left the 
time-honored doctrine of governmental immunity from tort 
liability tottering and uncertain. 
.The laws of Iowa with respect to local governmental tort 
immunity are nearing the completion of a 180 degree turn. 
The change has been gradual, but its completion may leave 
local governmental units in Iowa in a worse position, 
liability-wise, than if the doctrine of immunity had never 
existed. This is the reason that the pending abolition of 
the doctrine has been preceded by various cases in which the 
court has given injured plaintiffs relief from the applica­
tion of the doctrine by extending the statutory exceptions 
and then wiping out the defenses, which would be available 
to a private-party-defendant, within the area of exceptions. 
The five-to-four margin by which local governmental 
immunity, or its remaining vestiges, was upheld by the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa in the 1965 Bover case, 
indicates that it is not likely the existing common-law 
doctrine can survive many more attacks. This leaves local 
governmental units with the choice of riding the existing 
17 
doctrine, until the courts finally shoot it down or erode it 
away; or seeking legislation, to define the areas of immunity 
and liability, and to make some provision for financing in 
the areas of liability. 
Illustrative of the desirability of such legislation is 
a 1964 case in Chatam, New Jersey, in which a verdict awarded 
$1,215,140 to a 17-year old student injured while doing a 
tumbling stunt in the high school gym. It is believed to be 
one of the highest negligence awards ever made (82, p. 63), 
The officials of this school district of 10,000 population 
estimate that insurance would cover less than half of the 
amount. The pertinent point to think about is can a city, 
town, county, or school district afford to pay such sums in 
the ordinary course of business without taxing the taxpayer 
out of house and home? Insurance is no solution as premiums 
are based on the preceding year's loss experience. This can 
delay the impact of current losses on taxes for up to one 
year, but this merely gives time to budget them and does not 
prevent their increase at an ever-accelerating rate. 
The Public School is a State Agency 
The following section examines the legal status of the 
public school district as a governmental agency. In legal 
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theory the public school is a state institution. The rule is 
well-established that a state, unless it has assumed liability 
by constitutional mandatory legislative enactment, is not 
liable for injuries arising from the negligent or other 
tortious acts or conduct of any officers, agents, or 
servants, committed in the performance of their duties. If 
the public school is a state institution, the school district 
is at least a quasi-governmental agency and thus partakes of 
the governmental immunity. As Rosenfield stated (83, p. 63): 
"Thus, in the case of a school district, it is well nigh 
impossible for a court to label any of its functions 
'proprietary' so as to impose liability therefore." 
Various theoretical explanations for this immunity have 
been given by Garber (27, p. 195-196); 
"1. Under common law the state and its political sub­
divisions are not subject to tort actions. 
2. School districts have no power to operate a 
proprietary function; their only power is to 
operate the schools and all parts of the school 
program as applications of the governmental 
function of education. 
3. Since school districts receive no profit or 
advantage from operating the schools and are 
required to do so under the state laws, they are 
acting nolens volens or involuntarily; therefore, 
they should not be charged with liability for 
their mistakes. 
4. School districts ordinarily have only those powers 
given them by the state legislature or the state 
school officers, and they have not been given 
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permission to commit a tort. 
5. School district money is tax revenue collected for 
educational purposes only, not to pay damages. 
6. School property is exempt from attachment to pay 
damages for claims; so it is impractical, even if 
it were legal, to allow a judgment against a school 
district. 
7. The injured's personal interest in collecting tax 
money as damage must give way to the public welfare, 
so that the money may be preserved for the operation 
of the schools." 
Scope of the Study 
Only decisions of the Supreme Court and Attorney 
Generals' Opinions for Iowa will be studied, but court cases 
against municipalities to show parallel cases and decisions 
will be included. Historical trends in other states will be 
shown as to the status of the states in regard to immunity 
from tort liability, legislative enactments or judicial 
abolishment. Trends in the number of suits against school 
districts for bodily injury will also be shown. 
The findings of this study will depend upon the va­
lidity of the legal principle of stare decisis. The term is 
derived from the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta 
movers ; freely interpreted, it means to "adhere to precedent 
and not to unsettle things which are settled" (73, p. 98). 
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The principle requires that a court decision on a question of 
law arising in a case and necessary to its determination be 
regarded as a binding precedent in the same court or in 
courts of lower rank within the same jurisdiction in subse­
quent cases where the point is again presented (73, p. 3-4). 
There would be no basis for this study if the courts followed 
this principle strictly. The courts can and do modify this 
prior ruling when conditions so warrant. Since this study is 
based on court decisions, its findings will reflect such 
modifications. 
A further limitation is the inevitable fact that the 
writer is not learned in the law, but is by professional 
training an educator and school administrator. Thus, the 
study is confined and limited, as it deals with the technical 
and professional information peculiar to law to rather 
generally available knowledge and information within the 
scope of the writer's own specialized training in school 
administration. 
Delimitations of the Study 
Since each state has different statutes and legal 
interpretations, it follows that the status of tort liability 
of school districts and their employees will vary from state 
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to state. It was necessary to limit this study as follows; 
1, The study was confined to the State of Iowa from 
the time of its admittance into the Union through 
the year of 1964, and thus any inferencial 
generalizations from this study are contingent 
upon the particular circumstances to be found in 
each state. " 
2, Only Iowa Supreme Court decisions and Attorney 
General's Opinions have been considered. 
3, This study was limited to suits for bodily injury 
only against public school districts and has not 
included non-public schools, institutional 
schools, and institutions of higher learning. 
a. In considering this liability, it is only the 
school district as a quasi-municipal corpora­
tion that has enjoyed the immunity from tort 
liability, and it is the only phase that has 
been studied. 
b. Related subordinates to this problem are; 
1. Governmental-proprietary functions. 
2. "Safe place" statutes. 
3. "Save harmless" statutes. 
4. Nuisance. 
The primary emphasis of this study revolves around the 
modification of the immunity of school districts for tort 
liability in the area of negligence and the law to this 
effect. School districts are sometimes found liable for the 
maintenance of nuisance and for the trespass of property. 
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However, in this study negligence on the part of the school 
district received the intense treatment as such action 
creates a tort liability. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Chapter II consists of two principal parts--"Review of 
the Literature and the General Basis for Liability" and 
"Modifications of the Immunity Doctrine." Prior research in 
the area of school district liability has been edited and the 
writings of experts in the field of school law have been 
reviewed. The latter division of this chapter will present 
the modifications of the immunity doctrine in those states 
where it has been abrogated either by judiciary fiat or by 
legislative statutes. It includes a review of legal princi­
ples and essential information upon which liability of school 
districts and/or school employees is based, and recent 
attacks upon the immunity doctrine, and the results of these 
attacks. 
Review of the Literature and General Basis for Liability 
It is the purpose of this section to present a brief 
review of related studies and current literature, and, in 
addition, minimum essentials of the legal aspects of school-
connected tort liability. Although generalizations pertain­
ing to tort liability should be avoided, certain general 
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principles, legal research, and literature in the field of 
school law must be examined to provide an understanding of 
the problems of school tort liability. 
Historical Perspective 
Professor Charles W. Tooke of New York University Law 
School in 1940 wrote in the forward of Rosenfield's book, 
Liability for School Accidents. the following (83, p. ix): 
"The field of tort in general municipal law has had its 
analysors and its crusaders. Their achievements have 
warranted their efforts as evidenced in remedial 
legislation, both adopted and proved, and in the more 
enlightened reception with which the progressive 
branches of the judiciary have acquiesced in their 
views. The highly specialized field of municipal 
law--that of the school district--is equally in need 
of such analysis and treatment." 
Later in the same presentation Tooke states (83, p. xiii): 
"The question of reform of the existing law of -
municipal tort liability has within the past few years 
been brought to the front largely through the efforts 
of men like Borchard, Harno, and Ascher. The present 
state of the law in our various states is generally 
recognized by the courts as confusing and inconsistent 
and often incongruous. The attempt by the courts do 
ameliorate (to improve) the harsh results within the 
framework of the common law and to reconcile modern 
concepts of tort liability between private persons 
with the archaic (obsolete) principle of governmental 
immunity has been impossible to realize. As in 
liability for industrial accidents, the only remedy 
seems to lie in broad and comprehensive legislation 
which will substitute for the existing technique, a 
governmental responsibility similar to that embodied 
in our workmen's compensation statutes." 
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Rosenfield in his book, Liability for School Accidents 
(83, p. vii), published in 1940, divided the contents of his 
book on liability into the following headings: 
1. Negligence in the law 
2. School board liability 
3, Personal liability of school board members and 
officials 
4. Personal liability of teachers, principals , and 
superintendents 
5. Accidents in and about the school plant 
6. Gymnasium, playground, and athletic activities 
7. The classroom 
8. Transportation 
9. Health and medical services 
10. Cafeterias and school stores 
11. Off-school activities 
12. School safety patrols 
13. Non-school use of school buildings 
Rosenfield at the time of his writing was Secretary to 
the Commissioner of the Board of Education of New York City 
and an instructor in school law in the School of Education 
at New York University and a member of the New York Bar. He 
concluded with the following (83, p. 126): 
"There seems to be a growing realization that the general 
rule now being followed in approximately forty-five 
states in the United States is merely an antiquarian 
remnant of a barbaric system. Statutory deviations from 
the rule seem to be localized only in a few areas of 
the large field of tort liability for schools. Judicial 
deviations from the common-law rule, when analyzed, 
seem inadequate to cope with the generalized problem at 
hand. Although some states have had the judicial 
courage to depart from the rule of governmental 
immunity without statutory enactment, no thorough­
going, clear-cut, and decisive judicial interpretation 
can be expected which will make a complete departure 
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from the basic common-law rule." 
Madeline Remmelein's School Law was published in 1950. 
At the time Miss Remmelein was Assistant Director of the 
Research Division of the National Education Association and a 
lecturer in school law at George Washington University. She 
devoted several chapters to liability in general and three 
specifically to pupil injuries (75, p. xv): 
"lo Teacher liability for pupil injury 
2. Pupil injuries 
3. Transportation." 
In regard to the present status of tort liability for 
school districts, she wrote (75, p. 255-256); 
"...there does seem to be a theoretical trend toward 
the abolition or modification of the theory of non­
liability. A number of courts opinions and legal 
authorities in their treaties have admitted the 
injustice of the common-law immunity. Yet, as 
mentioned by the Illinois court above, there are no 
practical reasons why the development of legislation 
imposing liability has been slow, and outside of one 
or two states, the lag of legal theory exemplified by 
judicial decisions has impeded the effectiveness of 
what little legislation has been attempted." 
In 1955 Newton Edwards revised his classic textbook, 
The Courts and the Public Schools. from its earlier printing 
in 1933. The chapters in his book which were of importance 
to this study were entitled (18, p. xi-xv): 
"1. The School and the State 
2. School districts and municipalities 
3. Tort liability of school districts 
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4. Personal liability of school officers 
5. Transportation of pupils to and from school." 
In his summary on tort liability of school districts 
Edwards wrote (18, p. 41): 
"The doctrine of nonliability for tort which is appli­
cable to any agency of the state in the performance 
of a governmental function has been subjected to 
criticism as being illogical and unjust. A number 
of courts have expressed dissatisfaction with it on 
the grounds of social policy. But it is a long-and 
well-established principle, and the courts take the 
position that if it is to be changed, the legislature 
should do it." 
The Law and the School Bus ine s s Manager was published in 
1957 with Lee 0. Garber as editor. The purpose of this book 
was to delineate or point out some of the important legal 
pitfalls that can trap the unwary in the field of school 
business administration, and to suggest legal principles to 
guide the school business manager in making sound decisions 
concerning the problems that arise in these areas. 
Each unit of the book was written by a noted author in 
school law. The following areas were of interest to this 
study (27, p. 215-216); 
"1. School district status, organization, and control 
2. Pupil transportation 
3. Tort liability of school districts, boards, and 
employees." 
Madeline Remmelein wrote the chapter on tort liability. 
This was just five years after her textbook on school law. 
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She listed the status of the states in regard to liability 
where it for tort had remained the same, but she concluded 
with (27, p. 195): 
"The fact remains that an individual is legally responsi­
ble for his own negligence. It is also true that many 
school employees are judgment proof, that is, are not 
financially able to pay judgments assessed against them, 
while money payable by an insurance carrier impresses 
the injured as an impersonal and inexhaustible supply. 
Perhaps the answer is for school employees individually 
or collectively to carry liability insurance protection 
and thus turn the eyes of the injured away from the 
uncertainty of recovery through a school district. 
Perhaps the answer is for school districts to save 
harmless their employees and to pay their judgments 
out of insurance, the premiums of which are paid out 
of school funds. 
No one knows the answer that the future will bring. 
At present, the law is in a state of confusion, 
possibly because it is in a transitory stage. What­
ever develops, compensating the injured seems more 
important than the source from which the payment is 
made. In this day and age, tort immunity of 
governmental units and judgment-proof governmental 
employees are an anachronism. Yet these are the 
prevailing conditions today." 
The revised edition of the Law and Public Education by 
Robert Hamilton and Paul Mort was published in 1959 (32, p. 
xiii-xiv). The original text was published in 1941. 
Hamilton was Dean of the Law School at the University of 
Wyoming, and Mort was Professor of Education at Teachers 
College, Columbia University. One chapter of this textbook 
dealt with the liability of school districts, officers, and 
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employees. The first part of the chapter, which was impor­
tant to this study, was divided into the following categories: 
"1. In tort 
2. The doctrine of non-liability 
3. Exceptions of the doctrine of non-liability 
4. The New York Rule 
5. Liability under the "safe place" statutes 
6. The California Rule 
7. The Washington Rule 
8. Statutory modifications of the immunity rule 
9. Insurance against district liability 
10. Personal liability of district officials for torts 
11. Liability of teachers in tort." 
The authors confirm the works of others that the rule is 
well-established that school districts are not liable for the 
negligence of their officers, agents, or servants while 
acting in a governmental capacity, in the absence of a 
statute expressly imposing such liability; that the immunity 
from liability is based on the theory that the state is 
sovereign and cannot be sued without its consent; that school 
districts are instrumentalities of the state through which 
the state carries out its constitutional mandate to provide 
for a system of education and therefore falls within the 
category of state agencies immune from liability for torts 
committed while engaged in carrying out their governmental 
function. 
Hamilton and Mort contest the various applications that 
the courts have used in upholding the sovereignty, such as: 
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the master is liable for the acts of his servant is not 
applicable, and funds raised for school purposes may not be 
legally diverted to the payment of tort claims against the 
district. In regard to these positions which the courts have 
used, they state (32, p. 280); 
"The soundness of the reasoning in all cases may well 
be questioned. There is nothing inherent in the 
nature of municipal or quasi-municipal corporations 
which prevents the operation of the rule which holds 
the master liable for the acts of his servants while 
acting within the scope of his authority. The argu­
ment that there is no liability because the law does 
not provide means for raising funds to pay judgments 
as they are obtained is not sound. The fact that a 
judgment may not be satisfied is not a legal basis 
for non-liability. The courts taking this view have 
apparently considered it useless to render judgments 
against districts since they cannot be satisfied. 
The same may be said against any insolvent judgment 
debtor, but no case has been found in which the 
insolvency of a defendant has been stated as ground 
upon which judgment was rendered in his favor. 
Furthermore, it may be that failure to make legal 
provision for funds from which judgment may be 
satisfied is the result of non-liability rather than 
the basis of it." 
Another outstanding textbook in school law, School Law 
for Teachers, was edited by Chester Nolte and John Linn in 
1963. Nolte was Associate Professor of Education at Denver 
University and Linn was Assistant Dean of the Law School at 
the same institution. The authors devoted three chapters in 
their book to areas which are important to this study (69, 
p. xi, xiii): 
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"1, Legal foundations of the American education system 
2. Teacher liability for pupil injury 
3. The student teacher in legal theory." 
Their chapter on teacher liability was divided into the 
areas of torts; tort liability of public school districts, 
liability of school employees, negligence, teachers liability 
for inadequate supervision, defense against the charge of 
negligence, student assumption of risk, contributory negli­
gence, liability waivers, school safety patrols, field trips, 
errands, transportation in privately owned cars, medical 
treatment of pupils, avoidance of tort liability, and "save 
harmless" legislation. 
These authors concur with the previous writers as to 
the legal status of the school district in regard to the 
doctrine of immunity. They point out that very few legis­
latures have attempted to abrogate the common-law immunity 
of local school boards, and only New York, Washington, 
California, Illinois, and, to a limited extent. North Carolina 
and New Jersey, have provided by law for a waiver of 
sovereign immunity. In these states, school districts may 
be held liable under certain conditions for negligence of 
their officers and employees (69, p. 242). 
Thus in the span of thirteen years the theoretical trend 
predicted by Remmelein in 1950 has become a reality. 
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Nolte and Linn indicated a further trend, notably in 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, for the courts to 
denounce the theory of sovereign immunity and predicted that 
the trend to hold school districts liable for their torts 
would in all likelihood continue (69, p. 243). 
They stated that there were two arguments advanced for 
the support of non-liability of school districts for their 
torts. The first argument rests on the concept that schools 
perform a governmental function, that is, the education of 
children, and hence are not liable because as involuntary 
agents of the state, they perform a service imposed upon them 
by law. They state the validity of this argument has been 
seriously questioned because (69, p. 244): 
"Schools today are big business. Many of the functions 
which schools perform are not purely governmental in 
nature, nor do they relate directly to educational 
pursuits. Large spectator gatherings, such as ath­
letic events sponsored by the schools, for which an 
admission fee is charged, can hardly be considered 
"governmental functions." Injuries incurred by spec­
tators under these conditions should be directly 
answerable in damages by the schools, critics of this 
argument maintain. The injured party should not be 
made to suffer loss on the ground that the schools 
are performing a purely governmental activity. 
In the majority of states in which the common-law rule 
of non-liability of school districts has not been 
abrogated by the legislature, school districts are not 
held liable for injuries caused by negligence of 
their officers and employees if they are engaged in a 
governmental function but may be held liable if they 
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engage in a proprietary function and injury results. 
The problem before the courts in these cases centers 
on the distinction between governmental and proprietary 
functions. The distinction must be found in the 
factual situation and it is no simple matter in each 
case to determine whether the board engaged in a 
governmental (educational) function or a proprietary 
(non-educational) function." 
The second argument supporting district immunity is the 
trust fund theory, which is based on the contention that 
school districts have no monies out of which to pay damages. 
The concept being that the property which the schools possess 
is held in trust by local boards of education to be used 
solely for educational purposes. As stated by Nolte and Linn 
(69, p. 245): 
"School boards have no power to raise money for the 
payment of judgments against them unless permitted to 
do so by the legislature. Furthermore, according to 
this argument, the payment of judgments arising from 
tort actions would be an illegal diversion of public 
funds, and could conceivably bankrupt the school 
district and greatly hamper the educational program. 
For reasons of convenience, therefore, it is better 
to invoke the doctrine of immunity and avoid the 
risks of illegal diversion of funds and bankruptcy 
of the district." 
In challenging this theory, the critics maintain that 
no person should be made to bear the burden of injuries 
arising out of the tortious conduct of the school district on 
the pretext that there are no funds available from which to 
pay damages. The critics point out that there is liability 
» 
34 
insurance available to guarantee that the educational program 
of the school district will not be jeopardized (68, p. 42). 
A survey of the related literature would not be complete 
without mention of the many articles appearing in such pro­
fessional journals as the American School Board Journal, 
Nations Schools, School Management, Research Bulletins of 
the National Education Association and many others. The 
writer searched the Education Index under the subheading 
Liability for all articles referring to the subject of 
personal injury. Twenty-five articles on this subject were 
found. Most of these articles were written by authors 
previously cited and were digest of larger works or recent 
changes of the immunity doctrine in certain states. 
In 1958 a joint article which appeared in the School 
Board Journal was presented by two well-known authors in the 
field of school law. Edmund Reutter wrote on tort liability 
and the schools and E. C. Bolemeir wrote on the tort lia­
bility of school personnel. 
Reutter in his article devoted space to the doc.trine of 
respondeat superior. the basis for governmental tort 
immunity, modifications of the doctrine, the "safe place" 
statute and cases of nuisance. He concluded his article by 
stating that significant cracks are appearing (84, p. 30): 
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"This writer believes that some significant cracks are 
appearing....Also, a careful analysis of judicial 
opinions in applicable cases had indicated to the 
writer increasing reluctance of the courts through the 
years simply to invoke the immunity doctrine to dis­
pose of cases involving injury on school premises, 
where there is evidence of negligence on the part of 
school authorities. This reluctance is noted to some 
extent in the final judgments but it is more apparent 
in the opinions supporting the judgments and in the 
dissenting opinions filed. 
It is in the American tradition to discard doctrines 
as they become inappropriate to advancing civilization. 
Of the reasons cited earlier in this paper which pur­
port to justify the doctrine of school district 
immunity from tort liability, only that related to 
funds for payment of damages has any practical sig­
nificance today. But, with the advent of insurance, 
and with the substantially changed and changing 
governmental social policy, this reasoning is at best 
an extremely shaky support for the doctrine of such 
profound import." 
Bolemeir in his article brought out that the modern 
school program reveals that more and more activities are 
being conducted in schools and away from the school which 
jeopardize the safety of pupils. Therefore (7, p. 30): 
"The legal liability of school personnel for their 
tortious acts is a matter of growing concern. 
Especially is this true for acts of negligence 
which result in injuries to pupils and others." 
He divided this article into the following areas; 
increase of hazards, allocation of liability--school dis-
tricts--school administrators—bus drivers, meaning of 
negligence, responsibility following injury, avoidance of 
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liability, and contributory versus comparative negligence. 
Bolemeir contended there are more liability suits for 
damages resulting from pupil injury brought personally 
against the teacher than others of the professional staff. 
The reason for this obviously is because teachers constitute 
the greatest number on the professional staff and because 
they are in more direct contact with the pupils (7, p, 30). 
Bolemeir concluded with a customary warning to adminis­
trators that they should be alert at all times for unsafe 
activities and conditions. A yearly safety inspection by the 
safety engineers of the liability insurance company is a 
recommended procedure. Periodic inspections by the building 
principal and the head custodian will detect dangerous condi­
tions before catastrophe strikes. 
When an unsafe or dangerous condition is discovered, 
maximum effort should be made to correct this as soon as 
possible. If the condition is critical, evacuation and the 
closing of school would be indicated. The maintenance of 
buildings, grounds, and equipment in a dangerous or defective 
condition is a situation which can be remedied more readily 
than some other conditions. 
Schools have a duty to adequately supervise their 
students. Of course, what is adequate supervision is a 
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relative question, depending upon the time, place, and cir-
cums tances. 
The Research Division of the National Education Associa­
tion publishes several pamphlets each year in regard to school 
law. One of these Research Bulletins, published in 1958, 
titled, Plaintiffs and Defendants (64, p. 58), in the section 
on pupil injuries, reported that cases dealing with negli­
gence on the part of teachers, resulting in pupil injury have 
increased. These are the reasons given for this increase: 
"1) Parents of school pupils have become more conscious 
of the possibility of obtaining damages from school 
personnel who, with increased salaries are more 
able to pay damages today than a few years ago. 
2) The expanded school program places pupils in a more 
varied environment which injuries may occur in. 
3) Several states have enacted legislation which pro­
vides for the payment of judgments out of school 
funds, and parents are led to believe that the 
resevoir is bottomless. 
4) The governmental immunity of school districts in 
almost all states has become more widely known, 
and with this knowledge parents are less likely in 
these states to initiate a tort action that is 
almost sure to fail. Hence, they turn for redress 
to the allegedly negligent school employees instead 
of the school board." 
There were a total of 382 such cases from 1942 through 
1957 involving bus drivers, athletic coaches, principals, and 
superintendents as well as classroom teachers. 
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Another publication of this division is titled, The 
Pupil's Day in Court (65). This is an annual compiliation of 
cases relative to school law. Of the twenty-six cases re­
ported in the year of 1961, pupil injuries gave rise to 
twenty-two of these actions. Fourteen cases were from New 
York. 
The division also publishes annually The Teacher's Day 
in Court (66). This report contains digests of yearly court 
cases published in the National Reporter System and litigants 
in these cases are usually teachers or other professional 
school personnel. Madeline Remmelein is the current legal 
contributor. The publication is divided into ten topic areas 
and the area of interest to this writer was the topic on 
pupil injuries. 
Twenty-four cases were reported in these pamphlets from 
1959 through 1963 on pupil injuries. Thirteen of these cases 
were based on suits of negligence. This would tend to affirm 
earlier statements that the greatest amount of litigation 
arises in the area of negligence. 
Summary 
In summary, school law authorities in the past twenty-
five years have: 
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1. Attacked the doctrine of tort immunity because of 
its social implications, the increased business 
aspects of public education, and greater risks. 
2. Given a historical explanation of origin of the 
doctrine. 
3. Traced the modifications of the original doctrine 
such as, the "safe harmless" statutes of New York. 
4. Cited leading cases in states to demonstrate the 
need for modification. 
5. Developed a definition of negligence, that is, a 
means of determining guilt and the basis of litiga­
tion. 
6. Made a plea for closer administrative supervision. 
7. Concluded with a strong recommendation for abroga­
tion, by legislation, of the doctrine, and 
immediate provision for a required liability 
insurance and a limit on the amount of the claim. 
Recent Studies 
Searching the literature for similar investigation was 
fruitless. However, a number of studies were found, which in 
some manner related to the problem at hand. The bulk of the 
studies dealt with the larger area of immunity for the United 
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States as a whole, or for several selected states based on 
court cases and statutory enactments. In some dissertations 
a chapter or a section was devoted to the modification of the 
immunity doctrine in California, Minnesota, Oregon, Washing­
ton, and Illinois. The same can be said for the authors of 
the textbooks cited in the previous section. 
Martin (51) in 1962 at Duke University with the super­
vision of E, Co Bolemeir analyzed court decisions affecting 
the tort liability of school districts from 1860 through 
1961. The purpose of his study was to discover and identify 
the developments in court decisions which revealed trends in 
the tort liability of school districts in the United States. 
In analyzing the status of school district tort liability 
by states in selected years Martin found that the immunity 
from liability once enjoyed by school districts had decreased 
markedly since 1930. Martin found, via case briefings, that 
the courts of twenty-three of the thirty states in which the 
litigation on the question had occurred adhered strictly to 
the non-liability rule; and, by the end of 1961, the courts 
of twenty-one states still adhered strictly to the non­
liability rule, but in fifteen states school districts could 
be held liable under certain circumstances; and in five 
states the immunity of school districts had been virtually 
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removed altogether. 
It is important to note that Martin's findings in his 
analysis of the development of court decisions studied 
indicate that the dominance of the principle that school 
districts are immune from liability has recently entered a 
period of decline, and if this trend continues to gather 
strength, school districts in a majority of the states will 
soon be subject to some extent to the law of torts which 
governs all private corporations and individuals. 
A similar study was conducted by Fisher (23) at the 
University of Oklahoma in 1963. Fisher attempted to determine 
the extent which patterns of court decisions and statutory 
enactments were changing from legal immunity of schools, and 
to see what implications these patterns had for the Oklahoma 
Public Schools in relation to bodily injury. 
Fisher studied court cases and statutory enactments in 
relation to bodily injury in the states of Arizona, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. In addition, he secured state­
ments from the Attorney Generals of each of the selected 
states to secure the current thinking of this judicial group 
about school liability. 
He concluded the following: (1) many school officials 
and employees are unaware of the liability dangers that exist 
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in various school activities of our schools; (2) school 
officials and employees may need protection from liability 
action which can be brought against them, arising from the 
scope of their employment; (3) school officials and employees 
are never immune from suit for financial loss due to injury 
arising from any judgment or claim by reason of negligence; 
(4) the permissive insurance law for transportation should be 
replaced with a compulsory insurance law; and, (5) school 
officials and employees should be alert to the greater number 
of injuries and deaths occurring in athletic programs. 
It was Fisher's recommendation from his research that a 
sensible protective program for physical injury should be pro­
vided in the four states considered in his study. 
The earlier stated tentative conclusions, which were 
supported by the remarks of the jurors, suggested the follow­
ing as a legislative program for the Oklahoma Schools. This 
program might significantly clarify the legal responsibility 
for the public schools, school board members, and employees. 
Fisher made five proposals and these are listed in a 
condensed form. 
1. The common-law rules of exemption be abrogated. 
2. Every school district receiving some form of state 
aid, be required to qualify for this aid by carrying compre­
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hensive liability insurance covering the districts, agents, 
and school employees within reasonable limits to be deter­
mined either by the Legislature or the State Department of 
Public Instruction. 
3. This cost be included in computing the cost of the 
minimum program in determining the amount of state aid which 
any school would receive, 
4. That all schools be required to carry hospitaliza­
tion and medical insurance coverage, covering injuries to 
children while engaged in school activities for which there 
is no legal liability against some other person. 
5. That serious consideration be given to a study by 
the Legislature, based on the experience of the State 
Insurance Fund and other similar agencies, on handling both 
liability insurance and hospital and medical insurance 
through some state agency to reduce to a minimum the cost of 
the liability insurance coverage. 
In 1963 Wood (98) at Michigan State University studied 
the tort liability in Michigan school districts. The purpose 
of his study was to identify and examine problems of school 
operation relating to school districts and/or school person­
nel and to determine the effect present liability laws have 
on school policies, practices, and programs in Michigan school 
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districts. 
Wood used a unique approach for the study. An interview 
schedule was designed around three fictitious situations to 
allow interviewees free expression on realistic problems and 
to insure uniform consistent deliberation of certain aspects 
of the liability of school districts and school personnel. 
Appointed school administrative staff members were inter­
viewed using essentially a case study approach. The data 
were stratified by school size and the school official's 
perception of school liability. 
He concluded that Michigan public school administrators 
take an apprehensive view toward possible and potential 
school liability hazards under existing law. General 
liability insurance-is purchased by approximately three 
fourths of the Michigan school districts. School officials 
appear to lean heavily on the advice of insurance agents and 
the expectation that insurance affords sufficient protection. 
Insurance appears to be over-rated by school officials as a 
means of protection to the injured and as a device for pro­
tecting the teachers and other employees from possible 
liability. Liability has not generally been the basis for 
school policies, rules and regulations, and operating pro­
cedures in Michigan school districts. 
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Wood made several recommendations that would agree with 
Fisher and would implement the reasons for the need of this 
study in Iowa. 
It should be the duty of the legislature to clarify the 
confusing status of school liability; to pass legislation 
abrogating governmental liability, but giving protection to 
teachers from financial loss due to negligence under the 
save-harmless statutes; to grant school districts the 
authority to purchase liability insurance with the clarifica­
tion and definition of school liability; and, to impose 
strict liability as opposed to liability with "fault" as a 
condition insofar as liability relates to the operation of 
public schools. 
School officials, officers, agents, and employees should 
acquire a sound knowledge of their state's school tort 
liability laws. The teacher preparation institutions should 
include in their appropriate education courses a consistent 
concept of school district and personal liability. The local 
schools should make a periodic review of practices to elimi­
nate activities and practices which are dangerous, either 
inherently or in the manner in which they are performed. 
Finally, a handbook should be prepared for the use of 
school administrators and school personnel. This booklet 
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should summarize and review legal principles, statutes, and 
court decisions bearing on tort liability of school districts 
and liability of school personnel. 
In regard to this last point it is worth mentioning that 
just such a practice is being used in Estes Park, Colorado. 
In 1964 the school law and its significance for the teacher 
became the core of an in-service improvement undertaking. 
According to the author (20, p, 39); 
"The exploration of this topic by the staff seemed to 
have results beyond the expected increased knowledge 
of legal aspects of education. Better teaching, a 
more harmonious school-community feeling, and 
improved staff morale seemed to come from the dis­
cussions of teachers and administrators. 
Commonly, the responsibility for legal problems of 
the school has been assigned to administrators. Many 
states require formal training in the legal aspects 
of the public school as a prerequisite for certifica­
tion of superintendents and principals; few states as 
yet impose a similar requirement upon classroom 
teachers." 
Hartman (35) in 1964 at the University of Illinois 
analyzed the means and the rationale of the movement toward 
relaxation of the immunity principle. He stated that the 
greatest number of abrogations of immunity have been in the 
fields of school transportation and workmen's compensation, 
and that these two areas have received much attention from 
the judicial and legislative authorities. 
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His study was based on a review of the court cases and 
statutory enactments in the United States. He disclosed that 
there was a slight movement away from the traditional 
immunity. Three states, California, Illinois, and New York 
have been the leaders in the complete abrogation of immunity. 
Other states have developed specialized laws for granting 
recovery in limited areas. Kentucky, Tennessee, and Oregon 
allow recovery to the amount of liability insurance carried. 
School districts in the states of Washington were liable 
except for injuries occurring in certain specified locations. 
A few states attempted the division of the school's functions 
into governmental and proprietary categories. These findings 
would concur with the findings of Fisher and Martin. 
Hartman concluded that it does not take much foresight 
to see that school districts and tort liability cases will be 
a fertile field for an ever-increasing amount of litigation 
and statutory concern. The immunity doctrine originated in 
times which were very dissimilar to the present. It was 
based originally on the divine right of kings and the princi­
ple that "the king could do no wrong." How this reasoning 
applied in the United States is a mystery to American juris­
prudence. From the concept of the "king could do no wrong" 
the sovereign immunity of the state and of the school district 
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grew like "Topsy!' Many reasons are given, but the most cog­
nent are the protection of the public funds and the laws of 
confidence. At the time of his writing, the vast majority 
of the states extend the protection of immunity to school 
districts for tort liability, but the trend toward the 
modifications of immunity will continue and grow in strength. 
It is important to note that Hartman pointed out that 
school districts and personnel will become the target for 
ever-increasing accounts of litigation for tort liability. 
In the recommendations the emphasis was on the development of 
guide lines which would protect, limit, or mitigate the 
charges against the defendant. 
Review of Iowa Literature 
No general appraisal or survey of the Iowa Public School 
Districts in relationship to tort immunity has been done 
since Abels' work when he was Assistant Attorney General of 
Iowa in 1960 (1). Abels wrote an opinion on Iowa School 
Districts in relationship to tort immunity in the state 
education association's monthly journal and concluded that 
on the basis of Iowa cases what happened in Illinois is not 
likely to find immediate repetition in Iowa. The employees 
of a school district may be held liable for damage resulting 
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from their own personal negligence, but the district remains 
immune. Although the possibility exists that "it can happen 
here," a school district can protect itself against the 
eventuality by providing for an adequate insurance program 
for its employees. 
In 1964 an editorial in the Des Moines Tribune, following 
the Iowa Supreme Court decision on the Bover case, concluded 
that the majority opinion makes no attempt to defend govern­
mental immunity. The disagreement of the court in this case 
is solely on the question of how it should be eliminated, 
rather than on the soundness of the doctrine. 
"Iowa legislators find this opinion a clear invitation 
to take steps, in the interests of justice and fair­
ness, to provide lowans who suffer injury in the 
hands of government with the means for obtaining a 
—just hearing and settlement" (17, p. 6). 
Satterfield had one small unit in his study on the 
status of Iowa School Districts. He stated (86, p. 62): 
"Some writers (71, p. 363) on the subject have created 
the impression that public school employees in the 
State of Iowa enjoy the same privilege of immunity 
from liability for tort as their employer, the school 
district. This is most emphatically not so. A single 
decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in 1933 gave rise 
to that impression (37). 
A child named Hibbs was injured when he fell or was 
thrown from a school bus in which he was being trans­
ported from school to home. Action was brought 
against the school district and the bus driver. In 
deciding in favor of the school district and the bus 
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driver the court reasoned, 'exemption of school 
districts from liability for damages, resulting 
from negligence in performance of governmental 
functions, applies to school officers and employees 
thereof.' Such an opinion expressed by a court was 
unusual in the United States and it was promptly 
repudiated in succeeding decisions by the same 
court." 
The Status of General Liability at Present 
The tendency of the courts to perpetuate the common-law 
rule of governmental immunity has over the years been the 
dominant theme in decisions involving the tort liability of 
school districts. By virtue of this rule, many courts have 
repeatedly held that school districts, as agents of the 
state, engaged in the governmental functions of the executing 
the state's policy in education, are not liable for the torts 
of their officers, agents and employees. 
The state's sovereign immunity from liability in tort 
was first extended to a state subdivision in Russell v. Men 
of Devon (75, p. 243), an English case decided in 1788. At 
the time the idea of municipality as a corporate entity was 
in a nebulous state and the suit was in effect against the 
lawful inhabitants of an entire country. The purpose of the 
action was "to recover" damages for injury done to the wagon 
of the plaintiffs in consequence of a bridge being out of 
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repair. The major factors which led the King's Bench Divi­
sion to hold that the county could not be liable for negli­
gence were (1) the fact that no corporate funds existed out 
of which damages could be paid, (2) the lack of precedent of 
"such an action having been before attempted", and (3) the 
fear that an "infinity of actions" would result if the judg­
ment against the country were allowed. 
The courts in the United States assimilated into American 
law the principles derived from the Russell case and the line 
of English decisions which followed it. According to 
Remmelein (75, p. 195): 
"In the absence of statute, tort liability rests on 
common-law principles. Common law is the law that 
was in force in England at the time the United 
States was formed. Common-law principles remain 
the law in the United States unless changed for a 
particular state by its state legislature," 
Remmelein states the corporate liability of a school 
district depends upon whether or not (75, p. 194): 
"1. The statutes are silent 
2. Existing state statutes preserve the district's 
governmental immunity 
3. Existing state statutes abrogate the district's 
governmental immunity 
4. Existing state statutes impose liability." 
Robert Schaerer, writing in the American School Board 
Journal. summarized liability and liability insurance for 
schools up to 1964. He listed the school district liability 
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by states and divided it into three main categories as 
follows (87, p. 5-7): 
"General liability 
Immunity waived. Nine states have either directly 
or indirectly by state legislation or by court deci­
sions, completely waived or partially waived their 
governmental immunity of school districts. New York 
waived its immunity first by court decision in 1907 
and later by statute in 1923. Illinois first waived 
its immunity by court decision in 1959 and later by 
statute in 1959. Wisconsin waived its immunity by 
court decision in 1962. Minnesota court gave due 
notice that after the adjournment of the 1963 legis­
lature, it will no longer recognize governmental 
immunity. New Jersey in 1938 and Connecticut in 
1958 have indirectly waived their immunity by "save 
harmless" statutes. Washington in 1859 created 
limited liability for school districts by statute 
by eliminating liability for injuries which occurred 
in athletic, fieldhouse, playground, park, or 
industrial arts activities. 
Immunity vigorousIv maintained. Three states, 
Alabama, Arkansas, and West Virginia, whose consti­
tutions have in them provisions expressly prohibiting 
suits against the state or arms of state have 
vigorously maintained their immunity throughout the 
years. 
Compromise. Thirty-eight states have immunity 
maintained but purchase of liability insurance is 
permitted. Eighteen state constitutions authorize 
suits in one form or another against governmental 
bodies. They are Arizona, Delaware, Florida, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Wyoming. In other states, the permission to sue 
governmental bodies is so vaguely stated as to require 
court interpretation. In general it is concluded that 
all the other states fall into this category. In 
summary, it states that the courts uphold governmental 
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immunity of the school district, but by statute or 
other interpretation, schools have the right to 
insure. As long as the court cases are not taken 
through the appellate and supreme courts, lower 
courts have allowed judgments against the school 
district where the school district in its defense 
did not bring forth the principle of governmental 
immunity. The courts of Kentucky in 1942, Oregon 
in 1961, and Tennessee in 1933, 1936, and 1945, 
have deviated from this above rule and have 
stated that the purchase of insurance waives 
amount of the insurance but over this face amount 
of insurance carried the school district is 
immune. 
Transportation liability 
Immunity waived. Six states by special statutes 
have either totally or partially waived governmental 
immunity of school districts in the field of school 
bus transportation. They are Minnesota in 1938, 
Idaho in 1947, Oklahoma in 1951, Alabama in 1942, 
North Carolina and Mississippi in 1952. The latter 
three have not waived their immunity but by 
statutes have set up special state boards to hear 
claims and make payments out of certain desig­
nated funds if so-called negligence or liability 
does exist. 
Immunity vigorously maintained. Four states are 
forbidden by court decisions, attorney general 
opinions, or other rulings from insuring school 
buses against liability. They are South Dakota, 
Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi. The latter two 
though have set up special state boards to hear 
such claims and funds from which to make payments 
of damage. 
Workmen's compensation or employer's liability 
The liability of school districts under Workmen's 
Compensation or employer's liability laws fall in 
three categories : 
1. Those states where Workmen's Compensation 
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laws are compulsory on the school districts and where 
the school district is liable by statute. They are 
Arizona, Colorado, California, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Georgia (in cities and towns), Illinois 
(only when engaged in extrahazardous work), Indiana, 
Iowa, Maine cities, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York (state 
employees only), North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Tennessee (state employees only), Utah, Virginia, 
Washington (for hazardous work only), Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming (for hazardous work only). 
2. Those states in which the Workmen's Compensa­
tion laws allow the school districts, by option, to 
elect coverage under a statutory act or to reject 
coverage. The states in which the school district 
may elect or reject the coverage of its employees and 
accept liability are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, (counties), Kansas, Kentucky, Maine (towns), 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
New York (cities of one million population or more), 
Rhode Island, Tennessee (county and municipal employ­
ees), Vermont, and West Virginia. 
3. School districts not liable are Arkansas, 
Mississippi, and Oklahoma. They stand alone as states 
where no teacher may receive the benefits of Workmen's 
Compensation. Mississippi does not have a Workmen's 
Compensation law. Oklahoma excludes school districts, 
and in Arkansas all public employees are refused 
coverage." 
Negligence 
Negligence is defined as any conduct that does not 
measure up to the standards established by law for the 
protection of others. Linn and Nolte define negligence as 
follows (69, p. 245): 
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"Negligence is defined as the omission to do something 
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations 
which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or 
the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent 
man would not do." 
According to Remmelein, negligence and carelessness are 
not synonyms, and negligence emerged as a separate tort in 
1825 (75, p. 204). Remmelein states that there are certain 
elements necessary for an action based on negligence (75, 
p. 204). 
"1. The duty to so act as to protect others from unneces­
sary risks 
2. The failure to so act 
3. The injury, of another, causing loss or damage, as 
the result of such failure." 
Remmelein clarifies the difference between negligence 
and a pure accident thusly (75, p. 203): 
"Throughout the discussion of governmental immunity and 
the abrogation thereof, negligence on someone's part 
has been assumed to have caused the injury. The 
reader must not gain the false impression that abroga­
tion of governmental immunity means that a school 
district is liable for damages regardless of the 
existence of nonexistence of negligence. When there 
has been no negligence, the injury is said to have 
been caused by pure accident. If there has been no 
negligence, liability attaches to an individual or to 
a public body which has no immunity. The question of 
governmental immunity or the liability of school 
districts arises only when the injury has been caused 
by negligence." 
In cases involving the possibility of negligence, the 
courts have generally sought to determine what a reasonable 
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and prudent man would have done under the circumstances, then 
apply this norm to the acts of the person alleged to have 
acted negligently. However, Remmelein points out that 
judges and juries differ as to what a reasonably prudent man 
would do in a given set of circumstances. Therefore, the 
facts of each case are important and are often the deter­
mining factors (75, p. 205). 
The prudent man 
If the duty is present, the actor is obligated in a 
manner so as not to cause any unreasonable risks to the other 
party. It is in this area where legal fiction of the rea­
sonable and prudent man reigns supreme. 
A case in point arose in a New York school. In a 
physical education class, the instructor permitted two husky 
boys untrained in the sport of boxing to fight through one 
round and part of another while he sat in the bleachers. 
One of the boys was fatally injured, and the parents brought 
suit for recovery of damages against the instructor. Said 
the court in holding that the instructor was negligent and 
personally liable for the injury (47): 
"It is the duty of the teacher to exercise reasonable 
care to prevent injuries. Pupils should be warned 
before being permitted to engage in dangerous and 
hazardous exercise. These young men should have been 
taught the principles of defense if indeed it was a 
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reasonable thing to permit a slugging match of the kind 
which the testimony shows this contest was. The testi­
mony indicates that the teacher failed in his duties in 
this regard and that he was negligent, and the plaintiff 
is entitled to recovery." 
Foreseeabilitv or proximate cause 
Related to the prudent man is the other test for negli­
gence, and that is the test of foreseeability. In deciding 
whether or not a person has been negligent, the court will 
first examine the evidence for the foreseeability of the 
injury. Thus, when a reasonably prudent person could have 
foreseen the harmful consequences, he is negligent and his 
negligence becomes the proximate cause of the injury. He 
is, therefore, liable for the injury. 
Keesee, a 13-year old student in a New York City public 
junior high school, was injured in a game of line soccer 
played on the gymnasium floor as part of the physical educa­
tion program. She was, apparently, given no choice in the 
matter and had to participate in the game. 
The question before the court was on whom will liability 
rest when an inexperienced student is injured while partici-' 
pating in a game as part of the school's required physical 
education program, when the instructor changes the game rules 
from those appearing in the program syllabus. 
The court found the board of education was negligent in 
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permitting the game to be played under the circumstances 
portrayed. The reasoning of the court was (41); 
"That an injury would result to someone from the melee 
ensuing (when eight novices converged on the ball, at 
a run) was, if not inevitable, at least reasonably 
foreseeable. To permit such a large aggregation of 
novices to engage in such a dangerous sport evidenced 
a complete disregard by the teacher for the safety of 
her pupils...." 
Negligent supervision 
In response to compulsory attendance laws, parents have 
entrusted their children to the public schools for instruc­
tional purposes. The law does not take without giving some­
thing in return; the law anticipates that the children will 
be protected and their best interests looked after by those 
in charge. The law, however, does not guarantee that no 
child will not be injured while at school. Accidents will 
happen even when there is the teacher nearby and supervision 
is legally adequate. 
According to Nolte and Linn, legally adequate super­
vision has no clearcut legal definition. It is rationally a 
matter for the courts to decide, and the courts use the 
three-way test for negligence (69, p. 255). 
1. Was a duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant? 
2. Was there a breach of that duty? 
3. Was the breach of duty the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's misery? 
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When all three questions are in the affirmative, the 
courts will declare the existence of defendant's negligence. 
Some examples will serve to illustrate. In one of the 
New York City schools in 1963, groups of boys were placed on 
each side of the gymnasium and given certain corresponding 
numbers at random. When a number was called, two boys on 
opposite sides of the room would run to a ball in the center 
of the floor and attempt to kick it. Suit was brought 
against the board of education for negligent supervision 
(10). The boy whose number corresponded to that of the 
plaintiff had been taller and heavier. The result had been 
that the plaintiff sustained serious injury. 
The Court of Appeals of New York held that the circum­
stances showed such negligent supervision. Two judges 
dissented. They were of the opinion that the exercise was 
not dangerous and that the alleged mismatching of the two 
boys did not constitute negligence. It is important to 
observe that the over-matching charge involves some very 
close questions as to the adequacy of supervision. 
An opposite of this case was one decided by the Supreme 
Court of Colorado in 1963 which held that a teacher was not 
liable for injuries caused to a pupil when he was struck in 
the eye by a rock thrown by a fellow pupil. The teacher was 
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supervising the playground of an elementary school. It was 
alleged that the plaintiff was struck in the eye by a rock 
thrown by a fellow student and that the defendant teacher 
permitted the rock to be thrown. 
The court held that the district could not be held 
liable, even if the teacher had been negligent, because of 
the tort immunity doctrine in Colorado (13). The court 
further held that this was not sufficient to state a legal 
claim against the teacher. It declined to impose liability 
upon the teacher because "there was no allegation of direct 
participation in the alleged injury to the child." This 
failed to take into account the possibility that the teacher 
may have been negligent in not providing adequate super­
vision, but there was no such allegation in the complaint. 
However, the court quoted with approval from a New York 
decision having to do solely with the degree of supervision 
required. That decision was that (13): 
"There is no requirement that the teacher have under 
constant and unremitting scrutiny the precise spots 
wherein every phase of play activity is being pur­
sued; nor is there compulsion that general super­
vision be continuous and direct." 
Neither the school district nor school personnel are 
liable where supervision of areas is adequate and reasonable. 
Adequateness and reasonableness will continue to be legal 
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questions for the courts to decide. 
Contributory negligence 
In order to recover for a tort committed, the injured 
person must be free from "contributory negligence". That is, 
he himself must have used care in his conduct so that it was 
below the standard to which he should conform for his own 
protection. His conduct should not be such that, when com­
bined and concurring with the negligence of another, it 
contributes to the injury as a proximate cause. In effect, 
the negligence of one person cancels the negligence of the 
other person. 
Nolte and Linn define it this way (69, p. 255): 
"When the negligence of a student contributes to his own 
injury, he is precluded from recovery against the 
teacher unless the act took place in one of the few 
jurisdictions applying the comparative negligence 
doctrine. The cases involving contributory negligence 
of younger children are not held to the same high 
standards of conduct as are older children and adults. 
The teacher of younger children should exercise a 
greater than ordinary amount of care, since younger 
children are unpredictable in their actions." 
Obviously a minor cannot be expected to exercise the 
same degree of care as an adult. This fact is well-expressed 
in an opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah (40): 
"A child of eight years cannot, as matter of law, be held 
guilty of contributory negligence, and it is not pre­
sumed to conduct herself as an adult person under 
similar circumstances. 
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The degree of care required of a child must be graduated 
to its age, capacity, and experience, and might be 
measured by what ordinarily is expected of a child of 
like age and capacity under similar conditions, and if 
it acts as might reasonably be expected of such a child, 
it cannot be charged with contributory negligence." 
A twelve-year old boy was guilty of contributory negli­
gence if a recent New York case (88) when he was injured 
while playing on a fence in the school yard. 
The fence had a single horizontal pipe, two-and-a-half 
inches in diameter, attached about two feet above the ground 
to interspaced iron bars. There was no evidence that the 
fence was improperly constructed or maintained, or that it 
had been the cause of any prior injury to school children. 
It was not situated in the school playground area and 
obviously was not designed to serve an athletic or recreational 
purpose. There was no proof that the fence itself was 
inherently dangerous. 
The boy injured himself when attempting to walk along 
the rail. He slipped and fell, fracturing his ribs and rup­
turing his spleen. On other occasions he had fallen from the 
rail without injury. At the time of the accident, no 
teachers were present to supervise the area. It was upon 
this alleged breach of duty that the boy rested his charge 
against the school board. 
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School children had been forbidden by school authorities 
to walk on the rail. Frequently announcements to this effect 
had been made to the pupils by means of the public address 
system and the teachers had personally told pupils to keep 
off the fence. The court held that the board's duty to pro­
vide adequate supervision within the school yard was dis­
charged when the child was directed not to play on the fence. 
Constant surveillance of children to enforce a known rule was 
not required, according to the court, and the case was not 
the same as those in which boards had permitted obviously 
dangerous activities within the playground area. 
Furthermore, in the court's opinion, this boy was guilty 
of contributory negligence. Since he contributed to his own 
injury and for other reasons stated herein, the board was not 
held liable. 
Intervention of third parties 
Where original negligence is followed by an independent 
act of the third party resulting in direct injury, the 
original negligence may constitute "proximate cause" if it 
is known that the intervening act was likely to occur; 
otherwise, the chain of causation is broken by the inter­
vening act and the original negligence cannot be considered 
as "proximate cause". 
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Such intervention can best be illustrated by an instance 
where some high school juniors who were helping the custodian 
store equipment stole some chemicals from the store room. 
They gave the chemicals to a third boy who did not go to 
school. The third boy was seriously injured by an explosion 
of these chemicals. His parents unsuccessfully brought suit 
against the school district and the custodian. The court 
held that "the chain of causations" was broken when the 
chemicals were delivered by a third party (25), 
Respondeat superior 
This phrase is often used to indicate the responsibility 
of a principle for the acts of a servant or agent, or let the 
master pay for the faults of his servants. Reutter states it 
this way (84, p. 51); 
"v^Hien a worker in private employment is negligent in the 
course of his employment or in the intended further­
ance of his employer's business, the employer is 
liable to third parties thereby injured. This doctrine, 
known as respondeat superior. does not apply under 
common law to public employees whose employers are 
considered the people." 
Nolte and Linn have this to say about the doctrine (69, p. 
51): 
"The immunity from tort liability which school districts 
generally enjoy does not extend to the district's 
employees. The individual employee may be held liable 
for torts arising from his own negligence. Even though 
the district is not liable under the doctrine of 
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respondeat superior (by which the master must answer for 
the wrongs of his servant), each teacher, bus driver, 
custodian, principal, and superintendent is held 
accountable, either singly or severally, for injuries 
caused by his negligence. The injured party, failing 
to have a cause of action against the school district, 
may seek relief by instituting suit against the 
employee." 
Rosenfield put it this way (83, p. ?4): 
" o f  m o r e  r e c e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  i s  s o m e w h a t  l e s s  c u r r e n t  
than others; in the commission or negligent and careless 
acts the employees of the board or school district are 
not board or school-district agents in terms of agency 
laws, and that consequently the master (the board or 
school district) is not liable for the acts of the non-
servant (the employee.)" 
Edwards substantiates what has been said above with (18, p. 
3 9 8 ) :  
"School districts, in the absence of a statute making 
them liable, are not liable for injuries to pupils 
growing out of the negligence of employees. In such 
cases the rule of respondeat superior does not apply. 
Obviously, if a school district is not liable for 
negligent acts of its officers, it is not liable for 
the negligence of its employees. The principles 
applicable in the first case are equally applicable 
in the second case." 
Briefly stated, the doctrine of respondeat superior does 
not apply to school districts since they are arms of the 
state created for the sole purpose of the administration of 
the commonwealth's system of public education. 
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Liability in the Transportation of Pupils 
In a large number of school districts, perhaps the 
greatest proportion of school accidents occur in connection 
with the bus transportation system. Many pupils are daily 
transported. The rules of liability applicable to bus 
transportation are exactly the same in most respects as those 
applicable to any other proper activity of the school dis­
trict. 
The driver of the bus is not immune from liability by 
virtue of the fact that the school district is immune. This 
was illustrated in a North Carolina case in 1951 where a 
driver of a school bus contended that since the school dis­
trict was not liable for injuries growing from negligent 
acts of its officers, agents, and employees, he, as an 
employee of the district was also exempt from liability. The 
court denied such reasoning and stated (33): 
"Undoubtedly the county board of education, as an agency 
or instrumentality of the state, enjoys immunity to 
liability for injury or loss resulting from the negli­
gence of the driver of its school bus...but the driver 
of the school bus, who is a mere employee performing a 
mechanical task is personally liable for his own 
negligence." 
To implement the above statements Bolemeir presents the 
status of the school bus driver as follows (7, p. 31): 
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"Tort liability is applicable to nonprofessional school 
personnel who are entrusted with the care and protection 
of children just the same as it applies to teachers, 
principals, supervisors, and superintendents. School 
bus drivers especially are vulnerable to liability for 
negligence which causes pupil injury in the process of 
pupil transportation to and from school." 
Bolemeir states that the status of the school district 
in regard to pupil injuries from transportation accidents 
are as follows (27, p. 181): 
"In virtually every court case involving liability for 
personal injury accruing from the negligent act of an 
employee, the court rules out liability of the school 
district unless there is a specific statute indicating 
that the school district shall assume such liability." 
Degree of care to be exercised 
Since the purpose of the study is interested in the tort 
liability of school districts and not the employees or agents, 
specific cases will not be further cited as to negligence of 
the employees. However, the writer would like to mention 
some principles that are taken into consideration by the 
courts when these litigations do arise. 
Courts vary in regard to the degree of care required of 
drivers of vehicles transporting children. Though terminology 
differs, the weight of authority is divided between requiring 
the school bus driver to exercise due or ordinary care, and 
demanding that he use the highest or extra-ordinary care. 
Like any other person in our society, the driver must 
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refrain from being negligent. The rule of prudence and care 
governs the bus driver in all his relations with the pupils 
whom he transports to and from school. It governs the condi­
tion of the bus, the speed, the discipline of the pupils 
while on the bus, and the circumstances under which they are 
permitted to leave it. A bus driver will not escape liability 
by pleading that he did not foresee the precise injuries that 
the pupil sustained; he will be held liable if a reasonably 
circumspect person, under the circumstances, would have 
anticipated some injury. 
Though the standard of care required is referred to as 
ordinary or extraordinary care, the court in measuring that 
care often looks to age, intelligence, and experience of an 
injured person as the determining factor as to whether or not 
the bus driver is to be judged negligent. 
Bolemeir, writing on pupil transportation, had this to 
say (27, p. 185): 
"Much litigation concerning the liability of school bus 
drivers could be avoided if the statutory provisions 
were more carefully drafted and more rigidly adhered 
to. Every state now has some statute or statutes 
stipulating various requirements of the bus driver. 
These provisions vary from state to state. Persons 
responsible for the administration of the bus 
service should be familiar with the law of their 
respective states as it relates to the qualifica­
tions of bus drivers." 
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Briefly then, a school bus driver is liable for his own 
negligence. Although school districts as corporate entities 
may be exempted from liability injuries which may result 
from negligence in connection with transportation to or from 
school, the bus driver is held to be individually liable for 
the results of his own negligence, even though he is an 
employee of a district. Obviously, the school bus driver's 
only protection against suit is care and prudence. 
Modifications of the Doctrine and Recent 
Attacks on the Doctrine 
Since the doctrine of school district immunity is in the 
common-law, it can be abrogated or modified by statute or 
changed by judicial interpretations. It is possible to 
categorize the existing exception to the doctrine of non­
liability in tort of school districts into seven broad 
classifications, three involving legislation, and four 
involving court interpretations. 
Rosenfield explains it as follows (83, p. 24-25, 28-29, 
30-31, 37-38): 
"The general common-law rule states that a school dis­
trict is not liable for injuries unless it consents. 
Only the state can consent to suit against school 
districts. Some states have attempted to pass such 
statutes. One provision which might appropriately be 
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called a 'safe-place' statute...it provides that any 
public agency shall be liable in damages for injury 
resulting from the dangerous or defective condition 
of public property. 
Another interesting form of statute at present re­
stricted to New York and New Jersey is the so-called 
'save-harmless' statute which requires boards of 
education to indemnify teachers and others in their 
employ against financial loss resulting from judg­
ments arising out of accidents while on duty and 
acting within the scope of employment. 
Another judicial theory... escapes the governmental 
immunity of the common-law rule through the doctrine 
that a school district is liable if it creates or 
maintains a nuisance. In legal terminology, a 
nuisance consists in the existence or creation of 
a situation which by its very nature is likely to 
cause injury, harm or inconvenience to another. 
For example, if an owner so maintains his property 
that after every rain a large body of water which 
has been collected during the rain flows onto 
another's property, or if the chimney of his factory 
is so constructed that it continuously ejects smoke 
into another's window, he has maintained a nuisance. 
Another avenue of escape from the common-law doctrine 
of immunity proceeds from one of the problems 
inherent in municipal law in general, that is, from 
the distinction between governmental and proprietary 
functions. For instance, when a school board oper­
ates a playground it has almost universally held that 
in so doing it is operating under governmental 
function; but when a city operates a playground it is 
generally held to be a proprietary or private function. 
Those courts resorting to this distinction permit 
recovery for injuries incurred in performance of 
proprietary functions but refuse it for injuries 
occurring during the performance of governmental 
functions. Basically the theory goes back to the 
principle that 'a king can do no wrong.' Accord­
ingly, in the performance of proprietary functions 
there is no reason to establish immunity." 
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These same theories presented by Rosenfield were again 
presented by Remmelein (27, p. 195-201) in the textbook, The 
Law and the School Business Manager. 
Legislative Approach 
A few states have enacted legislation to modify the 
common-law principle of sovereign immunity and allow actions 
against the state and its subordinate agencies for tort. 
Unless there is some statute, however, the school district 
is not liable for injuries caused even by the negligence of 
its officers, the school board (63, p. 31), 
Abrogation 
One legislative approach, utilized in a few states, is 
to basically abrogate the doctrine. This has been done in 
California and there are no exceptions, except that claim for 
damages must be verified and presented in writing within 
ninety days after occurrence of the injury. In the state of 
Washington, the law on tort liability of school districts is 
different from that of any other state. Districts there are 
held liable for their torts with certain exceptions. The 
exceptions are accidents relating to playgrounds, athletic 
apparatus or appliance, and industrial arts equipment owned, 
operated, or maintained by such school district. Two recent 
cases in Washington help to explain this: 
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In 1963 the state supreme court considered whether a 
district was liable for an injury suffered by a teacher on 
the school premises (5). 
It appeared that on the evening of November 15, 1960, 
teacher drove his automobile to the school for a night 
function. It was a dark, rainy evening. He parked his car 
in approximately the same place a number of times during 
three previous years while attending night functions. The 
district was engaged in certain construction on the school 
property. For three or four days before the accident 
occurred, employees of the district had been removing large 
stones from the construction site. At least two of these 
stones were left on the edge of the pavement which extended 
to the wall in that area, which was not lighted. While 
returning to his car later in the evening, the teacher was 
injured when he stumbled and fell over these rocks. He con 
tended he did not see the rocks, but that by groping in the 
dark, he discovered what he determined to be a rock about 
eighteen inches high. There was evidence that the teacher, 
when being taken to the hospital, said that earlier that 
evening he had seen the rocks but had forgotten that they 
were there upon returning to his car. 
The case turned on whether there was contributory negl 
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gence by the teacher. It will be remembered that an injured 
person may not recover from another who is negligent, if the 
injured person's own negligence contributed to his injury. 
The question of contributory negligence is for the court or 
jury to decide. The court here said that there was suffi­
cient evidence of contributory negligence by the injured 
teacher to call for a jury determination of whether that 
negligence in fact contributed to his injury. 
A case was decided by the Supreme Court of Washington 
in 1964 (3) which is an example of the exception to complete 
abrogation in that state. The court held that a baseball 
thrown by a member of a high school team while warming up on 
a public playground was not an "athletic apparatus or 
appliance" within the statute, and the statute did not pre­
clude a spectator from suing the school district. The 
plaintiff was struck on the left side of his face and 
injured by a baseball thrown by a member of one of the high 
school teams of the district. He alleged that the school 
district had not exercised proper care in supervising the 
activity or conduct of the students relative to the game. 
In the court's opinion, the words "athletic apparatus 
or appliance" as used in the statute, have a reference to 
more or less permanently located equipment--such as swings, 
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slides, traveling rings, teeter boards, chinning bars, etc. 
The words have no application to anything as highly mobile as 
a baseball. 
Three of the nine judges dissented. The dissenting 
judges emphasized the word "relating" in the statute. In the 
opinion of the dissenting judges, athletic apparatus, appli­
ances, and industrial arts equipment are all things pertain­
ing to and relating to the activities of those engaged in 
athletics. 
The doctrine has been modified in North Carolina so that 
it affects tort claims against county and city administrators 
for injuries arising out of the operation of public school 
buses. Power to decide such claims is vested in the North 
Carolina Industrial Commission. If the commission awards 
damages against a local school district, the damages are to 
be paid by the state board of education. A maximum of ten 
thousand dollars per claim is set by law. 
At the time of this writing the school districts in the 
state of Illinois are liable for actions based upon tort. 
The Molitor decision, which reversed over sixty years of 
immunity, removed the judicial barrier to liability. Legis­
lation was passed shortly thereafter which limited liability 
recovery to $10,000, and deadlines were established, and 
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notice of claims procedure was set. 
Since the Molitor case has been cited by this writer on 
several occasions to date, it is worthwhile to make a careful 
survey of just what can happen when there is abrogation 
without limitation. 
On May 23, 1959, the Supreme Court of Illinois handed 
down the decision in the Molitor v. Kaneland case (56). In 
this historic and unprecedent case the highest court in the 
state established that the district could be held liable in 
tort for negligence. Eighteen school children were injured 
March 10, 1958, when a school bus operated by an agent of the 
school district hit a culvert and burned. The fact that this 
decision did not say anything about retroactivity of this 
ruling, much apprehension was created among school people. 
In a rehearing held in December, 1959, the court ruled that 
this decision with the exception of Thomas Molitor, applied 
only to future occurrences. In a later decision the court 
said that all of the students included in this particular bus 
accident may have the immunity of the school district abol­
ished (56). In the original complaint the district was 
charged with negligence through its agent and servant, the 
bus driver. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff, 
Thomas Molitor, received paramount injuries and sought 
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damages of $56,000. The record showed that the defendant 
carried liability insurance with limits of $20,000 for each 
person and $100,000 for each accident. However, in the 
complaint this was purposely omitted. The court considered 
many of the traditional and historical reasons for immunity. 
The court concluded (56): 
"We are of the opinion that none of the reasons advanced 
in support of school district immunity have any true 
validity today. Further, we believe that abolishing 
of such immunity may tend to decrease the frequency of 
school bus accidents by coupling the power of transpor­
tation of pupils with the responsibility of exercising 
care in the selection and supervision of bus drivers. 
We conclude that the rule of school district tort 
immunity is unjust, unsupported by any valid reason, 
and has no rightful place in modern society. 
For the reasons herein expressed, we accordingly hold 
that school districts are liable in tort for negligence 
of their agents and employees and all prior decisions 
to the contrary are hereby overruled." 
The case was remanded to the Circuit Court of Kane 
County to determine the negligence of the school district. 
Four of the Molitor children and two other children asked for 
damages of $1,527,000. The Kaneland School District has been 
sued by seventeen of the eighteen involved pupils for more 
than five million dollars. The verdict awarded a sum of 
$2,500,000. 
The General Assembly reacted quickly to this new and 
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somewhat alarming decision of the court. Two months later, 
on July 22, 1959, an act was approved which pertained to this 
subject (92). The Legislature of Illinois also appropriated 
$750,000 to assist the Kaneland District in paying the judg­
ment. 
Several cases have been heard in the courts concerning 
the effective date of the Molitor opinion. The court 
stressed the application of the Molitor ruling as to the 
effective date. 
In a later case Price v. York (74) in 1960 the court 
held that new rules of negligence had been created by the 
Molitor ruling. The school district operated a school bus 
which picked up the defendant, an eight-year-old child. The 
route was such that the child had to cross a state highway in 
order to board the bus. If the bus had been routed on a 
rural road which ran in front of the defendant's home, it 
would have eliminated the need to cross the highway. The 
plaintiff charged the district with negligence in not using 
the rural road thereby giving rise to the proximate cause. 
The case was appealed to the appellate court from the Circuit 
Court, Coles County. The court stated that in order to claim 
negligence there must be a duty, a failure to perform the 
duty, and injury resulting therefore. The court held that 
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the district did not owe a duty to the child to protect her 
while walking from her home to the point of pick up. Nor was 
there duty imposed upon the district to reroute the bus so 
that no child would need to cross the highway. It is apparent 
from this decision that negligence still must be proven in 
Illinois before liability attaches to the school district. 
Save harmless 
A second legislative approach is known as the "save 
harmless" law. Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and 
Wyoming have this on a local option basis only. 
This technique, which was developed recently, was the 
enactment of "save harmless" statutes. These statutes have 
indirectly made the boards of education liable for negli­
gence. By the enactment of this type of law the board of 
education assumes the liability of certain school employees 
while acting within the scope of their duty. 
Reutter explains the law as (84, p. 29): 
"Statutes known as 'save harmless' laws are found in a 
few states. They provide that the employee will be 
'saved' by the district from 'financial harm' result­
ing from judgments for damages against him arising 
from his negligence while discharging his duties. 
It should be emphasized that this type of statute 
does not directly touch the doctrine of immunity of 
school districts. However, teachers are protected 
against financial loss, and a practical means of 
recovery is made available to those who are injured 
through the negligence of school employees acting 
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within the scope of their employment." 
In Connecticut since 1957, it is mandatory that boards 
"save harmless" teachers who are liable for damages. Nolte 
and Linn have this to say about the Connecticut law (69, p. 
2 6 7 ) :  
"The principle underlying the Connecticut law is sound. 
The teacher who must pay damages for a single mistake 
in conduct may be saddled with a judgment for the re­
mainder of his professional life or be forced into 
bankruptcy proceedings. The growing complexity of the 
educational enterprise indicates that the number of 
pupil injury cases will doubtless increase. In the 
interests of school morals, boards will find it 
increasingly expedient to "save harmless" those who 
are "taking risks" in the classrooms throughout the 
land. State associations of school boards should 
therefore urge the enactment of mandatory save harm­
less legislation in their states. Teachers' associa­
tions can do no less." 
In 1937, New York enacted a "save harmless" law for 
school districts which included authorization to carry 
insurance (27, p. 199). According to Remmelein (27, p. 214), 
the New York Courts interpreted the"save harmless"laws as, in 
effect, imposing direct liability on the school board, saying 
that it was unnecessary to sue an employee and obtain a judg­
ment first and then seek settlement of the judgment from the 
school board. 
These statutes in New York in no way make the school 
district liable for the employee's negligence. Neither do 
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they exempt the employee from his financial loss. 
A pupil and his guardian sued a New York school dis­
trict (50) for injury caused by the negligence of teachers. 
Action was based on the statute "to 'save harmless' and pro­
tect all teachers..., from financial loss" for claims for 
injuries to pupils resulting from the negligence of teachers. 
The court held that, "The statute does not make school dis­
tricts liable for torts where no liability existed before, 
but merely provides that the district indemnify the teacher 
after she suffers loss by reason of injuring a pupil." 
Accordingly, action could not be maintained. 
Not only do "save harmless" laws usually pay the money 
damages awarded against those covered by such laws; they also 
frequently provide that the board of education is to furnish 
legal counsel and pay all expenses of defense of the accused. 
In 1955 Wyoming passed a permissive statute authorizing 
the school district to "save harmless" and protect teachers 
from civil liability. 
The total impact of the "save harmless" statutes upon 
the immunity of school districts has been negligible in two 
of the four states, while in New York it has been coupled 
with a more widespread move toward abrogation. 
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"Safe place" statute 
A third category of legislative action is the "safe 
place" or "public liability" statute. Such a statute makes 
public bodies liable for injuries sustained as a result of 
faulty construction or maintenance of public buildings. 
Hamilton and Mort explained the statute as follows (32, 
Po 285): 
"Recovery is sometimes sought against a district under 
so-called 'safe place' statutes in effect in a number 
of states, on the theory that these laws have cut 
into the exemption previously enjoyed by public 
governmental entities in the performance of govern­
mental functions. These statutes provide in general 
that every owner of a public building shall so con­
struct, repair, and maintain such public buildings 
as to render the same safe to employees and frequenters 
thereof." 
Rosenfield wrote- (83, p. 28): 
"The workmen's compensation statute is closely allied 
with another form of statute which appears in at 
least two states and probably in many others. This 
is the so-called 'safe place' statute, requiring 
public and private authorities to so construct, 
repair, and maintain buildings as to render them 
safe for people using them for lawful purposes. 
In Wisconsin, although the 'safe place' statute as 
first adopted was inapplicable to school districts, 
it was later amended to become so applicable." 
Remmelein stated (27, p. 200): 
"...in several common-law states (where school districts 
have governmental immunity in general) have enacted 
legislation which requires safe construction and main­
tenance of public buildings including schools. These 
laws are generally called 'safe place' statutes." 
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In states such as California and New York the school 
district was held liable for maintaining buildings, grounds, 
and premises in an unsafe manner. Washington has partially 
restricted this liability for a "safe place." Two states, 
Colorado and Wisconsin, have enacted special statutes which 
impose liability upon the school district to build and main­
tain its buildings and/or equipment so as to render them safe 
for general usage. 
The state of Wisconsin had established a definite statute 
concerning "safe place." The "safe place" statute of Wiscon­
sin defined the place of employment, the employer, and the 
frequenter. 
In keeping with the general trend of strict interpreta­
tion by the courts, schools in Wisconsin, were exempt from 
suit until the above amended statute, which expressly men­
tioned school districts, was passed. In one case the court 
of Wisconsin allowed recovery. The plaintiff fell down an 
elevated stairs. At the bottom of the stairs a door was 
closed suddenly by another student. The boy injured his hand 
by ramming it through a glass panel in the door. The shut­
ting of the door by the other student was the proximate cause 
(22), The district was held liable for the dangerous condi­
tion of the stairs and the door. In the other cases the court 
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had ruled so as to bar recovery. In the Lawyer case a flag­
pole was held not to be part of the building as defined in 
the section of the statutes (48). 
A boy was killed when struck by a falling flagpole on 
the evening of October 11, 1938. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court which had 
dismissed the case. The court held that a flagpole was a 
true structure, but that it was not used as a place of resort 
assembable as indicated in the statutes. The doctrine of 
immunity of a municipality in the performance of a govern­
mental function was affirmed. In another Wisconsin case the 
plaintiff was enrolled in a vocational school(43). As a 
result of operating an unguarded wood planer, the plaintiff 
injured his arm, which was later amputated below the elbow. 
He asked damages of $30,000. The case was appealed from the 
district court which had overruled the defendant's demurrer. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the circuit court. The 
court stated that the machine was unsafe, not the building. 
A student was not an employee, nor was a school a place of 
employment for a student. This ruling upheld the school 
while discharging its governmental function, and the school 
district was not liable for the acts of negligence. In a 
case tried in 1957 the court ruled that (34): 
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"Under Wisconsin law an absolute duty is imposed on the 
occupant to make the place as safe as the nature and 
place of employment will reasonably permit and per­
formance of the common law duty to make it reasonably 
safe does not suffice." 
As it appeared, the courts of Wisconsin did allow 
recovery for violations of the "safe place" statutes, but the 
construction of the statute was one of the strictest charac­
ter thereby resulting in limited recovery. 
Judicial Opinion 
As pointed out previously, legislative action is one way 
which changes in the doctrine of school district immunity 
have been made. The other was through judicial opinions. 
Four distinct categories of exceptions to the doctrine are 
discernible from an analysis of court opinions. 
Remmelein wrote (27, p. 196): 
"Because governmental immunity has been considered 
inequitable under conditions, courts sometimes try 
to find a way around it. Some writers feel that 
the theory is on the wane, but the deviations of 
the courts to avoid it have been used on occasions 
for years back and the most that can be said is that, 
in the absence of statutory abrogation of the 
common-law principle, governmental immunity has 
less prestige today than formerly." 
Deviations 
Of these four categories of exception, the first is for 
a court simply to deviate from the long-standing precedent. 
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Reutter (84, p. 29) wrote that the New York courts have gone 
further than those of any other state in judicially declaring 
the doctrine inappropriate at points. This has been affirmed 
by Garber, Hamilton, Remmelein, and others. In the Herman 
case (36), tried in 1922, the court said that the school 
district was liable for negligence. In this leading case, 
a school district was held liable for its negligence in 
failing to provide a guard for a table saw used in an 
industrial arts class. 
The New York courts have clearly indicated that all of 
the essential elements of a negligence claim must be present. 
The school was not the insurer of the welfare of the child 
and was bound to use only ordinary care. There existed a 
duty to maintain buildings, grounds and equipment in a 
reasonably safe condition, and a failure to do so was negli­
gence. 
Procedural matters have caused much litigation in the 
state of New York. The deadline of filing a claim within 
ninety days after the incident has been extended frequently 
by the courts if the rights of the defendant were not 
prejudiced. 
Another example of this complete abrogation by judicial 
decision is the Molitor case in Illinois which was discussed 
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earlier. Here the Supreme Court of Illinois completely 
abrogated the doctrine. It did not take the Illinois Legis­
lature very long to make a statute to this effect with 
limitations on recovery. 
In the case of Spanel v. Mounds View District No. 621 
(93) in Minnesota in 1962, the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
abrogated the sovereign tort immunity rule. The abrogation 
was to become effective after the adjournment of the 1963 
session of the state legislature, subject to any statutes the 
legislature might enact on the matter. 
In this case a five-year-old boy was injured on a 
defective kindergarten slide. A suit was brought against the 
school district, the principal, and the teacher in charge. 
The case was dismissed in the lower court under the doctrine 
of governmental immunity from tort liability. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of this 
action, but prospectively overruled the doctrine of govern­
mental immunity as a defense to tort claims against school 
districts, municipal corporations, and other governmental 
units, except the state itself. 
The Spanel opinion concludes (93): 
"It may appear unfair to deprive the present claimant of 
his day in court. However, we are of the opinion it 
would work an even greater injustice to deny defendant 
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and other units of government defense on which they 
have a right to rely," 
The 1963 legislature restored the governmental immunity 
rule as a defense in actions against school districts, but 
provided that when a school district procures liability 
insurance, then during the period the insurance is in effect 
and to the extent of the coverage, it becomes subject to the 
statutory provisions relative to liability for torts com­
mitted by the school district or its officers or employees, 
acting within the scope of their employment and duties, whether 
arising out of a governmental or a proprietary function (55). 
The Spanel decision was dated December 14, 1962. The 
reinstated rule of immunity expires on July 1, 1968. Accord­
ing to Hamilton (30), "This is the only instance to come to 
my attention in which tort immunity has been established in a 
state after having been abrogated by the state's supreme 
court." 
In April, 1963, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Stone v. 
Arizona Highway Commission, abrogated the doctrine of tort 
immunity of governmental agencies, including school districts. 
From the title of the case it will be observed that schools 
or school districts were not involved in the decision, but 
Hamilton stated, "The court left no doubt that the abrogation 
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of the rule was applicable to school districts and it remains 
to be seen whether the Arizona legislature will reinstate the 
rule" (30). 
Liability insurance 
A second category of judicial exception of the school 
district immunity doctrine appears in connection with the 
purchase of liability insurance by the school district. Many 
states have statutes which permit the purchase of liability 
insurance. In some states liability insurance is purchased 
without the express statutory powers to do so, Reutter wrote 
(84, p. 29): 
"It seems quite clear that the legislature has the 
power to permit or require school districts to 
purchase liability insurance and can waive govern­
mental immunity of a district to the limits of 
the insurance. In the absence of a statute, how­
ever, the purchase of liability insurance has been 
judicially approved in some jurisdictions as an 
implied power of local boards and disapproved in 
others as an illegal expenditure. The effect of 
the purchase of liability insurance on district 
immunity has been considered in several juris­
dictions, It is generally held that such a 
purchase technically does not constitute a waiver 
of immunity, although its effect is similar to an 
abrogation of immunity to the extent of the 
insurance." 
Remmelein presented it this way (27, p. 197): 
"Since one of the reasons advanced for justification 
of governmental immunity is that tax moneys should 
not be used to pay damages, many school boards carry 
liability insurance. When liability insurance is 
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carried, the damages, if judgment is obtained, are not 
paid out of school money. However, tax money is used 
to pay the insurance premiums and courts traditionally 
have held that a school district has no legal power to 
carry liability insurance unless the state legislature 
has authorized it. If the function is governmental, 
there is no liability to insure. This argument is 
rarely advanced today when carrying insurance is so 
prevalent in all phases of our life." 
A Kentucky court has said that, "A statute giving a 
school district provision to carry liability insurance to 
cover torts...in no way makes the district itself liable for 
such torts" (95). 
Despite this fact there are some exceptions to this 
rule. American Law Reports had this to say about removal of 
immunity to the extent of the coverage (2, p. 1437): 
"In a few jurisdictions the courts have taken the view 
(which is worth of characterization as enlightment) 
that to the extent that a liability insurance policy 
protects a governmental unit against tort liability, 
the otherwise existing immunity of the unit is re­
moved." 
Tennessee and Kentucky are two states which have 
pioneered in this new legal area. Illinois allowed recovery 
at one time under insurance but has since changed to the 
extent of the policy. At the time of this writing the pic­
ture in Indiana appeared to allow recovery. 
It is apparent that a few states have taken this route 
as a means of alleviating some of the injustices of immunity 
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without violations of the trust funds or public money. It is 
a safe middle of the road technique which has had some 
limited application. 
Nuisances 
A third classification of judicial exception to the doc­
trine of nonliability in tort through the years has been made 
by some courts in cases involving nuisance. There is no 
simple definition of nuisance, but Reutter said (84, p. 30), 
"Basically it is an intentional or negligent interference 
with the interest of an individual in the use or enjoyment of 
land. " 
Reutter implemented this definition by explaining that 
under the nuisance theory school boards have been held liable 
in some states in such situations as the following; snow 
falling from the roof of a school building onto adjoining 
land, balls being hit from a school playground onto adjoining 
property which was damaged by the balls and the pupils 
retrieving them, and the placement of a septic tank on school 
property with the result that the spring of a home adjoining 
the school was ruined due to polution from the septic tank 
(84, p. 30). 
Remmelein wrote (27, p. 196); 
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"Maintenance of a nuisance is another theory on which the 
courts have hung liability of school districts. For 
each such case, however, there are more wherein this 
pleading has not been accepted by the courts. A nuisance 
at law is a thing of rather narrow meaning. When the 
injury is to property, the injured are likely to be 
neighbors of the school and nuisance is not a general 
nuisance but merely a private inconvenience. When 
injury is to the person, the hazardous condition 
causing the injury is usually a part of the operation 
of the school and as such constitutes a governmental 
function for which the general rule of immunity 
applies o" 
In the Wisconsin case, mentioned in the "safe place" 
section, in which a flag pole fell and injured a child, the 
school district was held liable for maintaining a nuisance. 
In Michigan in 1964 (72) the Supreme Court of Michigan 
considered whether a district is liable despite the immunity 
rule. The allegations were that a Mrs. Pound had been 
injured by falling on ice which had accumulated on a public 
sidewalk adjoining the school building. Water from the roof 
of the school building was drained through a downspout onto a 
cement culvert, which discharged the water onto and across 
the sidewalk. As a result the sidewalk became coated with 
ice. The trial court had dismissed all this on the familiar 
ground that the district was entitled to interpose the de­
fense of governmental immunity. The trial court "reluctantly 
concluded" that upon the facts alleged the district could 
escape liability. 
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The Supreme Court cited one of its cases in 1899 where 
the school district had been held liable for nuisance. In 
the court's opinion, the allegations of the plaintiff's here 
were sufficiently similar to those in the 1899 case to meet 
that case's criterion of "a direct injury to the person of 
the plaintiff while outside the limits of the defendant's 
premises." They were, therefore, sufficient to state a cause 
of action to which the defense of governmental immunity may 
not be interposed. It follows that the case was remanded to 
the lower court to be tried on the alleged facts. 
Hamilton and Mort concluded on the theory of nuisance by 
stating (32, p. 283): 
"Although there are a number of cases in which recovery 
has been sought on the ground that a nuisance has been 
maintained, the fact that relatively few have per­
mitted recovery on that theory demonstrates the indis­
position of courts to subsume the facts under the 
exception." 
Proprietary function 
A fourth judicial exception to the doctrine is comprised 
of cases involving proprietary functions as distinguished 
from governmental functions. According to Nolte and Linn the 
distinction must be found in the factual situation, and it is 
no simple matter in each case to determine whether the board 
has engaged in governmental (educational) function or proprie 
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tary (non-educational) function (69, p. 243). Remmelein 
stated (27, p. 196): 
"Strict courts will say, however, that school districts 
have no power to operate a proprietary function; their 
only power is to operate the schools, and all parts of 
the school program are applications of the governmental 
function of education. Less strict courts have held 
that injuries resulting from the operation of a function 
for which the school district obtains funds on a fee 
basis impose liability on the school district because 
it is operating a proprietary function. Most courts 
have declared that merely collecting admission fees 
to a school function or charging rent for the use of 
a school auditorium or stadium does not put the school 
district into a proprietary business." 
A school district which operated a swimming pool as a 
summer recreational program was held liable when a boy 
drowned (59). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a lower 
court and held that this was a proprietary function. How­
ever, the court held that a football game was an educational 
activity and therefore a governmental function (52). Also, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a school district 
was not liable for negligence in performing the governmental 
function of maintaining the school grounds and fences. 
A case heard in Arizona held the school district liable 
for a proprietary function (94). The Arizona Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court which had upheld immunity. The 
defendant had leased the football stadium to another school 
and received a fee of $300. A paying spectator fell because 
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of a faulty handrail. The court ruled that the school dis­
trict had leased and received compensation and was therefore 
engaged in a proprietary function and liable. 
One of the most recent cases on proprietary functions 
was heard by the Superior Court in Delaware in 1963 (90). 
According to the law of Delaware, school boards shall allow 
free use of school buildings for various public meetings and 
functions, 
Persuant to this law, a local board leased a school 
auditorium to an amateur theatrical group, Mr, Solvin, a 
member of the group, alleged that the steps leading from the 
stage to a lower level hallway gave way and seriously injured 
him. He sued the board, the superintendent of schools, and 
the industrial arts teacher in whose class the steps were 
constructed. It was alleged that the teacher "gave" the 
group a set of steps to be placed for the convenience of the 
players. The steps were movable in the sense that they were 
not a permanent part of the building. 
The district asserted certain defenses, among them 
immunity from liability under the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, and argued that the relationship between it and the 
injured person was that of a landlord and tenant, Mr, Solvin 
took the premises as he found them, the board declared. 
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The board was held not liable on the ground that Mr. 
Solvin was no more than a licensee in his use of the building 
since he used it for his own personal benefit. He was not an 
invitee of the district, in which case it might have been 
possible to make a good case against the district. Since he 
was a licensee, he took the premises as he found them, and 
there was no evidence that there was a willful disposition by 
the board to injure or trap him. Of course, there is a duty 
not to do so even in the case of mere licensee. The board 
escaped liability on the ground that it owed no responsibility 
to the injured person to provide a safe place for theatrical 
activities. 
The superintendent was also absolved from liability. It 
was shown that he was not at the school the night the injury 
occurred. The mere fact that he was superintendent was not 
sufficient to place liability upon him under the circumstances 
shown here. He was at best an agent of the board in leasing 
the building and if no liability existed as to the board, 
none could be placed upon the superintendent. 
The industrial arts teacher also escaped liability. It 
was shown that all he did was "make available" the steps for 
the use of the players. He did not assume, and was not charged 
with, the responsibility of securing the steps in place. If 
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there was any responsibility in this regard it rested upon 
the theatrical group of which Mr. Solvin was a member. The 
court said that it found it difficult to understand why the 
director of the play "was not intelligent enough to see to 
it that the steps were made secure.'.' 
The amount of litigation based upon this count has been 
small in comparison to the total picture of tort liability. 
Within any one given jurisdiction, prudence would indicate 
the need for ascertaining if this division was attempted. 
Recent Attacks on the Doctrine 
The Molitor decision in Illinois again illustrates the 
fact that the law is not static and that the courts take 
cognizance of changing social conditions. 
As was stated in the introductory chapter and quoted 
from Garber (26, p. 72), "...this case is particularly sig­
nificant because it is likely to encourage other courts to 
take similar action. As a result, school administrators 
should be aware of the fact that change is in the wind." 
Recent changes and attacks in Minnesota, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Colorado, and Arizona have been cited previously. 
In addition to these, the doctrine has been attacked during 
the years of 1963 and 1964 in Colorado, Alabama, Utah, 
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Kansas, and Iowa. The writer will make mention of each of 
these attacks, except those involving Iowa which will be 
included in Chapter IV, 
In 1963 the members of the Supreme Court of Colorado 
found themselves in violent disagreement as to what the 
state's law should be on tort liability of school districts 
( 9 5 ) .  
Action was brought to recover damages in tort injuries 
sustained by a boy while practicing basketball. The suit was 
unsuccessful in the lower court under what that court found 
to be the settled pronouncements of the Supreme Court of 
Colorado, It was admitted on behalf of the injured boy that 
the doctrine of governmental immunity from liability in tort 
applied to school districts in the state. However, it was 
urged that these cases be overruled and that the law be 
changed as it had been in a number of states. 
The court declined to abrogate the rule. In terse 
opinion, the majority of the court adhered to its former 
decisions on the ground that it was not within the provision 
of the judicial branch of the government to change long-
established principles of law. This, the court said, is a 
legislative function. 
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Justice Moore wrote on a separate opinion especially 
concurring with the holding of the majority. He "respectively 
submitted" that there comes a time when the minority should 
recognize that an issue of law has been decided in Colorado, 
and the rule of stare decisis is applicable to a given situa­
tion. He recognized that under certain circumstance the 
doctrine should not be followed, but he was convinced that 
this was not true of the case in question. He felt that the 
court was here limited by both law and conscience to the 
judicial function of faithfully interpreting and applying the 
law as the court found it. It could not, according to him, 
"usurp the legislative powers of establishing public policy." 
He did not mention the fact that the doctrine was created by 
the courts and not by the legislature. 
Justice Moore emphasized that there had been several 
sessions of the legislature since the minority members of the 
court "opened war on the doctrine of governmental immunity," 
He apparently thought that the legislature must have known of 
this "war" and by failing to take any part in it must have 
intended that the rule remain in effect. 
Chief Justice Frantz, writing for the three dissenting 
members, made the point that the common law of America is 
evolutionary. It was his opinion that the courts have a duty 
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to keep the common law abreast of changes wrought by time. 
Courts should not be so averse to molding common law princi­
ples to meet the dictates of experience and observation. The 
Justice pointed out that in a number of cases the court had 
expressed dissatisfaction with the immunity rule. In his 
opinion, where once the doctrine had smooth sailing, it is 
now rocking along troubled waters. It will be indeed inter­
esting to observe developments in this area in Colorado as 
the personnel of the court changes. 
In Alabama, as in other states generally, a city may be 
held liable to an individual who suffers injury due to failure 
of the city to keep its streets safe and in good repair. At 
the same time, Alabama adheres to the doctrine of immunity 
from tort liability of school districts. 
In 1963 the Supreme Court of that state decided on a 
case in which the City of Bessemer was sued for damages sus­
tained by a boy when his motor scooter collided with a chain 
stretched across a driveway in front of a school in that 
city (15), The pivotal question was whether the driveway 
upon which the injury occurred was a public street. If so, a 
suit against the city would be admissable. 
The driveway went through property owned by the City 
Board of Education, which had paved the road. The chains. 
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one at each end of the entrance, had been placed there by 
school authorities. The plaintiff contended that the Board 
dedicated the area for the use as a public street, or per­
mitted it to be used for that purpose. Also, he contended 
that the city, by certain acts of traffic control, had 
accepted the dedication and thereby had subjected itself to 
liability for the injury. This contention was designed to 
show that the driveway was in fact a city street and that the 
city was legally bound to keep it safe. 
The suit against the city was unsuccessful. In the 
court's opinion, the school board had no legal authority to 
dedicate for use as a public street or highway any portion of 
its real properties held in trust for school purposes. The 
pertinent statutes provided, in effect, that all real and 
personal property, acquired for school purposes be held in 
trust by the City Board of Education for the use of the pub­
lic schools of the city. It followed that the plaintiff was 
not injured on a public street or highway. The court made it 
clear that the Board had the authority to establish and 
improve the driveway for the convenience of the school patrons 
and the children using them for school purposes. Such 
improvement did not free the area for general use by the 
public as a public street. 
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Utah is another state that has upheld the doctrine of 
immunity for school districts. This doctrine in Utah has 
been frequently and vigorously attacked but the Supreme Court 
of Utah has steadfastly refused to abrogate or modify it. 
The latest decision in Utah on the subject was in 1964 
(12). A boy, fourteen years old, sued to recover for injury 
impairing the sight of his eye caused by a metal particle 
thrown by a machine during a shop class in his school. The 
trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that the 
district was protected by the immunity doctrine. It was 
admitted on behalf of the boy that the dismissal was sup­
ported by the prior decisions of the court, and that the 
school districts of Utah are instrumentalities of the state 
and acting in its behalf in educating children. As such 
instrumentalities, the districts partake of the sovereign 
immunity of the state. 
In what the court described as an "all and persuasive 
brief" counsel for the boy sought to persuade the court to 
change the rule. Decisions from other states showing the 
trend in law in the area was cited to the court. Among the 
cases referred to was the Arizona Highway case that was cited 
earlier, where the Arizona Supreme Court abrogated the 
doctrine. 
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Despite these decisions, the court indicated its belief 
that if there is to be a change which would have such an 
important effect upon public institutions and their opera­
tions, it should be left entirely to the legislature to 
determine. It followed that the immunity doctrine was sus­
tained and the injured boy was not allowed to recover. 
When the immunity doctrine prevailed in the majority of 
the states, numerous attempts were made on behalf of injured 
persons' to bring cases under some exception of the rule. It 
will be remembered that the usual exceptions have been in the 
cases in which the board maintained nuisance or engaged in a 
proprietary function. 
In 1964 the doctrine was attacked in Kansas on what is 
believed to be novel grounds (44). In this case, a fourteen 
year old boy, who had returned to school after the noon 
recess, had to wait outside the school building until 1:00 
p.m., at which time classes were to resume. During the wait­
ing period the boy was struck in the head when a fellow 
student picked up another student under the arms and swung 
him into the air. The injured boy, who was sitting on the 
ground, was knocked senseless, and the blow severely damaged 
his brain. As a result he suffered loss of speech and 
became a paraplegic. 
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Kansas law provided that district superintendents or 
principals shall have charge and control of the schools, 
subject to the rules and orders of the school board, which 
shall exercise general management over district affairs. 
It was argued on the boy's behalf that the school board 
failed to comply with its statutory duty to take charge and 
control the student body, and to provide the plaintiff in 
this case with a healthful place to receive instruction. 
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute referred 
to did not impose tort liability on the board. The court 
quoted and adhered to the rule that a school board is not 
liable for the consequences of a breach of public duty or 
for the neglect or wrong of its officers, unless there is a 
statute expressly imposing such liability. The statute in 
question did not have this effect. 
Kansas has the so-called "mob statute," It was con­
tended on the boy's behalf that a group of unsupervised 
students constituted a mob. The court rejected this, point­
ing out that the legislature had limited the statute's 
application to incorporated cities and towns, and that it 
could not be extended to include school boards. 
For reasons which did not appear in the decision, the 
boy did not attempt to recover against the individual members 
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of the board or the school principal. 
Summary 
It was the prime purpose of this chapter to analyze the 
means and rationals of the movement toward relaxation of the 
immunity principle. The source of this movement comes from 
either the judicial or legislative authority. The greatest 
abrogation of immunity has been in the fields of school 
transportation and workmen's compensation. These two areas 
have received much attention from the judicial and legisla­
tive authorities. Workmen's compensation is a separate field 
and not a part of this study. Injuries to pupils provided 
the major source of litigation in cases charging the school 
district with negligence. 
California, Illinois, and New York were the leading 
states in the modification of school districts' immunity for 
tort liability based upon a charge of negligence. Other 
means of recovery, usually quite limited and specialized, may 
be found in other states and in other jurisdictions. 
The state of New York, while not the first state to move 
toward abrogation, was a leader in the field of modification. 
The New York courts have clearly indicated that all of the 
essential elements of a negligence claim must be present. The 
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school was not the insurer of the welfare of the child and 
was bound only to use only ordinary care. There existed a 
duty to maintain buildings, grounds, and equipment in a 
reasonably safe condition, and failure to do so was negli­
gence. New York statutes imposed a duty upon the district to 
supervise its students. The failure to do so has been held 
actionable negligence. The adequacy of the supervision was 
a relative question and was usually a point of fact to be 
determined by a jury. Under permissive statute, the school 
districts may carry liability insurance or act as self-
insurers. The matter of insurance has had little effect upon 
the tort liability of the school district, 
California, a comparative late-comer to the field of 
modifications, was the first state to pass express statutes 
for the purpose of abrogation, California has maintained 
such a position up to the present. California and New York 
vied for the number of suits brought against the school 
districts. School districts were required to carry liability 
insurance; cities, over 500,000, may act as self-insurers, 
Washington enacted its first abrogation statute in 1869, 
Following a rush of cases, the legislature in 1917 passed an 
act which permitted liability but excluded actions stemming 
from playgrounds, gymnastics, athletics or industrial arts. 
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Since this enactment the courts have allowed suits against 
the school districts for injuries occurring in ways other 
than the statutory exclusions. 
In Illinois in 1959 the Supreme Court abrogated the 
doctrine of immunity. Immediately following this decision, 
legislation was enacted abrogating the immunity doctrine but 
limiting the amount of recovery and a deadline for filing 
such claims. Despite the furor caused by this decision, the 
appellate court has ruled that as of now basis for negligence 
has been created and that it was still necessary to show the 
essential elements of a negligence claim. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota abrogated the doctrine as 
of 1963 but the Minnesota Legislature immediately re-instated 
the doctrine of immunity and this is the only known state in 
which this has happened. 
Arizona is the most recent state to have the doctrine 
abrogated by the courts. However, it is too early to ascer­
tain what will happen in this state. 
In certain states and in certain specific restricted 
areas, the school district may be held liable for tort negli­
gence. While the school may be held liable for this specific 
charge, the general concept of immunity still prevails. 
One of these areas was the so-called "safe place" 
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statutes. Two states, Colorado and Wisconsin, have enacted 
statutes which impose a liability upon the school district to 
build and maintain its buildings and/or equipment so as to 
render them safe for general use. Generally, the courts 
interpreted these statutes very strictly and recovery was 
limited. 
Four states, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and 
Wyoming have passed "save harmless" legislation. These acts, 
which cause the board of education to assume the liability of 
school employees acting within the scope of their duties, may 
or may not make the board of education liable in tort negli­
gence, Connecticut courts have interpreted this statute as 
one of indemnification from loss, not from liability. In 
other words, a judgment must first be secured against the 
employee. In New Jersey the court has said that this act did 
not create a liability upon the part of the district, and the 
school district was held immune from suit. The statute of 
Wyoming contained within itself a statement to the effect 
that no new liability had been created. 
In a few jurisdictions the courts have attempted to 
classify the functions of the school as either governmental 
or proprietary. If the function was held to be proprietary, 
liability may attach. Such distinction is hard to make; 
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therefore, it is infrequently done. 
Many school districts carry liability insurance with or 
without statutory authorization. The carrying of insurance 
would seem to void one of the reasons for immunity, the pro­
tection of public funds. The bulk of the states did not 
allow recovery even when the district was fully insured; 
however, several states have departed from this concept, 
Kentucky and Tennessee have done so. 
Recapitulating in brief the status of tort liability of 
school districts in the United States, there has been a 
slight movement away from the traditional immunity. Three 
states have been the leaders in complete abrogation: 
California, Illinois, and New York. Other states have 
developed specialized laws granting recovery in limited areas. 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Oregon allow recovery to the amount 
of liability insurance carried. School districts in the 
state of Washington were liable except for injuries occurring 
in certain specified locations. A few states attempted the 
division of the school's functions into governmental and 
proprietary categories. 
The overwhelming preponderance of cases reported in this 
review indicates that the trend toward the modification of 
immunity will continue to grow in strength. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
This chapter deals with the methodology employed for the 
legal research used in this study and the use of legal re­
search tools. A short description has been given of each of 
these tools. Legal research is subject to the same general 
requirements as are other forms of research. In nature, it 
most closely resembles bibliographic research. The task has 
been to find and summarize pertinent statutes, to trace legal 
developments through related court decisions, and finally to 
analyze the decisions in light of the problem being investi­
gated. The last step was the writing of the report which 
must convey legal information to educators and laymen who are 
not themselves legally trained. 
General Methods 
(1) A careful and extensive search was made for all cases in 
point which have been decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa, 
These were identified through the examination of the pertinent 
case listings in the "School and School Districts" section of 
the American Digest System. This Digest System is a series 
of digests or cases from 1958 to date. There are eight units 
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(75, p. 338-339). 
Cases in each of these digests are arranged in the same 
order according to subject matter. "Schools and School Dis­
tricts" is in its alphabetical setting. Within each topic 
the subject matter is logically outlined and each item in the 
outline is given a number (this number is) called the key 
number. As an illustration of the detail used in the clas­
sification of a case for the American Digest System, the out­
line of topics on "Schools and School Districts" is shown 
below in part. The arabic number in front of each sub-topic 
is its key number. 
II. Public Schools (9-178) 
F. Claims Against District, and Actions (112-126) 
G. Teachers (127-147) 
147, Duties and Liabilities 
Thus, according to Remmelein (75, p. 341): 
"The American Digest System constitutes a device for 
finding all cases on a point among the thousands of 
cases reported each year. The System consists of 
short digests of each case arranged in the order of 
the outlined topics." 
In any digest under "Schools and School Districts", the 
number of the sub-topic in the outline is identified by a 
tiny key in front of it, and "for this reason it is referred 
to as the key number" (75, p. 341). At the beginning of each 
digest is the name of the state in bold face type; at the end 
Ill 
of each digest is the citation of the case, its name, and 
where to find it. 
The American Digest System includes a "Table of Cases" 
which gives for each case the exact title, alphabetically 
listed, and all of the places where it may be found to be 
read, also the topic and key numbers of every point of law 
decided in each case and whether it had been affirmed, re­
versed, or modified. From the "Table of Cases" then, the key 
numbers of a familiar case may be noted, and other cases can 
be found in the digest by looking for those identified by the 
same key numbers. 
According to Remmelein (81, p. 13): 
"From the American Digest System one compiles a biblio­
graphy of cases for further study. The digests in the 
American Digest System aid in determining whether a 
particular case is likely to be in point; they may be 
followed in the research study. But, this is just 
the first step in making a legal study. The digests 
are only these short paragraphs on each point in the 
case....In order to know their application, it is 
necessary to read the entire opinion of the court in 
the reports. The holding of the case cannot be 
cited on the basis of the digests alone. Doing so 
is an error of many inexperienced school-law 
researchers. The opinion must be read in its 
entirety." 
(2) Pertinent cases found in the Digest were read as they 
appeared in the volumes of the National Reporter System: the 
state reports were consulted only when a case did not appear 
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in a regional reporter. The National Reporter System includes 
all cases from all courts of record in all states and gives 
the actual opinions of the court in each. Remmelein said, 
"Using the National Reporter System, it is possible to read 
all the cases in all states on a particular point". The 
system is divided into nine geographical sections, for 
publication and citation purposes. An example is listed 
below : 
The Northwestern Reporter, abbreviated "N,W," or 
"N,W, (2d)" covers Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Nebraska. 
The National Reporter System also includes the Supreme 
Court Reporter covering cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 
Briefs which include the pertinent facts, the statement 
of the question before the courts, and the rational of the 
decisions, were made as each case was read. Extensive quota­
tions were made of any statute construed to effect the 
court's determination of a question. 
(3) American Law Reports and American Jurisprudence were con­
sulted for the purpose of finding additional cases in point: 
The American Law Reports. abbreviated A. L. R., began in 
1919, and about six volumes appear each year. Alphabetical 
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indexes are furnished as well as indexes to cases and annota­
tions. Remmelein writes on the values of this series, "This 
series is used primarily for annotation, although it can be 
used for reading of the opinion also" (81, p. 13). The 
annotations review the substance of what has been decided in 
other cases on the same point. 
The section used for this part in the A, L, R. Annota­
tions was Section IV, "Liability of School District or 
Authorities", 
Annotations are extremely useful in obtaining a general 
understanding of a point, or in gathering loose ends of a 
topic after having read many, and possibly conflicting, cases. 
Whenever a new decision warrants it, an annotation is 
published to bring the entire topic up to date. For example, 
an annotation may be cited as 146 A. L. R, 625, and then at 
the end of the annotation a remark would be made to this 
effect--"this annotation supplements those in 63 A, L, R, 413 
and 118 A, L, R, 806". This means that the previous annota­
tion was 118 A. L. R» 806, and, before that, 63 A, L. R. 413. 
Thus by tracing back the several annotations on a topic it is 
possible to study the history of the problem over the years. 
The same outline is used in each annotation on a particular 
subject, but "information found in one annotation is not 
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repeated in a subsequent one" (81, p. 13). 
American Jurisprudence which is encyclopedic in format, 
includes textual material with footnotes giving citations to 
cases illustrating the settlement of principles in the text. 
The section of interest to this paper was Section V., "Tort 
Liability". 
Remmelein has this to say about American Jurisprudence 
for use as a legal research tool for school-law problems 
( 7 5 ,  p .  3 4 7 ) :  
"...for the purpose of research in school-law problems, 
may be quite adequate coverage..American Jurisprudence 
is sufficient for most research in school law by school 
administrators, teachers or others who are not con­
cerned with technical niceties and distinctions of 
interest to lawyers," 
Point of issue was studied in the Iowa Law Review. This 
Review is a review of all Iowa cases and the issues of each 
case written by Law Schools for use in instruction and refer­
ence for practicing lawyers. 
(4) The judicial history of all cases used in this study was 
verified by the use of Shepard's Citators. To find out what 
has happened to a statute since the date of the official 
state code publication, one must turn to Shepard's Citation 
to Statutes. To find cases more recent than those included 
in the annotated statutes, or those for any reason omitted 
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from the annotations, if any, or in a state where the code is 
annotated, the same citator is used. 
Remmelein explains why the Citators are used (75, p. 
356); 
"By using Shepard's Citators one may discover every 
instance where any particular section of any law 
has been affected by subsequent legislation and 
every instance where it has been cited, applied, 
or construed by the courts." 
The method used in these Citators is merely the listing 
of the section number of the statutes with reference to the 
later enactments and court decisions, each preceded by an 
abbreviation which tells the story of what happened in each 
instance. These abbreviations cover many situations; an 
example would be: A (amended) means that the statute was 
amended, U (unconstitutional) means that the court has 
declared the statute unconstitutional, and V (void or valid) 
means that the court has declared the statute invalid. 
In addition to showing what has happened to each section 
of the statutes by subsequent legislatures, the Citators show 
where each section has been cited by a court; unless there is 
a symbol in front of these references to cases, it means 
merely that the court referred to that section, 
(5) Finally, in the absence of court cases. Attorney General 
Opinions were studied and used where appropriate. 
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In general it can be said that the procedure proposed in 
this study was the typical system used in legal research (81, 
p. 1-25), The Citator method of legal research was utilized 
by tracing through appropriate Shephard publication cita­
tions to the cases and statutes which cite or construe the 
manner of liability of school districts. After compiling a 
bibliography of cases and statutes from the search of books 
and other references as given above, note cards were prepared 
for each case and each statute. Each case and each statute 
was then carefully read and a brief prepared. The cases were 
read as they were found in the National Reporter Svstem or 
the reports of various states. Accepted law research demands 
that each brief contain the citation, the date of the case, 
the court hearing the case, and who the plaintiff and de­
fendant were. If the case was being appealed, the brief 
indexes include the court it originated from, the facts of 
the case, the congruity or discongruity with past decisions, 
and the dissenting opinion and other related data, A former 
Iowa Assistant Attorney General, currently chairman of a 
national committee for municipal tort liability, served as 
legal consultant. 
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Procedural Steps 
/ 
The method used in this research was primarily a docu­
mentary one. It is part of a more general pattern for the 
criteria of historical research (61, p. 226). The procedure 
attacking this problem involved three steps: 
1. Collection of data to determine patterns existing in 
the United States and in the state of Iowa. This 
was accomplished by the following: 
A. Collecting recent court cases in Iowa and other 
states and Attorney General Opinions in Iowa 
that pertain to the problem. 
B. Collecting all statutory enactments in other 
states pertaining to school liability for bodily 
injury. 
C. Examining textbooks, current literature, and 
other publications which refer to bodily injury 
cases of school liability by title. 
D. Examining statements from legal counsels of 
selected states pertaining to patterns of 
liability for municipal corporations. 
2. Analysis of the data for determining whether there 
was a pattern toward eliminating immunity for school 
districts for liability responsibility. This was 
accomplished by the following: 
A. Investigating court records of cases that had 
been adjucated and that referred to liability of 
public school districts and municipal corpora­
tions . 
B. Studying the statuatory enactments of various 
states pertaining to school district liability. 
C. Reviewing current literature, textbooks, and 
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other publications which refer to school dis­
trict liability by title. 
D. Examining statements of legal counsels from 
selected states to secure the current thinking 
of this judicial group about liability for 
school districts. 
3. Interpretating the data, drawing conclusions, making 
recommendations, and itemizing the implications for 
Iowa public schools, Iowa teacher preparation 
institutions, and Iowa tax payers. (The following 
steps were followed in this process.) 
A. Each case was identified as to principles or 
issue it illustrated. 
Bo The resulting principle and issue were assembled 
a and studied, and those similar were grouped 
together. 
C. The data were organized and tabulated, then pre­
sented to a legal counsel to see if legal pat­
terns deviated from immunity. 
D, Conclusions were drawn, implications for Iowa 
public schools, teacher preparation institutions, 
and Iowa taxpayers were identified, and recom­
mendations for the Iowa legislature on school 
liability were made. 
The findings of this study depend for their validity on 
the legal principle of stare decisis. This term is derived 
from the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movers : 
freely interpreted, it means "to adhere to precedent and not 
unsettle things which are settled". The principle requires 
that a court decision on a question of law arising in a case 
and necessary to its determination be regarded as a binding 
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precedent in the same courts or courts of lower rank within 
the jurisdiction in subsequent cases where the point is again 
presented. 
There would be no basis for this study if the courts 
followed the principle strictly. The courts can and do modify 
this prior ruling when conditions warrant. Since this study 
is based on court decisions, its findings will reflect such 
modifications. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS--LIABILITY IN THE STATE OF IOWA 
As of 1964 school districts in the state of Iowa still 
enjoy immunity from tort liability. It was during this year 
that the leading Bover case was heard by the Supreme Court of 
the State of Iowa. The court ruled, in a five-to-four deci­
sion, that it should not overturn the doctrine of govern­
mental immunity. It was the majority opinion that abolition 
of the immunity doctrine was a matter for legislative, rather 
than judicial, action. 
However, with the opinion in the Boyer case was a warning 
to give consideration to the vigorous dissenting opinion as 
being indicative of the trend toward improvement of the 
harshness of governmental immunity. The feeling prevails 
that it is probable in some future case that the doctrine of 
governmental immunity will not be upheld. 
Immunity was overruled in some non-school cases. This 
trend in Iowa toward greater liability was shown by recent 
Supreme Court decisions handed down against local units of 
government. It should be noted that a fundamental differ­
ence exists between school districts as quasi-corporations 
and municipal corporations proper. Municipalities are not 
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agents of the state except when utilized by the state for the 
performance of governmental functions. 
In the 1963 case of Moore v. Murphy. three of the 
justices of the Iowa Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion, 
stated that although the doctrine of local governmental 
immunity had not been directly an issure before them in the 
case, they were serving notice that they contemplated 
abolishing it at the first opportunity. 
This, of course, amounted to a courteous warning that 
the culmination of the trend manifested by the expansion of 
the "street defect" exception, the "nuisance" cases, and the 
"proprietary function" cases would mean the virtual abolition 
of the defense of contributory negligence. 
In a short period of time the concept of immunity in the 
state of Iowa has undergone a series of developmental changes. 
In short, it has traversed the continuum from immunity to 
almost non-immunity. 
In this chapter the historical development of liability 
in Iowa was studied by case law and Attorney Generals' 
Opinions. Each leading case was briefed as to the facts of 
the case, the issue at hand, the ruling of the Court, and the 
reasons for the ruling. 
The first section will begin with the earliest cases and 
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build up to the doctrine in the broadest form on the Hibbs 
case. The second section will begin with the gradual erosion 
of the doctrine of immunity and the various doctrines that 
the Court has used to get around the legal principle to get a 
social principle that "good equity makes bad law". The 
exceptions occur where the Court has used the proprietary 
function rather than the governmental function, and nuisance 
rather than negligence. The final section indicates the 
culmination where the vestiges of the immunity doctrine 
appear rather small. 
Early Cases 
As was stated in an earlier chapter, the doctrine of 
"the King can do no wrong" was first applied to a subdivision 
of the state in Russell v. Men of Devon. In Iowa this was 
first applied to a school district in 1876, when it was held 
that a school district was not liable for injuries received 
by a child while playing about unguarded well-drilling equip­
ment on the school ground (99). 
WOOD V. THE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MITCHELL. 44 IOWA 
27, 1876. 
FACTS: A party who had contracted with a school district to 
drill a well on the school grounds left his drilling machine 
unlocked and unguarded. In his absence a nine-year old boy, 
playing with other children on the school grounds during the 
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noon hour, caught his foot in the drilling rig and crushed it. 
ISSUES: Was the district liable for acts of its servants and 
agents and was there a nuisance maintained by the district 
when it allowed the machinery to remain on school property? 
HELD: Affirmed the verdict of the lower court because the 
danger arose not from the character of the work but from the 
machinery used and accordingly that the district was not 
liable for the negligence of its contracters. That machinery, 
although it may be dangerous if interfered with and left 
unguarded, was not a nuisance when properly stationed for a 
legitimate purpose. 
REASON: If there was any liability in this case resting upon 
the district, it existed outside of the fact of the employ­
ment of the contractor to drill the well. The contractor 
was not agent for the district. Then, if the district was 
liable it must be upon some other grounds than its relation 
to the contractor, whose alleged negligence caused the 
injury. 
The court was not prepared to hold that every person having 
upon his premises machinery, tools, or implements which would 
be dangerous playthings for children, and in their nature 
affording special temptations to children to play with them, 
was under any obligation to guard them in order to protect 
himself from liability for injuries to children received 
while playing with them, although the children were right­
fully on the premises. 
In 1880 this precedent of immunity was extended in a 
case holding counties not liable for injuries received in 
poorly lighted hallways (42). 
KINCAID V, HARDIN COUNTY. 53 IOWA 430, 1880. 
FACTS: The plaintiff was attending as a witness in a night 
session of the District Court held in the Hardin County 
Courthouse. The said courtroom was accessible only by a 
narrow stairway, which at night was extremely dangerous and 
unsafe to traverse, unless lighted by lamp or other arti­
ficial light, as the defendant well knew. The plaintiff sued 
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the county for $10,000 damages when he fell on the unlighted 
stairway. 
ISSUES: Was a county liable in damages to a person injured 
by reason of negligent construction of a courthouse, and 
because of negligence in not lighting an unguarded and 
dangerous stairway leading to a courtroom? 
HELD: Affirmed the verdict of the lower court and held that 
the county as a quasi-corporation cannot be held liable in 
damages for a personal injury sustained by reason of the 
defective construction of its courthouse, and the negligence 
of the county in failing to keep it properly lighted at night. 
REASON: Counties, towns, school districts and the like are 
quasi-corporations, and as a result, are not liable for 
damages in actions of this character because they are in­
voluntary territorial and political divisions of the state, 
created for governmental purposes, and that they give no 
assent to their creation, whereas municipal corporations 
proper are either specially chartered, or voluntarily organ­
ized under general acts of the legislature. 
Thus, in 1880, the courts clearly defined the status of 
the school districts in Iowa as to their governmental stature 
and immunity. 
Two years later, 1882, a school district was held not 
liable for personal injuries sustained on account of the 
negligent construction of its school building, or for negli­
gence in failing to keep it in repair (45). 
LANE V. THE DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF WOODBURY. 58 IOWA 462, 1882. 
FACTS: This was an action of law to recover for personal 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff, an infant, who was struck 
by lightning while in attendance at the public school. The 
plaintiff's petition was in two counts. The first alleged 
negligence of the school district in permitting the lightning 
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rods on the school building to become broken and out of 
repair, thereby causing the lightning to strike the building 
and inflict injury upon the infant. The second charged 
negligence on the part of the school district in that it 
failed to provide protection from lightning and therefore the 
infant was injured, 
ISSUES; Was a school district liable for personal injuries 
sustained on account of the negligent construction of its 
schoolhouse, or negligence in failing to keep it in repair? 
HELD: Reversed the judgment of the lower court in an order 
overruling a demurrer to the petition. 
REASON: A school district was a public corporation, or a 
quasi-corporation, created by statute for the purpose of 
executing the general laws and policy of the state, which 
requires the education of all its youth. It was a branch of 
State government, an instrument for the administration of the 
laws, and was, so far as the people concerned, an involuntary 
organization. The education of the youth was the only pur­
pose of the corporate school district. The powers were 
restricted to the execution of this purpose. There was no 
difference from the fact that the school district was far 
more limited in its functions and powers than a county. 
The court proceeded to cite the ruling of the Kincaid 
case in defense of its position. Thus, the position of the 
school district in Iowa was defined by the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in 1882. 
The Attorney General, in a 1912 opinion, ruled that a 
school district was not liable for injuries resulting from an 
explosion of a boiler in a school building (76). 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION, 1911. 
FACTS: An individual was injured by an explosion of a steam 
boiler, connected with a school corporation's heating plant. 
This opinion was given at the request of the State Superin-
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tendent of Public Instruction. 
ISSUE: Was a school corporation liable for injuries to an 
individual caused by the explosion of a steam boiler? 
ANSWER: No, a school corporation was not liable for injuries 
caused by the explosion of a steam boiler connected with its 
heating unit. 
REASONS: A school corporation was a public corporation 
created by statute for the purpose of executing the general 
laws and policy of the state, which require the education of 
all its youth. It was well-established that when sub­
divisions of the state were organized solely for a public 
purpose, by general law, no action lies against them for 
injury received by an individual on account of defective 
facilities, nor for the negligence of its officers of such 
sub-divisions unless a right was expressly given by statute. 
In Iowa there was no statute giving this right. 
In 1927 the opinion by the Attorney General ruled that 
school districts were not liable for injuries received by 
pupils engaging in school athletics programs (77). 
FACTS: School undoubtedly failed to provide a mat for pupils 
while boxing in school. 
ISSUES: (1) Was there a law concerning the use of a mat 
while boxing in school? (2) Could the school board be held 
liable for an injury to a pupil while in school? (3) Could 
the school board be sued, and if so, in what court? (4) Did 
the school board have a legal right to settle a claim for 
injury to a pupil while in school? (5) In case of neglect on 
the part of the coach or superintendent, could they be held 
liable? 
HELD: No. 
REASONS: (1) There was no statute requiring the use of mats. 
(2) The general doctrine was that a school corpora­
tion was not liable for non-contractual injuries. 
(3) A school was a corporation and could be sued in 
any court just the same_as any individual. 
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(4) The school board was under no legal obliga­
tion to pay, but could make a legally reason­
able settlement. 
(5) A teacher, coach, or superintendent could be 
held liable to a student injured as to "direct" 
consequence of such instructor's negligence. 
A 1930 opinion extended the immunity to cover injuries to 
visitors on school premises (78). 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION, 1930. 
FACTS: Members of a school board rented school buildings to 
an individual and while being used for rented purposes, an 
individual was injured. This request for an opinion was for 
the Board of Education at Sioux City. 
ISSUES: (1) Could an elector enjoin the directors from rent­
ing school facilities? (2) Was the school district or 
individual members of the school board liable for injuries 
sustained to individual or organization? 
HELD: (1) Yes (2) No. 
REASONS: (1) As provided by the statutes, the electors could 
or could not grant the directors the power to rent the school 
facilities. Since the power was vested in the electors, any 
elector or taxpayer could enjoin the directors from exer­
cising this power. 
(2) Neither the school board nor the school district was 
liable for resulting injuries from renting the school facili­
ties, whether the authority had been granted by the electors 
or not. 
The leading Iowa case on immunity for cities and towns 
was decided in 1931 (91). The ultimate facts relating to the 
injury were, in substance, that the city had established and, 
maintained through the park board a certain public square or 
commons, known as the city park. Within the confines of the 
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city park there had also been established and maintained a 
tourist camping ground. As part of the equipment of the 
park, there had been installed a combined teeter-totter and 
merry-go-round. 
SMITH V. CITY OF IOWA CITY. 213 IOWA 391, 1931. 
FACTS: On or about September 3, 1929, Geraldine Smith, a 
minor child of about nine years of age, went from the camp 
grounds to the park, and while engaged in playing with the 
teeter-totter was severely injured. Action was brought to 
recover damages on account thereof. 
ISSUES: (1) Was the teeter-totter an attractive nuisance? 
(2) Was the park board maintaining a nuisance? (3) Can a 
municipality in the exercise of a purely governmental 
function be liable for negligence? 
HELD; Affirmed the decision of the lower court. Ruled that 
a combined teeter-totter and merry-go-round erected and main­
tained in a city park by the city through its park board, for 
the sole purpose of amusing children, could not be deemed an 
attractive nuisance, even though the said instrument was not 
kept in repair. 
That a city in exercising its governmental power through a 
park board to acquire and maintain public parks was not 
liable in damages consequent on the negligent failure to 
keep the instrumentalities in said parks in repair; nor 
were the members of the park board individually liable for 
such nonfeasance on their part. 
REASON: The purpose of the establishment and maintenance of 
the park and of the particular, and perhaps other, devices 
therein was the use and pleasure of children. Such was the 
only purpose for which the device complained of was installed. 
It was in its nature and purpose designed to be attractive to 
children. It, therefore, very clearly did not come within 
the definition of nuisance. 
The teeter-totter was in no sense, offensive or dangerous to 
the public. It affected neither the comfort, morals nor 
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health thereof. It was not an annoyance to anyone and in no 
way operated to disturb, inconvenience or injure the public. 
It did not, therefore, come within the common-law definition 
of a nuisance nor did it come within the statutory classifica­
tion thereof. 
The construction and maintenance of a public park by a 
municipality has been repeatedly held in this state to be a 
purely governmental function. The rule long established in 
this state is that a municipality in the exercise of its 
purely governmental function, was not liable for negligence. 
It is interesting to note that the court specifically 
defines that with attractive nuisance charges there must be 
trespass, and that the history of the court shows it has 
always been reluctant to extend the doctrine of attractive 
nuisance. 
Yet, the court acknowledged that the instrument was in 
poor condition and in need of repair but refused to consider 
negligence. 
It should be remembered that in Chapter II the nuisance 
theory was explained and various definitions given by various 
authors. Also, given was the reasoning the courts have used 
when nuisance has been the charge. It should be noted that 
the court went into great detail trying to defend their 
stand in finding the city of Iowa City not guilty of the 
charge brought against them, Hamilton and Mort substantiate 
the position that the court held when they state (32, p, 283): 
"Some courts refuse to recognize a distinction between 
130 
torts committed through the maintenance of a nuisance 
and other torts, and deny recovery against the district 
in tort cases. The refusal is based upon the judicial 
conviction that the doctrine of non-liability is so 
well established that it should not be permitted to be 
circumvented by resort to the law of nuisance. The 
difficulty in determining factually whether or not the 
act complained of constitutes a nuisance renders it 
easy for the courts to avoid a nuisance; it is auto­
matically placed in the class of torts in general and 
the general rules applicable to them apply. Although 
there are a number of cases in which recovery has been 
sought on the ground that a nuisance has been main­
tained, the facts that relatively few have permitted 
recovery on that theory demonstrates the indisposition 
of courts to subsume the facts under the exception." 
Application of the doctrine of immunity to school dis­
tricts in its broadest form reached its peak in the Hibbs v. 
Independent School Pistrict of Green Mountain in 1933 (37). 
On October 8, 1929, Merle Hibbs, a pupil eight years of age, 
fell, or was thrown, from the school bus in which he was 
being transported from school to his home and received some 
serious injuries. The action brought on his behalf against 
the school district and Mary M. Wilson, the driver of the bus, 
to recover damages, resulted in a trial, in a directed verdict 
for the school district, and a verdict and judgment against 
Mary Wilson, appellant, for $750. 
HIBBS V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF GREEN MOUNTAIN, 218 
IOWA 841, 1934. 
FACTS: Merle, with his twin brother, was riding in the front 
seat with the driver of the bus. In some way not definitely 
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shown by the evidence, the right front door of the bus 
opened and Merle fell out and was injured. The negligence 
charged was the alleged failure of the driver of the bus to 
securely close the door; the latch of which, it was claimed, 
was defective. Mrs. Wilson owned the bus but the school 
district had contracted with her husband for the transporta­
tion of the students. 
The trial court, upon motion of the school district, directed 
the jury to return a verdict in its favor but declined to so 
rule upon a motion of appelant upon the ground that she was 
also charged in the performance of a governmental duty at the 
time the accident occurred. 
ISSUES: When acting in its purely governmental capacity, 
were municipalities liable in damages resulting from negli­
gence on the part of its officers, servants, and agents? 
HELD: Reversed the verdict of the lower court and ruled that 
the principle that when officers, servants, or agents of a 
municipality were engaged in performing a governmental act 
for and on behalf of the municipality, they were not liable 
in damages consequent on their negligence in doing the act, 
applied to a person who, with the knowledge and acquiescence 
of a school board, was operating for the school district a 
bus in the transportation of children to and from school, 
even though the person operating the bus was acting at the 
time in lieu of the person with whom the district had 
actually contracted for the transportation. 
REASON: No case against an employee of a school corporation 
directly involving personal liability on his part for negli­
gence causing injury had to exist for granting exemption from 
liability to the employees of other municipal corporations 
whose negligence had resulted in injuries or damages for 
which relief was sought, where the same arose while the 
municipality was engaged in the performance of a governmental 
function and to deny the same to an employee of a school 
corporation when similarly engaged. 
A school corporation, being an independent agency of the 
state for the purpose, in part, of the education of the boys 
and girls residing therein in providing for the transporta­
tion of pupils to and from school were engaged in the per­
formance of a governmental function. 
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Had the husband been driving the bus, it would have to be 
conceded that he, under the circumstances of this case, would 
be immune from liability. The appellant, with the knowledge 
and acquiescence of the school board, was performing the 
identical functions and rendering the same services as her 
husband could have rendered. Not technically an employee of 
the district, it was only because her husband, whose place 
she had taken, sustained a technical contractual relation 
thereto. The rule of nonliability existed because the 
function being performed was for the common good of all 
without any special corporation benefit or profit. No dis­
tinction in principle can be made upon the basis of which the 
general rule of nonliability shall not be applied to the 
facts of this case. The contract for carrying the pupils was 
not before the court at that time. 
In addition, the court ruled that a school board of a 
non-consolidated school district had ample power to provide 
for the transportation to and from school of pupils living an 
unreasonable distance from the school. 
A 1933 Attorney General Opinion reiterated that the 
district was not liable for negligent bus operation (79). 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION, 1933 
FACTS: The school district at Alexander owned the bodies of 
the school buses, while the drivers furnished the chassis. 
The owner-drivers wanted to turn the chassis over to the 
school district to be exempt from paying license fees. 
ISSUES; If the owner-drivers turned the chassis over to the 
school district, was the truck then exempt from a motor 
vehicle license fee? And if the school district owned and 
operated the school buses transporting children to and from 
school, was there any liability for resultant injuries? 
HELD: On the first part of the question, the statutes pro­
vided that no license fee should be collected on motor 
vehicles owned by counties, municipalities, and subdivisions 
of the state. On the second part of the question, probably 
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not, if transporting children to and from school was a 
governmental function. There probably would be no legal 
liability for damages caused by the motor buses owned and 
operated by the school district, because a school district 
was a quasi-corporation in control of public funds for 
educational purposes and was in that respect an instrument 
of the state government. A school district being a govern­
mental subdivision and not liable for injuries while engaged 
in a governmental function. 
In 1938, the Supreme Court declined to extend the doc­
trine of immunity to an independent contractor operating 
school buses under contract with a school district (70). Mr, 
Ole S. Olson, administrator of the estate of his deceased 
son, commenced action against Paul Cushman, who was a driver 
of a school bus under written contract with the Consolidated 
School District of Lloyd Township, Dickson County, to recover 
damages for the death of his son. 
OLSON V. CUSHMAN, 224 IOWA 974, 1938. 
FACTS: Elmer Robert Olson was seventeen years of age and a 
student in the Terril, Iowa high school. Paul Cushman had 
been engaged by the school district, under a written con­
tract, to transport to and from the school the pupils who 
lived in the country. On the morning of the accident, the 
bus was loaded with children on the way to the high school 
when the front part of the bus went into a ditch and the 
bus overturned on its side. Several students were injured, 
Olson and one of his companions walked towards school to 
secure help. There was evidence that within thirty minutes 
after the accident that Olson complained of a pain in the 
back of his head. For approximately two weeks thereafter he 
attended school, but each day his mother treated him for the 
trouble complained of in his neck and the back of his ear. 
This condition continued to grow worse; the pain and soreness 
were more severe each day. On the 20th of January his father 
took him to a doctor in Estherville, where the ear was 
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treated, and he was told to return the next day. When he 
returned, the doctor placed him in the hospital and the case 
was diagnosed as a middle ear infection with a mastoid 
involvement, and an operation was performed. Elmer remained 
in the hospital until his death on the l4th of February. 
ISSUE; Was the bus driver engaged in the performance of a 
governmental function for the behalf of an agent of the 
state and therefore not individually liable for any negli­
gence in such performance? 
HELD; Affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that 
a school bus driver, furnishing his own bus, under a contract 
embodying certain conditions to transport children, but not 
under the supervision, control, and regulation of the board, 
was an independent contractor liable for his own negligence 
and not an employee exercising a governmental function. 
REASON: Cushman was not an employee of the school district. 
He was an independent contractor. The contract that he had 
with the school district was set out in full. He was to 
furnish the school bus, pay all expenses, both operating and 
repair; he was to collect the pupils at certain hours and to 
return late in the afternoon to take them to their homes; he 
was either to drive the bus himself or furnish a suitable 
driver. For this service of collecting and delivering the 
pupils he was to receive so much each month. While not so 
engaged, he was at liberty to perform or do any other kind 
of work he saw fit. 
Mr. Cushman claimed that he was engaged in the perform­
ance of a governmental function for and on behalf of an agent 
of the state and was not individually liable for any negli­
gence in such performance. He used as his defense the 
results of the Hibbs case. The judge writing the opinion 
for the court said that he did not agree with the rule laid 
down in the Hibbs case, and his views were set out in a dis­
senting opinion in the case of Shirkev v. Keokuk County 
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(which will be discussed later), but regardless of his views, 
the Hibbs case was still the law of the state. 
Thus, the court reasoned that in view of the rule laid 
down in an earlier case, Paul Cushman was an independent con­
tractor and not an employee of the school district, and was 
liable for his own negligence. 
The significance of this case was that the court has 
indicated they were not in agreement with the decision of the 
Hibbs case, but it was still the law of the state. Secondly, 
Mr, Cushman was sued in this case as an independent con­
tractor and the school district was not named in the suit, 
although Mr. Cushman claimed as one of his defenses, that he 
was an employee of the school» 
The First Erosion of the Doctrine of Immunity 
Commencing in 1938, a gradual erosion of the doctrine of 
immunity was noted. In a suit arising out of injuries suf­
fered to a boy who was struck by a county-owned truck while 
riding his bicycle, the court overruled the Hibbs case and 
held the driver personally liable for his negligence (60). 
MONTANICK V. MC MILLAN, 225 IOWA 442, 1938. 
FACTS: This was an appeal from the Wapello District Court, 
Verne Montanick, who was sixteen years of age and a student at 
Ottumwa Senior High School, was returning to his home from 
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school on his bicycle. Fred McMillan was driving a truck 
belonging to Wapello County. He was crossing a sidewalk with 
his truck to enter a quarry when he struck the boy. As a 
result of the accident, this lawsuit occurred. It was brought 
by his father against Fred McMillan, the driver of the truck, 
and Wapello County, seeking damages in the amount of $27,075. 
There was a trial to the jury. Before the case was submitted, 
the plaintiff dismissed the cause of action against Wapello 
County. The jury returned a verdict of $5,000 against Fred 
McMillan. Being dissatisfied, McMillan appealed. 
ISSUES: Was the boy guilty of contributory negligence? Was 
the driver guilty of negligence? Was their exemption for 
governmental bodies and their officers and agents from 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior? Was the 
principle of the master and servant involved? 
HELD: Affirmed the verdict of the trial court and held that 
the boy was not guilty of contributory negligence, the funda­
mental and underlying law of torts was that he who does 
injury to the person or property of another is civilly 
liable in damages for the injuries inflicted. That every 
case which allows recovery against a servant can be based not 
upon any relationship growing out of the employment but upon 
the fundamental proposition that the servant violated some 
duty that he owed to the person injured. That the exemption 
accorded counties and other governmental bodies and their 
agents or employees was a limitation or exception to the rule 
of respondeat superior, and in no way affected the fundamental 
principle of torts that one who wrongfully inflicts injury 
upon another is individually liable to the injured person. 
That a governmental employee committing a tortious act which 
causes injury to another in violation of duty owed to the 
injured person, becomes, as an individual, personally liable 
in damages therefore. Hibbs case overruled. 
REASONS: The liability of the driver was not predicated upon 
any relationship growing out of his employment, but was based 
upon the fundamental and underlying law of torts. 
It was a well-established rule in this state that counties 
were not liable for torts growing out of the negligent acts 
of their agents or employees. Only, except in the Hibbs 
case, did they find that the agent or employee himself, when 
sued as an individual, rather than in his official capacity, 
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was not liable for acts of misfeasance, that is, a positive 
negligent act which caused injury and damage to another. 
Every case which allowed recovery against a servant could be 
based upon the fundamental proposition that the servant 
violated or breached some duty he owed to the person injured. 
It may be an act of misfeasance, nonfeasance or malfeasance. 
The exemption of governmental bodies and their officers from 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, was a 
limitation or exception the rule of respondeat superior, and 
in no way affected the fundamental principle of torts. In 
this case they were confronted with an act of misfeasance on 
the part of an employee of a county. 
Public service should not be a shield to protect a public 
servant from the consequences of his personal misconduct. 
There was a well-marked distinction between an act of an 
employee, agent or officer of the state or arm thereof, which 
was done as an act per se governmental in its nature and an 
act which, though performed by the agent or officer while he 
was engaged in a public duty, was nevertheless unrelated to 
the performance of the duty in any other way. The fact that 
the negligent person was a governmental employee should 
certainly not exonerate him from the consequences of his 
negligence. 
An act of misfeasance was a positive wrong, and every em­
ployee, whether employed by a private person or a municipal 
corporation, owed a duty not to injure another by a negli­
gent act of commission. It was the breach of this duty 
which the law imposed on all men that was involved, and this 
general obligation to injure no man by an act of misfeasance 
was neither increased or diminished by the fact that the 
negligent party was an employee of a municipal corporation. 
The laws of the state and nation must keep pace with condi­
tions that exist. Where a rule had its origin in the deci­
sions of the courts it may be changed by the courts in the 
light of experience unless it has become fixed by constitu­
tional or legislative provision. If the old rule was found 
to be unsuited to present conditions or was unsound, it 
should be set aside and a rule declared which was in harmony 
with these conditions and meets the demand of changes. That 
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the common-law had within itself the quality and capacity for 
growth and adaptations to new conditions, had been one of its 
most admirable features. The law has the inherent capacity 
to meet the requirements of the new and various experiences 
which arise out of the development of the country. 
Upon the question of the duty of the courts to correct their 
own decisions when they are found wrong, no matter how long 
these decisions have stood and notwithstanding there had been 
no legislative change in the law as originally construed, they 
had the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in an opinion handed down this same year. In this opinion 
the Supreme Court of the United States overruled a case that 
had been supported by other recent cases. The rule in that 
case could have been changed by legislative enactment. In 
fact, many bills were introduced to change it, but Congress 
failed to act, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 
believing the decision wrong, by a six to two opinion, re­
versed the holding of that same court more than one hundred 
years before and followed continuously to the present time. 
The court proceeded to make a distinction between an act 
of governmental nature and an act being performed by a public 
officer or agent while engaged in a public duty and said (60): 
"There is a well-marked distinction between an act of an 
employee, agent, or officer of the state or arm thereof, 
which is done as an act per se governmental in its 
nature and an act which, though performed by the agent 
or officer while he is engaged in a public duty, is 
nevertheless unrelated to the performance of the duty 
in any other way. An employee of the county may, for 
instance, during the hours of darkness step into the 
driver's seat of an automobile, and without turning 
on the lights and on the wrong side of the street, with 
the lights at an intersection set against him, at an 
excessive speed, collide with a pedestrian lawfully 
crossing at the intersection. The fact that the negli­
gent person is a governmental employee should certainly 
not exonerate him from the consequences of his negli­
gence. " 
The Court then made a distinction between acts of non-
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feasance and acts of misfeasance and quoted from the Smith v. 
Iowa City case, which was the defective playground equipment 
case cited earlier in this chapter. The court made the dis­
tinction between these two acts by saying (60): 
"An act of misfeasance is a positive wrong, and every 
employee, whether employed by a private person or a 
municipal corporation, owes a duty not to injure 
another by a negligent act of commission. It is the 
breach of this duty which the law imposes on all men 
that is involved, and this general obligation to 
injure no man by an act of misfeasance is neither 
increased or diminished by the fact that the negligent 
party is an employee of a municipal corporation," 
And so this Court, as now composed, after careful con­
sideration, had come to the conclusion that the rule an­
nounced in Hibbs case was wrong, and the opinion in that case 
was overruled; that an employee of a city, county, or state 
who commits a wrongful or tortious act, violates a duty which 
he owed to the one who is injured, and is personally liable. 
It was stated in Chapter III that the findings of this 
study depend upon the validity of the legal principle stare 
decisis. and that there would be no need for this study if 
the courts followed this principle strictly. The case just 
cited gives basis for the purpose of the study. 
It was stated at the beginning of the Montanick case in 
1938, that this was the beginning of the gradual erosion of 
the doctrine of immunity. However, the immunity of the 
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district itself had been reinforced by three 1937 court 
decisions. 
In the first decision the district was held immune for 
the death of a speaker at school exercises which resulted 
when he fell from a shakily-construeted platform (46). 
LARSEN V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANE TOWNSHIP, 223 
IOWA 691, 1937. 
FACTS: Mrs, Emma Larsen, as administrator of the estate of 
Arthur Larsen, brought suit to recover for accidental death 
of her husband in a school building of the Independent School 
District of Kane located in Pottawattami County for the amount 
of $30,000. Mr. Larsen's death came as a result of a fall in 
the school building, Mr, Larsen was to make an address to 
the school children on Armistice Day, 1935, Prior to that 
time, the school district had prepared a platform at one end 
of a hall in the said school building with three movable 
steps at the side of the platform where Mr, Larsen was to 
stand while making his address. Above this a curtain hung 
from the ceiling where it was fastened on rollers, but it was 
not fastened to the railing. Back of the curtain there was 
an opening space or stairwell to the floor below. The 
speaker, who had an artificial leg, as he mounted the plat­
form, stepped back and lost his balance; as he clutched for 
the curtain, it tore away from its mooring. He fell over the 
railing to the floor below, sustaining injuries from which 
he died in a few days. The case was tried before a jury in 
the District Court of Pottawattamie County and a verdict for 
the defendant school district was entered. 
ISSUES: Were the school district and its officers and employ­
ees guilty of certain acts and conduct consisting of omis­
sions and commissions of negligence which negligence was the 
direct and proximate cause of the injuries to the decedent, 
which resulted in his death? 
HELD: Affirmed the decision of the jury trial and held that 
a school district, organized, existing, and acting under the 
laws of the state as a governmental agency, was not liable in 
damages consequent on the negligence of its employees, or in 
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consequence of the maintenance by it, through its employees, 
of a nuisance. 
REASONS; From the decisions of the courts of Iowa, there has 
been a line of distinction between incorporated cities and 
towns and such corporations as counties, and school districts, 
the latter being what are known as quasi-corporations, and 
only for governmental purposes. A school district is an 
organization simply for the purpose of carrying on the 
schools, for that and nothing else. They were only quasi-
corporations, and in the face of the past decisions, it 
would be very disregardful of the law for the court to hold 
in a case of this character that the school district was 
liable. 
The court stated that it had in the Kincaid case plainly 
marked the distinction between municipal corporations, as 
incorporated villages, towns, and cities, and those other 
organizations, such as counties, school districts and the 
like. The court had held for more than a half a century, 
persistently and consistently, that a county could not be 
held liable for negligence in the performance of its govern­
mental functions, with the single exception of negligence in 
the construction and maintenance of bridges and approaches 
thereto. 
Further in the Lane v. District Township of Woodbury 
case, the court had defined the status of the school dis­
trict, and in the Smith v. Iowa City case, the court had 
defined the status of a municipal corporation. Therefore, 
after considering these cases and the principles laid down in 
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them and the authorities cited in these cases, the Court 
records clearly defined that the defendant was a school 
corporation for public purposes and, hence, immune. 
In the second case in 1937, the court refused to award 
damages to a painter who fell from a negligently constructed 
scaffold while painting the ceiling of a schoolroom (24). 
FORD Vo INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 223 IOWA 795, 1937. 
FACTS: This case was an appeal from the District Court of 
Page County and involved two cases, but since the same school 
district was the defendent in each case and the facts and 
issues identical, the cases were consolidated for submission 
to the court. In February, 1934, the plaintiff was employed 
as a painter by the Civil Works Administration, an instru­
mentality of the Federal Government. That previous to the 
time of such employment the Civil Works Administration and 
the defendant school district had made an agreement and 
arrangement whereby the plaintiff, with others, were to be 
employed in the painting of a room in the high school build­
ing. A temporary scaffold was built and placed in room by 
the school district for the use of the painters. The scaf­
fold broke and partially fell and the painters were injured. 
The petition alleged that because of the faulty construction 
the scaffold constituted an unsafe place to work and the 
school district was aware of this. The lower court dismissed 
the petitions and a judgment was entered in each case against 
the plaintiff for costs. 
ISSUES: Was the act of repairing and painting, as it was, a 
ministerial act, and therefore, the rule of nonliability on 
the part of municipal corporations for negligence in perform­
ing governmental functions should be applicable? 
HELD: Finding no error in the lower court's decision, the 
ruling was affirmed, and held, that a school district in 
causing its schoolhouse or the rooms thereof to be painted 
must be deemed as engaged in a governmental function with 
complete exemption from liability for negligence in so 
doing. So held where it was urged that the district had 
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contracted to furnish the workmen a "safe place" in which to 
work. 
REASONS: An anology existed between this case and the Larsen 
case which sustained the contention of the defendant therein 
that in the operation and maintenance of its school building 
the district was acting in purely governmental capacity. The 
painting of the ceiling was clearly one of those things 
incidental to the maintenance of a school building of the 
district and was not proprietary but governmental in nature. 
A school district was not liable on account of negligent 
construction or failure to keep in repair its school build­
ings, the district being an instrument of the state for the 
administration of the laws. 
The third 1937 case involved a collision between a 
private automobile and a county road maintainer (89). 
Although the maintainer did not display statutory warning 
lights, the county immunity was upheld, and the court ob­
served that school districts enjoy the same degree of immunity 
as counties. 
SHIRKEY V. KEOKUK COUNTY, 225 IOWA 1159, 1937. 
FACTS: This was an appeal case from Keokuk District Court in 
a suit to recover damages of the defendant Keokuk County, the 
members of the Board of Supervisors of the said county, and 
the operation of a maintainer in use by said county, asking 
for a judgment of $26,446.60 with interest. In the original 
hearing of the case by the Court, the decision of the lower 
court was upheld. The plaintiff was riding in an automobile 
owned and driven by her husband on a county road. William 
Kelley was pulling the maintainer with a tractor without 
lights of any kind thirty minutes after sunset on the left 
side of the road. A collision resulted whereby plaintiff was 
injured. The case was reheard by the court in 1938. 
ISSUES: Was the county liable in cases of this character? 
HELD: The decision of the lower court was upheld in the 
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immunity of the county and the supervisors, but the operator 
of the maintainer was held personally liable. 
I 
1. Neither a county as a quasi-corporation nor its board of 
supervisors is liable for the negligence of its employee in 
operating after dark a road maintainer without lights on the 
left-hand side of a highway, and in an action by a motorist 
who sustained injuries on account of such negligence demur­
rers to the petition by the county and its board of super­
visors were properly sustained. 
2. Counties and school districts, being political or quasi-
corporations not clothed with full corporate powers as are 
cities and towns, cannot be sued for negligence, and the 
question of the exercise of a governmental function is 
immaterial. 
3. Mandatory statutes requiring danger lights on road 
machinery and providing punishment for their violation of a 
duty owed to the injured person, becomes, as an individual, 
personally liable in damages therefore. 
REASONS: The precise question before them had been recently 
ruled upon in the Montanick case and they were staying with 
that ruling. The reason for this rule had been exhaustively 
discussed and considered in that opinion, and there was no 
reason to pursue the discussion further. The court was not 
inclined to change the rule laid down therein, 
MINORITY OPINION (one Justice): At the time of the Hibbs 
decision he was a member of the court. He did not agree then 
and does not now on the decision rendered. This was the only 
Iowa case where a driver and owner of a vehicle had been 
excused for negligent operation of his vehicle. The mantle 
of the protection of governmental immunity granted the driver 
of the school bus complete immunity for negligent operation 
of her own bus. 
If this be the law, then the owner and operator of a motor 
vehicle need no longer pay attention to the law of the road, 
or traffic rules and regulations, if in such operation of his 
motor vehicle he is engaged in a governmental function. Such 
a rule has no basis in reason or authority. In fact, the 
general rule that the employee of a municipal corporation was 
liable to a third person injured by his negligent act of a 
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misfeasance was the law of Iowa until the decision in the 
Hibbs case. 
This case was the first case in which there was a dis­
senting opinion by a member of the court. One member wrote a 
dissenting opinion of the first hearing of the case and then 
upon the re-hearing this member changed his opinion to an 
affirmation and a member who affirmed the majority opinion 
on the first hearing, dissented on the re-hearing. 
It was also the first case in which the Court indicated 
that it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, to 
change the statutes. 
It is interesting to note that the judge indicated he 
was a member of the court when the Hibbs decision was made, 
and he did not agree with the decision; yet the record 
indicates there was no voting against this decision or dis­
senting opinions. 
In summary, during this two-year period, the immunity of 
the quasi-municipal corporation still holds, but the immunity 
of the individual employee has fallen. The question still 
remains as to what was the function of the employee. 
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Nuisance Cases 
The year of 1939 marked further erosion of the doctrine. 
Until then the immunity of public bodies included liability 
based on the nuisance theory, as well as that based upon 
negligent acts or omissions. In the first two nuisance cases 
an athletic field was held not to constitute a nuisance (14), 
CASTEEL V. TOWN OF AFTON, 227 IOWA 61, 1939, 
FACTS: This case was an appeal from the District Court of 
Union County. On June 24, 1936, the plaintiffs filed a peti­
tion, alleging that they were owners and occupants of a 
residential property in the town of Afton, that the said town 
was the owner of an adjoining property which was used as a 
public playground and athletic field, equipped with an 
electric outdoor lighting system; that the town permitted 
various persons to hold athletic contests and games on the 
said property at any time; that the playground was a nuisance; 
that the persons using the said grounds would bat, throw, and 
kick balls onto their property, knocking down and destroying 
gardens and plant life, and that they had come onto their 
premises to retrieve the balls, and while so doing had broken 
down and destroyed fences, vegetables, and fruit trees. They 
stated that the person used the grounds at night and that 
such grounds were lighted and the lights shown and reflected 
into their house; and that such persons using the grounds used 
vulgar and profane language that could be heard by the plain­
tiff. That because of these lights, profane and vulgar 
language, and the destroying of the plant life their health 
and working efficiency was jeopardized. They asked for an 
injunction, temporary and permanent. Trial was held to the 
court on April 27, 1937, and a decree rendered in favor of 
the town. The Casteels appealed, 
ISSUES; Was there action in equity to enjoin and restrain 
defendant from maintaining a nuisance and continuing repeated 
trespassing on the plaintiff's property? 
HELD: Affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that 
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the facts did not warrant issuance of an injunction to 
restrain such use as a nuisance. 
REASONS: A person who lives in a city, town, or village 
must, of necessity submit himself to the consequences and 
obligations of the occupations which be carried on in his 
immediate neighborhood, which are necessary for trade and 
commerce and also for the enjoyment of property and the 
benefits of the inhabitants of the place, and matters which, 
although themselves annoying, are in the nature of ordinary 
incidents of city or village life and cannot be complained 
of as a nuisance. 
Playgrounds and athletic fields are of advantage to the 
health and well-being of the community and are not per se 
nuisances, though they can be conducted as to become 
nuisances. 
In a second case in 1941, a school district was held 
liable for damages to windows and to shrubs of a private 
property owner whose home abutted the school playground, and 
the school district was ordered to provide better supervision 
of its playground (67). 
NESS V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SIOUX CITY, 230 IOWA 
1159, 1941. 
FACTS: This case was appealed from the District Court of 
Woodbury County. Mr. Ness acquired his residence in Sioux 
City in 1913. Subsequently, the school district built a 
junior high school west of and adjacent to his home. The 
district maintained a playground south of his property. 
There was an alley between the two properties. Mr. Ness's 
complaint was that the students played baseball on the 
playground with the consent, encouragement and supervision 
of the school district; that the school children repeatedly 
trespassed on his premises and had destroyed his flower beds, 
gardens, trees and vegetation, and that baseballs had 
seriously damaged his property; that the playing of the ball 
games created artificial dust storms which interfered with 
the comfortable enjoyment of his home; that he had received 
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and was in fear of receiving personal injuries from balls 
batted onto his premises. The school district maintained 
that the operation of the playground was in the exercise of 
a governmental function and denied that it constituted a 
nuisance and that trespasses and damages, if any, were not 
caused by them. 
ISSUES: Was the immunity of a governmental agency for 
liability for negligence in the exercise of governmental 
functions exempt from liability for a nuisance created and 
maintained by it? 
HELD: Affirmed and modified the ruling of the lower court 
and granted the plaintiff $300 for damages. 
REASONS: Where a school district conducts a playground in 
such a manner as to constitute a private nuisance to an ad­
joining property owner, it is liable for damages, since the 
majority rule is that the immunity of a governmental agency 
for liability for negligence in the exercise of governmental 
functions does not exempt it from liability for a nuisance 
created and maintained by it. 
In an action to enjoin a school district from maintaining a 
private nuisance created by school children playing ball on 
property of the school district adjoining that of plaintiff, 
a decree that would compel the school district to prohibit 
the ball playing on the playground in order to avoid con­
tempt of the injunction was too stringent. The playing of 
baseball on a playground is not a nuisance per se. 
Nevertheless, in this same period, school district 
immunity for negligence was upheld in an Attorney General's 
Opinion in 1939 stating a school district was not liable for 
injuries to a visitor who fell from an unrailed porch of a 
school building when it was being used for a Grange meeting 
(80) .  
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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION, 1939. 
FACTS: The Independence Township School Board in Jasper 
County allowed the Baxter Grange to use the school facilities 
for meetings without compensation. After a meeting one per­
son attending a Grange meeting departed by the way of the 
front porch. Instead of going off the front of the porch, 
where the steps were located, the individual turned to the 
left of the porch and fell off breaking his arm. The porch 
was unlighted and had no protective railing. 
ISSUE: Was the school corporation liable for damages arising 
out of said injuries? 
HELD : No. 
REASONS: The statutes provided that the school directors 
could authorize the use of school buildings for the purpose 
of meetings of Granges. A school district was an organiza­
tion simply for the purpose of carrying on the school. It 
would be very disregardful of the law to say that the school 
district was liable. The use of the school building by the 
Grange was authorized by law and did not in this case change 
the function of the school corporation from governmental to 
proprietary. 
Proprietary Function 
A decision by the Supreme Court of Iowa in 1951, in which 
a city was held liable for damages resulting from negligently 
killing bees of its tenant on a leased portion of a municipal 
airport, created a further inroad on the immunity doctrine, 
but only with respect to proprietary functions (11). 
It should be noted in asking for the Attorney General's 
Opinion in 1939 that there was the question posed as to 
governmental or proprietary function. 
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BROWN V. SIOUX CITY, 242 IOWA 1386, 1951. 
FACTS: C. A. Brown sued the city of Sioux City alleging in 
his petition that in 1948 he rented certain property located 
at the municipal airport for the purpose of maintaining and 
establishing colonies of bees thereon; that in August of that 
year the city was negligent in spraying the air base property 
with a poisonous substance called chlordane so that his bees 
were sprayed and the bees picked up the poisonous substance 
on their bodies and carried it back to the bee colonies with 
the result that his bees died, his honey was permeated with 
the poisonous substance and rendered unfit, and the hives 
also were rendered unfit for further use. His petition 
alleged that the city operated the Sioux City Air Base in its 
proprietary capacity. At the conclusion of the evidence the 
trial court submitted the questions of defendant's negli­
gence, and whether defendant was acting in a governmental or 
proprietary capacity to the jury. After a verdict for 
plaintiff for $1500, the court sustained defendant's motion 
for judgment notwithstanding verdict on the ground "that the 
operation of the air base was a governmental function; that 
the farming operation in connection therewith was but an 
incident thereto." 
ISSUES: Was the city acting in a governmental or proprietary 
capacity? 
HELD: Reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded a 
new trial and held, that there was nothing in the statutes 
which demands a holding that a city was acting in a govern­
mental capacity when it leased a portion of its property 
which was not being used for the purpose of the airport. 
REASONS: While as a rule a municipality in the exercise of 
its purely governmental functions is not liable for negli­
gence, the rule is to be strictly construed, and where there 
is doubt as to whether the city is liable the question will 
be resolved against the municipality. 
A city has the right to lease a portion of a municipal air­
port not required for municipal purposes, but in leasing its 
property to tenants, it assumes the duty of all landlords to 
exercise ordinary care so as not to injure a tenant in occu­
pancy thereof. When renting such land the city is acting in 
a proprietary capacity. 
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When a city leased a portion of its airport land to plaintiff 
for the purpose of an apiary, it had the liability arising 
from a landlord-and-tenant relationship, and was therefore 
liable for negligent acts in spraying with poison land 
adjacent to that leased to plaintiff resulting in killing his 
bees and spoiling his hives and honey. 
The city cannot accept and exercise the special privilege of 
leasing its property to tenants without assuming the re­
sponsibilities and liabilities flowing from that relation­
ship. Surely the city in its capacity as landlord has the 
same duty all landlords assume, namely, to exercise ordinary 
care so as not to injure a tenant in the occupancy of the 
leased premises. When renting the land the city was acting 
in a proprietary capacity. A good example of two-fold 
actions, one proprietary and one governmental, performed by 
a city, is present in a city's operation of a municipal 
electric light plant. 
Similarly, on the ground that it was engaged in a 
proprietary function, a county hospital was held liable, in 
1957, for negligent injuries to a patient (97). 
WITTMER V. LETTS, 248 IOWA 648, 1957. 
FACTS: This was an appellant case from the District Court of 
Washington County, Mrs. Wittmer's petition alleged the 
establishment, operation, and maintenance of the hospital in 
Washington County; that she was a paying patient therein and 
sustained injuries by a fall due to the excessive wax upon 
the floor of the hospital. The defendants were Letts, chair­
man of the Board of Trustees for Washington County, the 
individual hospital trustees, the superintendent of the 
hospital, the hospital, and the County of Washington. 
ISSUE: Was a county liable in damages to one who, as a pay 
patient in a county hospital, sustains injuries due to the 
negligence of the hospital employee? 
HELD: Reversed the ruling of the lower court and remanded 
for a new trial and held, that a county hospital established 
under the statutes was voluntary assumption of function by 
residents of the county and its operation was proprietary and 
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should be considered in the same light as a private hospital 
as far as liability to pay patient for injury was concerned. 
REASONS: The law in this state is well settled that private 
hospitals, charitable or otherwise, are liable in tort for 
injuries to pay patients injured through the negligence of 
their employees. 
The motion to dismiss as to all defendants, other than the 
county, rests upon the contention that they, being merely 
agents of the county and performing a governmental function, 
are entitled to the same immunity as is the county. There 
being no immunity in the county it must necessarily follow 
that there is no immunity as to them. 
The question of immunity from tort liability by cities 
and incorporated towns, as well as by counties and school 
districts, had been before the court upon numerous occasions 
and involved many factual situations. The Wittmer case, 
however, appeared to be the first where the functioning of a 
county hospital was involved. 
At first glance, these two decisions seem of little 
concern to Iowa school districts which have been held to have 
no proprietary functions as was decided in the Ford case and 
the Attorney General's Opinion in 1940. 
However, it should be remembered that in Chapter II the 
position of proprietary function in regard to various states 
was discussed. It would appear that all activities performed 
by any governmental unit, within constitutionally or legis­
latively assigned powers, were obviously governmental. Of 
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those governmental, some are recognized in this distinction 
as being more customarily performed by private industry, 
historically less associated with government alone. These, 
when they produce revenue or profit, have been termed 
"proprietary" for the purpose of exemption from governmental 
immunity and have been found to be non-governmental. 
Insurance 
In Illinois, warning of the complete collapse of the 
doctrine of school district immunity marked by the Molitor 
case, seems to have been furnished in a prior case decision 
in which a school was held liable on the ground that it 
happened to be carrying a policy of insurance fully covering 
such liability. 
In this leading case, immunity was removed to the extent 
of the insurance carried (59). The suit alleged the negli­
gence of a charitable institution, Bradley University. The 
facts of the case were that the plaintiff fell from a tres­
pass on May 2, 1940, while preparing for a circus in physical 
education class. The Supreme Court of Illinois overruled the 
lower court which dismissed the case. The court ruled that 
the trusts were not impaired or diminished by the judgment. 
The decision seemed to impart liability if insured. However, 
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the decision did not really create liability; it only fixed 
the manner of collection. 
A search of the very recent Iowa case decisions for 
similar warnings brings to light a 1957 case decision in 
which the Supreme Court of Iowa stated that the purchase of 
liability insurance by a city did not amount to a waiver of 
its immunity from liability for negligent acts of its employ­
ees who were engaged in performance of a governmental 
function (53). 
MC GRATH BUILDING C. V. CITY OF BETTENDORF, 248 IOWA 1386, 
1957. 
FACTS; The case as made by plaintiff's petition is that on 
October 18, 1956, the plaintiff was the owner of two houses 
located on Custer Terrace, an unpaved street in the defendant 
city. Several months prior to the date named, the Iowa-
Illinois Gas & Electric Company, the holder of a franchise 
for furnishing natural gas in Bettendorf, had installed a 
main or pipe line in the street in front of plaintiff's 
houses, with a service line extending into the house known as 
105 Custer Terrace and connecting with a meter in the base­
ment. On the date in question, the city through its employ­
ees, was operating a road grader in the street in front of 
plaintiff's houses, for the purpose of deepening a ditch 
along the north side of the street and grading it. It was 
alleged that the gas main in the street was only five inches 
underground, and was struck by defendant's grader several 
times, causing the service line to be disconnected from the 
meter. This permitted gas to escape into the basement of 
105 Custer Terrace; it became ignited and an explosion re­
sulted which entirely demolished that house and severely 
damaged plaintiff's adjoining house, 109 Custer Terrace. 
Negligence of the defendant city was alleged in various ways 
and damages were asked. This case was an appeal from a 
ruling of the District Court of Scott County and concerned 
the alleged error of the trial court in striking three 
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affirmative defenses pleaded by the defendant. 
ISSUES: Did the purchase of liability insurance by a city or 
town create a waiver of its immunity from the application of 
the doctrine of respondeat superior to the acts of its 
employees in performing governmental functions? 
HELD: Affirmed in part, reversed in part the ruling of the 
lower court and remanded for a new trial and held, that the 
statutes empowering cities and towns to purchase liability 
insurance did not enlarge the liability of a city or town 
which purchases such insurance; and, the purchase of lia­
bility insurance by a city or town does not create a waiver 
of its immunity from the application of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior to the acts of its employees in perform­
ing governmental functions. 
REASONS: The insurance the municipalities were authorized to 
purchase was for protection against any liability the munici­
pal employees or the municipal corporation mav incur. There 
was no expression on legislative policy. It was permitted 
only to insure against any liability which might be incurred 
and there were even at the time of the enactment of the 
statute, many potential liabilities which both the munici­
pality and its employees might incur. 
Neither the city nor its employees were protected against 
liability for negligence incurred in performing proprietary 
functions; and the city at least had liability for its 
failure to keep its streets and parks reasonably safe and 
free from nuisance. A legislative purpose to enlarge the 
potential liability of the city or town carrying insurance 
could not be found in the statutes. An indemnity policy was 
for the purpose of protection against liability and not for 
the creation or increase of liability. 
It was interesting to note in this case that the plain­
tiff pleaded for the court to overrule the doctrine of 
immunity. The court replied that they had cited in several 
previous cases that in their opinion, though the doctrine was 
largely of common-law origin, any substantial modification of 
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doctrine must come from legislation. 
It would seem the better part of prudence that all 
school personnel be protected as to their potential personal 
liability by insurance. Insofar as this concerns drivers of 
school buses and other school vehicles, authority exists for 
the local school board to pay for the policy. Whether addi­
tional authority exists for the board to purchase insurance 
for its employees against liability, arising out of other 
acts, is controversial by reason of ambiguity of the per­
tinent statute. 
The Iowa State Education Association has adopted an 
insurance plan (see Appendix) providing general liability 
insurance for its members as part of their membership service 
since 1959. The insurance is underwritten by the Horace Mann 
Insurance Company and currently agrees to pay on behalf of 
the teacher all sums up to the amount of $50,000, which the 
teacher might become obligated to pay by reason of liability 
imposed by law for damages because of bodily injury caused by 
the teacher's personal acts arising out of and in the course 
of the teacher's duties as an employee of the board of educa­
tion. The insurance company also agrees to pay for the 
teacher's defense in suit for damages even if suit is ground­
less, false, or fraudulent. 
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Recent Expansion of Exceptions 
Recent Iowa cases tending to broaden the existing 
exceptions to the immunity doctrine occurred in 1963. 
In the first case, the plaintiff was a truck driver 
delivering a sheet of plate glass to a residence (21), 
ENGMAN V. CITY OF DES MOINES, 225 IOWA 1039, 1963. 
FACTS: The driver parked his truck across the street from 
the house where he intended to make delivery and started 
across the street carrying a sheet of glass. Midway to the 
other side, he tripped in a chuck-hole and fell. The hole in 
which he tripped was not large enough to interfere with 
vehicular travel on the street. (1) There was evidence that 
the plaintiff was confined in the hospital and at home for 
sixty days following the injury, (2) An operation on the 
Lunar nerve was necessary and he was in the hospital and at 
home for twenty-four more days, for a total of twelve weeks 
in all. (3) There was evidence that he wore a body cast for 
an additional half month and worked part-time only, for many 
weeks. (4) His wages at the time of the injury were $100 a 
week. (5) The corporation of which he was one of the major 
stockholders, provided sick-leave benefits which paid his 
salary when he was off work. The jury in the lower court 
returned a verdict of $25,000 for the truck driver and the 
City of Des Moines appealed, 
ISSUES: Was there contributory negligence on the part of the 
injured truck driver? 
HELD: Affirmed the ruling of the lower court on the condi­
tion that the plaintiff should, within thirty days from the 
filing of the opinion, file a remitter of all the judgment in 
excess of $19,000 with interest on such excess; otherwise a 
new trial would be granted. 
REASONS: Evidence, that plaintiff, who was not familiar with 
the portion of the street where he fell, was carrying a 
wrapped piece of glass and walking cautiously, did not see 
the hole in the street, was sufficient to generate a jury 
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question on the issue of contributory negligence. In an 
action for injuries to a pedestrian who fell over a defect 
in the city street, an instruction referring to plaintiff's 
duties in exercising the care of a careful and prudent per­
son and the duty of the City to maintain the streets in a 
reasonably safe condition, did correctly advise the jury as 
to the law in sufficiently specific terms under the facts. 
The Court affirmed the verdict of the lower court, but 
concluded a judgment of $19,000 was the largest amount which 
the rule of fair compensation would permit and that any amount 
in excess thereof would be excessive. 
It was pointed out that there were no sidewalks on either 
side of the street and that in the absence of sidewalks 
leading to established crosswalks, the city should have 
foreseen that pedestrians would be likely to walk in the 
parts of the street intended for vehicular travel. 
The decision appears to establish a duty to maintain the 
surface of all streets not paralleled by sidewalks in the 
same state of perfection for pedestrian use usually required 
in sidewalk cases. 
Another 1963 decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa, the 
plaintiff was a twelve year old girl who was pushed into a 
creek by a five year old boy (62). 
MURPHY V. CITY OF WATERLOO, 225 IOWA 557, 1963. 
FACTS: This was an action for damages against the City of 
Waterloo. The creek formed part of the Waterloo storm sewer 
system. It was maintained by the city. Negligence was 
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claimed in failing to place a fence or barrier between tine 
creek and nearby sidewalk to obviate a serious hazard. When 
pushed into the creek, she struck her head on some cement 
clocks at the bottom of the creek and sustained a concussion 
of her skull. The jury rendered a verdict in her favor in 
the amount of $10,000 and a verdict for her father for 
hospital and doctor bills paid by him in the amount of $736,80. 
The city appealed. 
ISSUES: Was the city guilty of negligence and was there 
forseeability of injury? 
HELD; Affirmed the verdict of the trial court, and held that 
the city was negligent in failing to erect a barrier near 
the sidewalk, and to construe negligence, it was not neces­
sary that defendant could have foreseen the particular 
injury that resulted provided it should have foreseen its 
omission to act would probably result in injury of some kind 
to some person. 
REASONS: Cities shall have the care, supervision, and con­
trol of all public highways, streets, avenues, alley, public 
squares, and commons within the city, and shall cause the 
same to be kept open and in repair and free from nuisances. 
The duty to maintain the streets in a reasonably safe condi­
tion for travel includes, when reasonably necessary, the 
erection of barriers or guard-rails along grades and at 
other dangerous places. 
The creek ran through her father's back yard. There was 
conflicting testimony as to whether the girl was standing in 
the yard or on the sidewalk when pushed. The place where she 
went into the creek was about twelve feet from the sidewalk. 
After the accident, the city erected a snow fence along the 
bank but it appeared it trespassed upon the private property 
in so doing. Nevertheless, the court held that the act of 
erecting the fence after the accident, was admissable and 
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sufficient to show, for purposes of the claim, that the city 
had control of the property where the accident occurred. 
This, of course, raised the practical question as to how 
far a city must go to remedy defects on private property. 
In the third 1963 case, the court held a county sheriff 
guilty of negligence (58). 
MOORE V. MURPHY, 2 54 IOWA 909, 1963. 
FACTS; The plaintiff, Moore, brought action for damages 
against Johnson County, the Board of Supervisors, and A. J. 
Murphy, sheriff, alleging he sustained personal injuries 
while in the custody of the sheriff. The plaintiff alleged 
that while he was a prisoner in the Johnson County jail, the 
sheriff removed him from his cell, contrary to the statutes 
of the State of Iowa, and ordered him to climb a ladder 
placed in position by the sheriff. He said that the ladder 
was wobbly and that he had complained to the sheriff of this 
fact. The sheriff then held the ladder and told the 
plaintiff to paint. The sheriff. Murphy, then walked away 
from the ladder and the ladder fell with the prisoner, and 
he was injured. The lower court held that the sheriff was 
in the performance of his duty as required by law and that 
he was working in his governmental capacity. If he were 
guilty of any acts of negligence, it was nonfeasance rather 
than malfeasance or misfeasance and under the numerous 
holdings of the Iowa Supreme Court, he was not liable for 
damages in case of nonfeasance. The plaintiff appealed. 
ISSUES: Was an employee of a county not personally liable 
for a breach of duty to the general public? 
HELD: Reversed the decision of the lower court and held the 
sheriff personally liable for breach of duty to an injured 
party. 
REASONS: There was a duty to the public to keep custody of 
the plaintiff. And this duty included the right to require 
him to perform labor. The sheriff did, however, have a duty 
to furnish the prisoner safe equipment and a duty to refrain 
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from ordering him to climb an unsafe ladder, he also had the 
duty to the prisoner to continue holding it as long as it was 
necessary for the plaintiff's safety. The rule was well-
established that as to the county and the individual members 
of the Board of Supervisors, there was no liability for non­
feasance in the exercise of a governmental function. As to 
employees, the rule was that a tortious act which causes 
injury to another in violation of a duty owed to the injured 
party, makes the employee personally liable. 
One narrow question was considered in the appeal; that 
was, whether the plaintiff pleaded negligence constituting 
nonfeasance or misfeasance. The opinion was that it was 
misfeasance and as such, it brought the claim within one of 
the many exceptions to the court-made doctrine of govern­
mental immunity from liability for torts. 
The court reasoned that in recent years much had been 
written by legal scholars criticizing the doctrine of 
immunity, and that it has been abrogated by many other 
courts. All seemed to agree that the concept originated 
with Russell v. The Men of Devon case and came to this 
country as English common-law, which the American courts have 
continued to follow, although the English courts soon after 
that decision, ceased to follow the rule. The court con­
cluded (58): 
"With such a wide trend established by these and other 
decisions those who rely on immunity as a defense must 
realize our court made doctrine of governmental im­
munity may be subjected to a re-examination in the 
near future. My concurrence in the present opinion 
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is based on the narrow issue decided, A re-evaluation 
of the entire immunity doctrine can wait until the 
question is properly presented." 
The Culmination 
Two decisions by the Supreme Court of Iowa in 1964 just 
about wiped away all of the remaining vestiges of the im­
munity doctrine for cities and towns and for school districts. 
In February of 1964 the Supreme Court stated in 
Linstrom v. Mason City case that the theory of governmental 
immunity had faded in the face of statutory responsibility 
for streets and public places (49). The Court's opinion in 
the case was the complete opposite of earlier rulings in 
regard to municipalities. 
LINSTROM V. MASON CITY, 126 N. W. 2d 292, 1964. 
FACTS: Mrs. Linstrom, accompanied by her daughter, visited 
the city library in Mason City. One of the librarians men­
tioned with pride the gardens in the rear of the library and 
how to get to them. Mrs. Linstrom and her daughter began an 
unattended tour of the garden area. While descending the 
rough hewn steps, Mrs. Linstrom fell and was injured. To 
recover for her injuries, she sued the city alleging negli­
gence incident to the building and maintenance of the steps 
by the city, proximate cause, her own freedom from con­
tributory negligence and damage. The case was tried and 
submitted to the jury and the jury returned a verdict for the 
city. In a motion for a new trial, Mrs. Linstrom attacked 
the proprietary of these instructions given the jury in a 
case against a city. The trial court in a carefully con­
sidered opinion concluded that precedent, if not logic, made 
the limitations in an ordinary invitee case improper in a 
case against the city. A new trial was ordered and the city 
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appealed, 
ISSUES: Was there a distinction between the responsibility 
of a city to persons using municipal facilities such as parks 
and the liability of other owners to invitees? 
HELD: A higher degree of care was required in landlord-tenant 
common-way area matters than in ordinary business invitee 
cases, 
REASONS: The duty to keep premises safe for invitees applied 
only to defects or conditions which were in the nature of 
hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like, in 
that they were not known to the invitee, and would not be 
observed by him in the exercise of ordinary care. The 
invitee assumes all normal, obvious, or ordinary risks 
attendant on the use of the premises, and the owner occupant 
was not under duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so 
as to obviate known and obvious dangers. 
It was an unquestioned rule in the state that cities and 
towns were required to keep all streets and public places 
within their limits, and open for public use, free from 
dangerous obstructions and pitfalls. 
The statute did not make a city an insurer of safety of users 
of its streets and places, but it did impose a different 
standard of care than rests upon private owners. Municipal 
and private obligations not being the same, jury instructions 
peculiarly applicable to ordinary invitee cases were not 
appropriate in city cases. 
Even though a city library may be administered by trustees, 
it was city property offering a service supported primarily 
by city taxes. It was not comparable to a city power or 
water department's selling a service or commodity. 
Even though the garden area might be part of the whole 
library complex for the purpose of supervision, it was still 
a park area and not a library. It had the features of a park 
and none of the features of a library. The responsibility of 
the city for the safe maintenance of such areas had been well-
settled. 
The Court held that the sole question before it was the 
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distinction, if any, between the responsibility of a city to 
persons using municipal facilities such as parks and the 
liability of other property owners to invitees. Under court 
cases there was a clear line of demarcation between the 
responsibility of a city and that of a business proprietor or 
owner to an invitee. The limitations on liability appearing 
in business invitee cases do not appear in cases against a 
city. 
The Iowa Supreme Court in a five-to-four vote, ruled on 
April 8, 1964, in the Bover v. Iowa High School Athletic 
Association case, not to abolish governmental immunity at 
this time (9). 
BOYER V. IOWA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, SUPREME COURT 
OF IOWA, APRIL 8, 1964. 
FACTS: Marion Boyer and Carol Garland sued the Iowa High 
School Athletic Association and the Independent School Dis­
trict of Mason City for damages they sustained when bleachers 
collapsed at the high school district tournament basketball 
game in Mason City. The trial court returned a verdict in 
favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed. 
ISSUES: Should the entire burden of damages resulting from 
wrongful acts of the government be imposed upon the single 
individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed 
among the entire community constituting the government, 
where it could be done without a hardship, and where it 
justly belonged? 
HELD: Affirmed the decision of the trial court, and held 
that school districts were immune from liability in tort for 
the personal injuries or the death of pupils or other persons 
resulting from dangerous, defective, unsafe, or negligent 
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condition of school buildings, school grounds, or other school 
facilities or equipment on school-owned property. 
The question of governmental functions was decided affirma­
tively by the trial court and the question was not raised 
here. 
It had been public policy that the relaxation of governmental 
immunity should come about by legislative acts and by the 
Tort Claims Act which passed the Senate in the last session 
but not the House. The legislative acts, however, have not 
mentioned school districts and this may mean more than tacit 
approval of the Court's stand. 
REASONS: The Court would not change the rule but believed 
that it was strictly up to the legislature to change the 
rule. 
MINORITY OPINION (four justices): In the past the Court had 
suggested abrogation should come from the legislature. 
Nothing had been done to eliminate the court-made unjust 
rule. It should be abrogated now. Where this had happened 
in other states, legislative action soon followed. 
It was of the greatest importance that the law should be 
settled in fairness to the trial courts, to the legal pro­
fession, and above all, to the citizens. The law should be 
progressive; it should advance with changing conditions. 
Legal authority must be respected; not because it was 
venerable with age, but because it was important that courts, 
and lawyers and their clients would know what the law was and 
order their affairs accordingly. 
The law's emphasis generally was on liability, rather than 
immunity, for wrong doing. Charity was generally no defense. 
It was the legislature, not the courts, who should create 
and grant immunity. The fact that the courts may have at an 
earlier date, in response to what appeared good as a matter 
of policy, created an immunity did not appear as a sound 
reason for continuing the same, when under all legal theories 
it was basically unsound, and especially so when reasons upon 
which it was built no longer existed. 
Chief Justice Garfield, who wrote the majority opinion 
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pointed to language in several Iowa statutes which he said 
demonstrated legislative recognition of the immunity doctrine. 
In view of such recognition, it was the majority opinion that 
abolition of the immunity doctrine was a matter for legisla­
tive rather than judicial action. The statutes cited were a 
1951 statute providing that when a city fire department 
answered certain calls outside city limits, the same immunity 
applied as inside city limits. A 1959 statute authorized 
public bodies to purchase liability insurance for "proprie­
tary" activities. The 1963 "home rule" statute referred to 
powers 5 privileges, and immunities of municipal corporations. 
The majority opinion reviewed and commented upon past 
Iowa cases, as well as recent immunity cases in other states 
for the purpose of demonstrating within the prerogatives of 
the legislature rather than of the Court. 
They were fully aware of the trend away from govern­
mental immunity and they had made note of this in the Brown 
V. Sioux City case and other cases. In these cases, the 
Court had said that any substantial modification of the rule 
must come by legislation. Subsequent decisions had adhered 
to this rule. The consideration of the problems of legisla­
tive versus judicial abrogation of the rule left them satis­
fied the policy they had announced was the preferred one. 
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The majority opinion joined with the concurring opinion 
in the Moore v. Murphy case, which warned that the doctrine 
of governmental immunity might be re-examined in the near 
future. This had now been done. The conclusion reached from 
such re-examination was, that abrogation of the doctrine 
should come from the legislative, not judicial action. This 
was the position the Court had repeatedly taken, and in most 
instances by the other courts. In the words of the Court 
( 9 ) :  
"Our problem is whether we should now interfere and by 
judicial decision overrule a public policy doctrine 
that is more appropriately left to the legislature. 
We think not." 
The dissent in the Bover case, written by Justice Moore, 
preferred Court abolishment to legislative abolishment. 
Several times in the past this Court had suggested abrogation 
should come from the legislature. Nothing had been done to 
eliminate our court-made unjust rule. They should abrogate 
the rule now. As demonstrated in the case in other states, 
where the immunity doctrine had been abrogated by the courts, 
necessary legislative actions soon followed. 
He referred to a recent Missouri case where the Supreme 
Court of Missouri simply refused to follow the modern author­
ities on the subject of whether the court or the legislature 
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should abrogate the doctrine. That court held that the 
matter should be left to the legislature because several 
state legislatures had taken some action after abrogation by 
the court. "The fallacy of such an approach is clearly shown 
by the question--What has happened in Missouri? the answer--
Nothing." 2. 
He continued that the problem before them now was 
whether more harm would be done by overruling their previous 
cases in order to install what they thought was clearly the 
correct principle, or adhering to an unsound decision in the 
interest of the rule of stare decisis. That it was of the 
greatest importance that the law be settled for all concerned. 
Justice Moore concluded in fairness to the able trial 
court that he, like each trial judge in their last three 
cited cases, was duty bound to follow precedent. It was the 
Court's responsibility and duty to alter decisional law to 
produce common sense justice. As to Court's doctrine of 
governmental immunity, they had already waited too long, and 
he would join the vast majority of the other courts in abro­
gating it. The minority opinion concludes (9): 
"Thus it is evident that times have changed and are now 
changing in business, social, economic and legal worlds. 
The basis for and the need of such encouragement is no 
longer existent," 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to discover and identify 
the developments in court decisions which constitute trends 
in the tort liability of school districts in Iowa, The 
accomplishment of this purpose was attempted through (1) the 
examination of court decisions on the question of school 
district tort liability, beginning with the date of the first 
decision on the question, and (2) the organization and pre­
sentation of an analysis of the decisions by means of which 
chronological and jurisdictional trends might be illustrated. 
Summary 
The laws of Iowa with respect to local governmental tort 
immunity are nearing the completion of a 180 degree turn. 
The change has been gradual but its completion may leave Iowa 
local governments in a more severe position of liability 
than if the doctrine of immunity had never existed. This 
untenable position resulted when the Supreme Court gave 
injured plaintiffs relief from the application of the __ 
doctrine by extending the statutory exceptions and then 
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wiping out the defenses which would be available to a 
private-party-defendant, within the area of exceptions. 
Early cases 
The Supreme Court of Iowa held, in 1876, that a school 
district was not liable for injuries received by a child 
while playing about unguarded well-drilling equipment on the 
school playground in Wood v. Independent School District of 
Mitchell. In 1880 this precedent was extended in the case of 
Kincaid v. Hardin County, holding counties not liable for 
injuries received in poorly-lighted courthouse stairways. 
Two years later, a school district was held exempt, in the 
case of Lane v. District Township of Woodbury, where a pupil 
was injured by reason of defective construction of a school 
building. The attorney general, in 1912, ruled a school 
district not liable for injuries resulting from boiler 
explosion, and in 1928, he ruled that districts were not 
liable for injuries received by pupils engaging in the 
school athletic program. An opinion in 1930 extended the 
immunity to visitors on school premises. In 1933 the 
Supreme Court of Iowa extended the immunity in its broadest 
form based on the Hibbs v. Independent School District of 
Green Mountain. The court held that when officers, servants, 
or agents of a municipality are engaged in performing a 
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governmental act for and on behalf of a municipality, they 
are not liable in damages consequent on their negligence in 
doing the act. This applied to a person who, with knowledge 
and consent of a school board, was operating for the school 
district a bus in the transportation of children to and from 
school, even though the person so operating the bus was act­
ing at the time in lieu of the person with whom the district 
had actually contracted for the transportation. 
Street exceptions broadened 
For many years the leading Iowa case on a municipal tort 
immunity was the 1931 case of Smith v. Iowa City, in which it 
was held that a park board was not liable for injuries suf­
fered by a child on a defective teeter-totter, even though 
it had notice of the defect and an opportunity to repair. 
However, in 1956, in the case of Florev v. City of Burlington, 
the city was held liable for injuries resulting from the 
steepness of a footpath in a public park. No reference was 
made to the Iowa City case and the court appears to have 
based the liability on breach of the statutory duty to keep 
all public highways, streets, avenues, alleys, public 
squares, and commons within the city in repair and free from 
nuisance. Bringing a park footpath within the category of 
failure to repair, would seem to be reaching rather deeply 
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into the barrel for a result. The handwriting on the wall 
took a clearer meaning the following year in the case of 
Hall y. Town of Keota. Having used the street exception to 
immunity rule to hold the city liable for injury in a park 
in the Burlington case as precedent to hold the town liable 
for injury stemming from a defect in street parking in the 
Keota case. A utility company had abandoned a pole in the 
parking area between the street and sidewalk. It fell, 
injuring a five-year-old boy who was playing on the sidewalk. 
At some time or another, the town had affixed a stop sign and 
a no U-turn sign to the pole. The court cited the Burlington 
case, held the town liable, and remedied its oversight in the 
Burlington case by overruling the Iowa City case. 
Proprietary functions 
In some cases the immunity doctrine has been eroded on 
the basis of distinction between "governmental" and "pro­
prietary" functions. In the 1951 case of Brown y. City of 
Sioux City, the city was held liable for killing bees owned 
by a tenant on the leased portion of the municipal airport 
upon the ground that the city was engaged in a proprietary 
function. Evidently the governmental nature of airport 
operation does not include spraying for flies and mosquitos. 
Similarly, in the 1957 case of Wittner y. Letts. a county 
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hospital was held liable for injuries to a patient upon the 
ground that it was engaged in a proprietary function. The 
injured patient happened to be a paying patient, and it is 
not clear whether the function would have been held govern­
mental, as is usually the case with public health matters, 
had the plaintiff been a relief case. 
Nuisance cases 
Commencing in 1939, actions brought on a nuisance 
theory, as distinguished from negligence, were held to be 
outside the rule of immunity. The theory was first announced 
in the case of Casteel y. Town of Afton. but the town was 
held not liable for the reason that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove the operation of the town athletic field 
amounted to a nuisance. The theory was put to work, how­
ever, in the 1941 case of Ness y. Independent School District 
of Sioux City, in which a school district was held liable for 
damages to windows and shrubs of a private property owner 
whose home abutted the school playground. 
Sidewalk cases 
As part of the streets, sidewalks have been held to be 
within the exception to immunity set forth in section 389.12, 
Code of Iowa, See Keota case, supra. However, the statutory 
exception has been broadened, by court decision, to what 
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approached a rule of absolute liability. In the case of 
Beech y. City of Pes Moines in 1947, the city was held liable 
for injuries to a pedestrian who was tripped by a hole in the 
sidewalk even though she admitted she knew the hole was there 
and conceded she had previously passed over it some 1800 
times on her way to and from work. In a more recent case in 
1963, Engman y. City of Pes Moines. the plaintiff stepped 
into a hole in the portion of the street used for vehicular 
traffic, not a crosswalk, while carrying a sheet of plate-
glass from his truck to the job. He admitted that his head 
was turned and that he was not looking where he was walking. 
The district court jury awarded him $25,000 upon an instruc­
tion to the effect that a city was under a duty to maintain 
the portion of the street used for vehicular traffic in the 
same degree of perfection, for the benefit of pedestrians, as 
a sidewalk. The city appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court which affirmed the decision of the lower court but 
stated that a judgment of $19,000 was the largest amount 
which the rule of fair compensation would permit. 
The danger in the cases described above is that they 
appear to say there is no defense of contributory negligence 
available to the city within the area previously recognized 
as having exceptions to immunity. If the rule of immunity 
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were completely abolished, which amounts to the same thing 
as having all exceptions and no rule, it would be most desir­
able that the defense of contributory negligence be again 
made available to local governmental bodies in all cases. 
Moore v. Murphy 
In the 1963 case of Moore v. Murphy. three of the 
justices of the Iowa Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion, 
stated that although the doctrine of local governmental 
immunity had not been directly an issue before them in that 
case, they were serving notice that they contemplated abolish­
ing it at the first opportunity. The court in 1933 in the 
Hibbs case held that the immunity doctrine applied to agents, 
officers, and servants of a municipal corporation. In this 
1965 case, they reversed the decision of the lower court and 
held the servant, the sheriff, guilty of negligence. 
This, of course, amounted to a courteous warning that 
the culmination of the trend manifested by the expansion of 
the "street defect" exception, the "nuisance" cases, the 
"proprietary function" ca^es, and the virtual abolition of 
the defense of contributory negligence was at hand. 
The culmination 
In Bover v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, in 
1964, the Supreme Court of Iowa, by a five-to-four decision 
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declined to abolish governmental immunity at this time. The 
plaintiffs, paying spectators at a high school basketball 
tournament game, sustained injuries when the bleachers upon 
which they were sitting collapsed. An action to recover for 
these injuries was brought against the Iowa High School 
Athletic Association and the Independent School District of 
Mason City. The district court dismissed the action against 
the school district on the ground of governmental immunity. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, the court ruled as 
noted above. Although there has been a trend away from the 
judicially created doctrine of governmental immunity, the 
Iowa Legislature has recognized the doctrine to be a policy 
of the state; therefore, abrogation of the immunity can be 
properly effected only by the legislature and not by the 
judiciary. 
Yet in this same year, the court by unanimous decision 
held that a municipality can be held liable for its own 
negligence in the Linstrom v. Mason City case. 
Legislation 
In searching the statutes in Iowa nothing was found in 
changed legislation in regards to tort immunity for govern­
mental corporations. This short-coming has long been recog­
nized by the League of Iowa Municipalities. Bills (60th 
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General Assembly, Senate File 377) have been sponsored by 
this organization seeking corrective legislation. 
Unfortunately the proposed bills always wound up being 
assigned to the legislative-judiciary committees of the 
legislature rather than the city and town committees of the 
respective houses. Since the judiciary committees are 
usually heavily populated by claimant-representing type 
attorneys, the League of Municipalities failed to get their 
bills out of committee at either the 59th or 60th session of 
the General Assembly. The bills they did not get out of 
committee took the following approaches to the problem: 
1. Proposed enactment into statute of the common-law 
rule of governmental immunity leaving in force the tradi­
tional exception for street defects. 
2. Imposition of a ceiling of $20,000 for bodily injury 
or death of two or more persons, $10,000 for bodily injury or 
death to one person, or $5,000 property damage on the lia­
bility of the city for each negligent act within the excep­
tion, 
3. Authorization to expend public funds for liability 
insurance. 
4. Extension of the existing notice and limitations 
statute on injury claims to property claims. The statute 
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provides that unless the injured party gives the city notice 
within sixty days from the happening of the injury, he must 
commence his action within three months. 
Salient findings 
1, School districts in Iowa were still protected from 
tort liability for governmental functions by the 
application of the principle of the common-law 
rule of governmental immunity by an insecure margin 
of a five-to-four vote of the Iowa Supreme Court, 
2, Teachers and other employees were liable for their 
own torts as the principle of governmental immunity 
does not extend to offer individuals protection 
from liability if they were sued as individuals, 
3, Legal principles and precepts regarding the liability 
of teachers and other school employees were appli­
cable to school administrative personnel. 
4, The purchase of general liability insurance may be 
held to be an illegal expenditure of school funds, 
according to opinions of the Attorney General, 
5, Most writers on school law feel that governmental 
immunity in tort was outmoded and indefensible. 
Court dissatisfaction of the governmental immunity 
was evidenced in strong dissenting court opinions 
and supported by court exceptions allowing the 
injured to recover damages in spite of governmental 
immunity. 
6, By statutes, municipalities were liable for injuries 
to persons or property caused by defects in public 
places under their jurisdiction of which they had 
actual or constructive notice. 
7, Recently municipalities in Iowa were held to be 
liable irrespective of negligence or fault for the 
escape of dangerous forces confined on their 
property. 
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8, Local governments (including school districts) have 
been held not immune for injuries resulting from 
negligence in carrying on a proprietary function. 
9. Local governments (including school districts) were 
liable for damages resulting from nuisances main­
tained by them. 
10. If the doctrine of immunity were abrogated without 
accompanying controls or liability limits, large 
verdicts could result in oppressive property tax 
burdens upon local taxpayers. 
Conclusions 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the 
state and its subdivisions are immune from suit or liability 
for torts committed by a governmental unit. It also operates 
as an exception to the rule of "respondeat superior", since 
the governmental unit was not liable for the torts of officers 
and employees committed within the scope of their employment. 
The basis of the rule that the state cannot be sued has 
become so well-established that statutes allowing a govern­
mental unit to sue and to be sued have usually been strictly 
construed as removing only the procedural obstacle to claims 
otherwise recognized but not as a waiver of substantive 
immunity from tort liability. However, the entire doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, particularly the rule extending 
immunity to the lesser subdivisions of government, has been 
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the subject of a great deal of criticism by both commentators 
and the courts. 
The courts, in attempting to lessen the harshness of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, have developed the so-called 
governmental-proprietary distinction, which attaches tort 
liability to a proprietary function, but not to a function 
deemed governmental. The rationale given for the distinction 
was that many governmental units act in both a corporate 
capacity, similar to private corporations with local inter­
ests not shared by the state as a whole, and in a govern­
mental capacity endowed with governmental powers and re-
sponsibilities. 
The resort of the judiciary to the governmental-
proprietary distinction is an effort to separate these 
functions and impose tort liability for torts committed in 
the corporate or proprietary capacity to the same extent as 
any private corporation would be held liable. This general 
exception was applied both to municipal corporations and to 
quasi-corporations, but it has not been extensively applied 
to the state. 
Another judicially-created exception to the immunity 
doctrine is that the individually negligent employee or 
officer of the governmental unit may be personally liable. 
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In this situation the courts have distinguished between dis­
cretionary and ministerial functions of the employee and 
impose liability only for negligence which results from the 
performance of ministerial duties. Some courts have made 
the further distinction of ministerial misfeasance and non­
feasance with liability for the former, but not for the 
latter. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has generally sustained state 
governmental immunity, although some tort recovery is 
allowed by means of a legislative claim. As in the majority 
of jurisdictions, the doctrine has become so embedded that a 
statute allowing a county to sue and to be sued has been 
held not to waive tort immunity upon the theory that the 
county is an extension of the state and thus derives the 
state's immunity. Similarly, statutes which allow all state 
agencies and political subdivisions to purchase liability 
insurance for themselves and their employees have been held 
to be permissive and to have no effect upon the immunity 
doctrine. 
The Iowa court has developed the governmental-
proprietary distinction in holding municipal corporations 
liable in proprietary functions for their torts and the 
torts of their employees committed within the scope of their 
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employment. Despite earlier decisions, it now appears that 
the Iowa court will likewise hold quasi-corporations liable 
for torts committed in proprietary functions. In the recent 
case of Wittmer v. Letts. the Supreme Court of Iowa, in hold­
ing a county hospital liable to a paying patient for the 
negligence of its employees, disapproved earlier cases and 
stated the question to be whether or not the operation of a 
hospital by a county constitutes a governmental or proprie­
tary function. This case appears to establish that quasi-
corporation immunity will no longer be the absolute immunity 
afforded the state, but that it will now be determined on the 
same theory as municipal corporation liability. It could be 
argued this case indicated an increased willingness by the 
Iowa court to avoid the harshness of the doctrine by being 
more liberal in its determination of what constitutes a 
proprietary function. 
In another recent Iowa decision, Conrad v. Le Moines. the 
judiciary again indicated a willingness to limit the immunity 
doctrine. In that case the Iowa court held that a special 
appearance was not sufficient to raise the tort immunity of a 
state highway patrolman charged with negligence. It was 
stated that personal immunity from suit extended only to the 
governor and other high officials of the state. The court 
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reasoned that tort immunity of the officer was court created 
and, therefore, was a partial immunity which would be deter­
mined under the misfeasance-nonfeasance theory. While the 
main impact of the case is procedural, it seemingly indicates 
that the Iowa court will allow immunity from suit only for 
the benefit of the state and its highest officers. However, 
the lesser subdivisions of government and their officers are 
included only within the court-created immunity from 
liabilitv--a partial immunity subject to the governmental-
proprietary and misfeasance-nonfeasance distinctions. It 
would appear that the Iowa court has brought the immunity of 
both quasi-corporations and municipal corporations under the 
court-created immunity from liability, which the Iowa court 
should be free to alter or abolish. 
In the recent case of Moore v. Murphy the Iowa court 
sustained another exception to the immunity doctrine: a 
public officer was personally liable for acts of misfeasance 
committed within the scope of his employment but was not 
liable for nonfeasance. The rationale of this exception 
was that immunity extends to the officer if the breach of 
duty is to the general public, but if the duty was owed to 
the individual injured, immunity does not attach and lia­
bility was imposed. The specially concurring opinion in the 
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Moore case was of particular interest for it briefly con­
sidered the question of abrogating the sovereign immunity 
doctrine. The three concurring justices stated that those 
who relied on immunity as a defense must realize our court-
made doctrine of governmental immunity would be subjected to 
a re-examination in the near future. This dictum was an 
indication that the immunity doctrine was no longer favored 
by the Iowa court, and it invited the prediction that the 
Iowa court was ready to rid the law of this outmoded rule. 
The Bover case squarely presented to the court the issue 
of abrogation of the immunity doctrine. Despite the earlier 
indications of disfavor with the doctrine, upon re-examination 
of its status in Iowa, the five-to-four majority opinion 
concluded that abrogation of the doctrine should come from 
legislative, not judicial action. The majority explained 
its position by pointing out that even though the rule may 
have been judicially created, it was now the established 
policy of the state, as evidenced in laws authorizing the 
purchase of liability insurance covering proprietary 
functions and officers and employees of certain public 
bodies. In light of such limited legislative action in 
recognizing and relaxing the doctrine's application, its 
abrogation was considered by the court to be a legislative 
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function. A vigorous dissenting opinion, written by Justice 
Moore, emphasized the obvious inequalities resulting from the 
doctrine and the trend in other jurisdictions toward 
judicial abrogation of governmental immunity. In concluding 
that such immunity should be abolished. Justice Moore reasoned 
that legislative recognition of some of the doctrine's evils 
should not prevent judicial abrogation of a judicially 
created rule in order to produce common sense justice. 
As in the Bover case, whenever courts consider the 
modification or abolition of governmental immunity, the 
basic question was whether the judiciary or the legislature 
should take the initial action. In accord with the Bover 
case, several jurisdictions have taken the view that the 
courts are bound by stare decisis and that any action must 
come from the legislature. The soundest argument for this 
position was that it would be necessary to use public funds 
to settle claims or pay judgments and only the legislature 
can properly provide for their collection by taxation, and 
authorize expenditures for liability insurance. Neverthe­
less, courts in several of the abrogating jurisdictions had 
not considered themselves bound by prior statements that any 
change must come from the legislature. Courts which had 
abrogated the rule had generally based their action on the 
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rationale that since a compelling reason for the court-made 
rule no longer exists, the courts had a duty to modify or 
abolish it. 
Numerous courts, including the present court, have 
argued against judicial abrogation of governmental immunity by 
emphasizing the subsequent restrictive legislative reaction 
which had taken place in some abrogating jurisdictions. In 
contradiction to this argument, it had been advanced that 
subsequent legislative action was not necessarily statutory 
frustration of attempted judicial reform, but that the courts 
have overcome legislative inertia that would otherwise have 
delayed or defeated reform. Thus these developments may be 
viewed as illustrating not merely the possibility of clash 
between decisional and statutory creativity but also the 
possibility of their serving in combination to bring about 
reform that neither alone would have been likely to achieve. 
In view of the fact that abrogation of the immunity 
doctrine would affect numerous, diverse governmental units 
and operations, legislative action would seemingly be pre­
ferable to a case-by-case development in providing any 
desired exceptions to complete abolition of the doctrine and 
in implementing a full-scale reform. However, it was likely 
that many of the courts which have sustained the rule have 
187 
not fully considered the possibility of a comprehensive 
legislative reform prompted by judicial action. After citing 
instances in which the doctrine had been abrogated by the 
judiciary in other jurisdictions, the present Court assumed 
that because restrictive legislative action followed those 
decisions, judicial action in the instant case would have 
been improper. The majority opinion avoided a discussion of 
whether a court should act with the intention of stimulating 
legislative consideration of a legal question. Although it 
may be argued that a tendency on the part of courts to 
decide cases with the attitude that the legislature will 
correct any mistakes results in judicial irresponsibility, 
this argument would not seem to preclude creative judicial 
action which had a strong basis in reason. As has been 
indicated, both case authority and current jurisprudential 
writings lend approval to positive judicial action in areas 
involving questions such as the abrogation of governmental 
immunity. 
Judicial action aimed at speeding legislative reform 
would seem particularly suitable with respect to an inequit­
able and outmoded doctrine to which the courts themselves 
gave birth. Although the decision in the instant case settles 
the issue in Iowa for the present, it is suggested that if 
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the Court is faced with the issue again it should give care­
ful consideration to the possibility of a combined judicial-
legislative reform. In the meantime, whether the closeness 
of the present decision and the court's recognition of a 
trend to abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity will 
have any effect on the legislature was open to speculation. 
Hopefully,.the present opinion will serve as a spur to com­
plete legislative examination of the immunity doctrine result­
ing in remedial legislation for Iowa, 
The primary assumption at the onset of this study was 
that judicial opinions on the question of school district 
liability had been changing in recent years. The findings 
of the study not only show that the assumption was valid, but 
also provides indications as to the directions these changes 
have taken. 
These conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
1. The trend throughout the United States was in the 
direction of abolishing local governmental immunity, 
2. Where abolition comes about by court decision, the 
liability imposed was generally unlimited. 
3. Abolition by act of the state legislature appeared 
the more desirable method for the reason that it 
could be accompanied by legislative controls, 
4. The Supreme Court of Iowa has generally sustained 
state governmental immunity, although some tort 
recovery is allowed by means of a legislative claim, 
5. In view of the recent decisions by the Court in Iowa, 
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the state governmental units are "ripe" for abroga­
tion of the doctrine should another case come before 
the Court. 
6. The possible financial consequences of the abolition 
of the immunity doctrine in Iowa, by judicial fiat, 
without enactment of suitable legislative safe­
guards could bring about verdicts that could bank­
rupt a school district. 
7. To avoid the harshness of the doctrine, the Iowa 
Court has used the erosion-by-exception approach. 
This has proven entirely unsatisfactory. 
Recommendations 
It was noted that while the Iowa bills (60th General 
Assembly, Senate File 377) languished and expired in commit­
tee, the Minnesota Legislature passed a bill which contained 
many of the features sought in the Iowa bills, plus some 
additional features not included in the Iowa bills. The 
Minnesota Act imposed liability ceilings, notice and 
limitations requirements, specific authority to purchase 
insurance, and specific areas of immunity. Of particular 
interest was the limitation of ice and snow claims to 
situations caused by the affirmative negligence of the 
governmental corporation. 
The proper approach to the immunity problem in Iowa for 
1965 and the years ahead would seem to involve: 
1. Preparing of a bill similar to the Minnesota Act. 
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2. Incorporating in such a bill a section expressly 
making the defense of contributory negligence available in 
all cases. 
3. Enlisting the aid of the County Officers Association. 
4. Enlisting the aid of the Iowa State School Board 
Association, the Iowa Association of School Administrators, 
and the Iowa State Education Association. 
5. Sounding out the insurance lobby to determine 
whether their interest in writing the proposed insurance 
coverage is sufficient to make them allies. 
6. Calling the attention of each of the members elected 
to the 61st General Assembly to the existence of the dis­
senting opinion in the Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic 
Association and such subsequent decision, if any, as may have 
carried out the actual abolition of the immunity doctrine. 
7. Distributing articles from professional magazines 
of the educational associations and municipal governmental 
associations for the purpose of making and keeping local 
officials aware of the problem and the need for its correc­
tion. 
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Termination of Immunity-Legislation Versus Decree 
The trend indicated by this research indicates that 
school districts and personnel will become the target for 
ever-increasing accounts of litigations for tort liability. 
In order to protect justice in the field of school district 
liability and to prevent hardships inherent in the tradi­
tional immunity doctrine, this writer recommends that the 
immunity of the school district for tort liability be main­
tained; a virtual impossibility under the present situation. 
Cases which are brought to the bar are expensive both in 
time and money. In addition they cast a bad light on the 
school and on the reputation of the staff and administration. 
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of tort 
liability suits brought against the school district. 
The possible financial consequences of the abolition of 
immunity, by judicial fiat, without enactment of suitable 
legislative safeguards can bring about verdicts like the 
Molitor decision. How many districts could absorb such 
liability--even once--without substantially affecting their 
ability to function? When the Illinois Legislature appro­
priated money for the Kaneland School District, they more or 
less indicated that school districts could not afford this. 
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It is fairly safe to make the assumption that the court knows 
this now, too. 
The deterioration of the doctrine to this extreme may 
cause taxes to rise fantastically unless we have legislative 
steps. As the costs go up, the following questions should be 
asked : 
1. Who actually benefits from these suits? (The current 
rate of lawyers in Iowa for contingency fees is 33 to 
50 percent in procedural trial. 
2. Are ever-increasing awards justified? 
It would seem prudent to protect all school personnel as 
to their potential personal liability. This could be accom­
plished by the purchase of liability insurance policies by 
the district. In-so-far as this concerns drivers of buses 
and other school vehicles, authority for the local school 
board to pay for the policy exists. Whether additional 
authority exists for the boards to purchase insurance for its 
employees against liability arising out of other acts is in 
doubt by reason of the ambiguity of the pertinent statute. 
Certainly such authority should exist, but in any event, 
there is nothing to prevent the board from taking the cost of 
its employees to purchase their own insurance into considera­
tion when fixing salaries or, having made such allowance. 
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from requiring them to provide their own protection. 
Liability insurance as a solution to the financial conse­
quences of abolished immunity has its shortcomings. Judg­
ments have exceeded a million dollars. In face of almost 
limitless liability it must be remembered that all public 
bodies have financial and tax limitations. (Only the Federal 
Government prints money or can authorize any size deficit 
that it wants.) Governmental bodies must either, take money 
from an existing fund, probably already committed, increase 
taxes, or hope the taxpayers will vote for a special assess-
ment. 
Abrogation of immunity coupled with required insurance 
is not enough. Protection can be secured through insurance; 
however, insurance premiums are based on loss record experi­
ence and the higher the exposure, the higher the premiums. A 
local governmental unit might have some protection against a 
cas trophic verdict such as the Molitor case but this will not 
solve the general day-today problems of liability. Besides 
verdict exposure the local governmental unit must also con­
sider the litigation costs, processing claims, and prepara­
tion for trial. The public is going to pay this one way or 
another, either by larger staffs or attorneys or in the 
insurance premiums, and it is already established that the 
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volume of claims will increase many-fold. 
No one can be certain about the full effect that un­
restricted liability would have on the caliber of persons who 
would accept employment from a local governmental unit or 
the devotion with which they would perform their functions or, 
in fact, on how the school district would perform certain 
functions. 
There could be too many inconsistencies as a result of 
outright abolishment of immunity, unless accompanying prece­
dents were also overruled. These precedents were set when 
the Court was using the erosion-by-exception approach. 
In summary then, if immunity is to be amputated from 
local governmental units, suitable additional devices should 
be provided concurrently with the operation. Courts may have 
the power to abrogate immunity, but they certainly do not 
have the power to levy taxes or otherwise provide funds to 
meet the resulting liability. They do not have power to 
limit the amount of recovery or to force contribution from 
the state or some other agency. What then is the final 
answer? 
Several alternatives have been suggested: state partici­
pation, limits of liability, contributions between agencies, 
and controlled immunity through legislation. 
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From an analysis of the research data reported here-in. 
this writer recommends that controlled immunity through 
legislation is the best approach for Iowa. 
Controlled Immunity Through Legislation 
Legislation designed to fill the vacuum created by 
abolition of the immunity doctrine has been enacted in 
California and Minnesota. In 1963 the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota did abolish the doctrine in that state, and their 
legislature, which was then in session, immediately enacted a 
bill, which has worked well there and, which should serve for 
a model for Iowa. This law primarily does three things: 
1. Defines the areas of tort liability and immunity for 
quas i-corporations. 
2. Fixes the liability limits within the areas of 
defined liability. 
3. Authorizes the purchase of insurance to protect 
against such liability. 
Immediate and specific legislation is recommended to 
correct a dangerous liability situation in Iowa. 
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Need for Legislation 
Local governmental immunity, or its remaining vestiges, 
was upheld by the 1964 decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa 
in the 1964 Bover case, by a five-to-four margin. However, 
the closeness of the vote indicates existing common-law 
cannot survive many more attacks. This leaves local govern­
ments with the choice between riding the existing doctrine, 
until the Court finally destroys it or erodes it away; or 
seeking legislation at the forthcoming sessions, to define 
areas of immunity and liability, and to make some provisions 
for financing in the areas of liability. 
The urgency of such legislation was demonstrated by a 
1964 case in New Jersey in which a verdict of $1,250,000 was 
returned against a school district of 10,000 population, and 
the Molitor verdict of $2,500,000. 
A bill providing for controlled immunity through legis­
lation is recommended. A draft of such a measure has been 
prepared and is presented in the Appendix. 
Suggestions for Further Study 
1. An analysis of the current financial awards in 
personal injury actions against local governmental 
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units throughout the United States. 
2. A state by state investigation of how professional 
teachers' organizations are providing protection for 
their members in tort liability suits. 
In closing, school districts whose officers and employees 
exercise a reasonable degree of care in the maintenance of 
school facilities and in the supervision of school activities 
are not likely to incur liability. Liability is assessed 
only after negligence or other tortious conduct has been 
proven. 
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sanction of the design and the findings. 
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Definition of Terms 
Accident - An event which takes place without one's foresight 
or expectation; an event that proceeds from an 
unknown cause and therefore is not expected. 
Attractive Nuisance - A doctrine which holds a property owner 
liable when he knowingly leaves dangerous instru­
mentality, which he may be charged with knowing is 
of character to attract children, exposed in a 
place liable to be frequented by children, and as 
a result, a child who did not realize the danger, 
is injured. 
Case Law - The aggregate of reported cases as forming a body 
of jurisprudence, or the law of a particular sub-
jest as evidenced or formed by the adjudged cases, 
in distinction to statutes and other sources of 
law. 
Collateral Attack - Attempt to destroy the effect of a judg­
ment showing reasons why the judgment should not 
be given. 
Common Law - That body of unwritten law, founded upon general 
customs, usage or common consent, and in natural 
justice, or reason; it is custom long acquiesced 
in or sanctified by moral usage and by judicial 
decision. 
Contributory Negligence - If the evidence shows that the 
plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence con­
tributing to his injury, there can be no recovery. 
Conversion - An unauthorized assumption and exercise of the 
right of control over goods or personal chatels 
belonging to another^ to the altercation of their 
condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights. 
Decision - A judgment rendered by a competent tribunal. 
Defendant - A party sued in a personal action. 
Derelict - Neglectful. 
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Diete - The opinions of a judge which do not embody the 
resolution or determination of the courts, and, 
made without argument or full consideration of 
the point, are not the processed, deliberate 
determinations of the judge himself. 
Discretionary Powers - Powers or rights conferred to act 
according to the dictates or conscience of judg­
ment. 
Employees - Administration, teachers, bus drivers, custodians. 
Immunity - Freedom from natural or usual liability. 
Imputed Negligence - Negligence which is not directly attribu­
table to the person himself, but which is the 
negligence of a person who is in privity with him, 
and with whose fault he is chargeable. 
Indieturn - Statements and comments in an opinion concerning 
some rule of law or legal proposition not neces­
sarily involved nor essential to determination of 
the case in hand are otiter diots, and lack the 
force of an adjudication. 
In Loco Parentis - In place of a parent. 
Jurisprudence - A system of laws of a country. 
Liability - The state of being bound or obliged in law or 
justice to do, pay, or make good on something. 
The state of one who is bound in law and justice 
to do something which may be enforced by action. 
Ministerial - It is a definite duty arising under circum­
stances admitted and imposed by law. 
Misfeasance - Improper performance of an act. 
Negligence - The omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily 
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, 
or the doing of something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do. 
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Nolen Volens - Whether willing or unwilling; consenting or 
not. 
Nonfeasance - Neglect or failure to perform a duty. 
Nuisance - Anything that unlawfully causes hurt, inconveni­
ence, or damage. 
Opinion - The statement of reasons delivered by a judge or 
court for giving the judgment which is pronounced 
upon a case. 
Plaintiff - He who complains. 
Plenary - Meaning full, complete, unabridged. 
Proprietary - One who has legal right to anything. 
Proximate Cause - That cause of injury which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause, produces the injury, and with­
out which injury would not have occurred. 
Quasi - A term used to mark a resemblance and which supports 
a difference between two objects. Indicates 
partial or part owner. 
Quasi - judicatory - A judicial act performed by someone not 
a judge. 
Respondeat Superior - A phrase often used to indicate the 
responsibility of a principal for the acts of his 
servant or agent. 
Save Harmless - To exempt or reserve from harm. As where a 
statute reserves or saves vested rights. 
School - An institution of learning of lower grade than a 
college or university. 
School District - A public and quasi-municipal corporation, 
organized by legislative authority or directive, 
comprising a defined territory, for the erection, 
maintenance, government, and support of the public 
school within its territory in accordance with 
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and in subordination to the general school laws of 
the state, invested, for these purposes only, with 
powers of local self-government, and generally of 
local taxation, and administered by a board of 
officers, usually elected by the voters of the 
district, who are variously styled school direc­
tors, trustees, commissioners or supervisors of 
schools, 
School Officials - School board members, trustees, clerks, 
and treasurers. 
Solvent - Having the power of dissolving. 
Stare Decisis - To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases. 
Statute - A law established by the act of the legislative 
power. 
Subrogation - The substitution of another person in the place 
of the creditor to whose rights he succeeds in 
relation to the debt. 
Tort - In modern practice is used to denote an injury or 
wrongful act, A private or civil wrong or injury. 
A wrong independent of contract. 
Ultra Vires - A term used Co express the action of a corpora­
tion which is beyond the powers conferred upon it 
by its charter, or the statutes under which it was 
instituted. 
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April 10, 1964 
Dr. R. R, Hamilton, Dean Emeritus 
College of Law 
University of Wyoming 
Laramie, Wyoming 
Dear Dr. Hamilton: 
I am a Doctoral Candidate in school administration at Iowa 
State University at Ames, Iowa. I would like to do my thesis 
on "Tort Liability of School District Employees". To my 
knowledge, there has not been a historical study of this 
since about 1928. I am writing to you with the hope that you 
can give me some suggestions. 
Would it be wise to continue the historical approach of this 
subject from 1928 on, or would it be more sound to do just a 
historical study of Iowa? 
Any suggestions that you can offer me would be greatly 
appreciated. I know that you are a very busy person and that 
you are recognized as an authority in School Law. I have had 
the privilege of using your textbook and enjoy and appreciate 
your presentations of "The National School Law Reporter", 
distributed by Croft Publications. 
Sincerely, 
Fred J. Rohde 
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April 15, 1964 
Mr» Fred J. Rohde, Superintendent 
Ballard Community School District 
Huxley, Iowa 
Dear Mr, Rohde: 
If there is sufficient tort liability of districts 
material in Iowa I think you might well limit your study to 
that area. However, if you should decide to work on this 
subject in the broader area, I would hope that you would 
attempt more significant interpretation of the cases than 
has appeared in much of the writing in this field in recent 
years. 
I think there is little to be gained professionally in 
rehashing the material in this important area of school 
administration. The rapidly changing law on tort liability 
seems to have attracted some writers who have had little to 
offer, I regret to say. I am sure your study would not fall 
in this category if you should decide to work in the broader 
area. 
Good luck to you. 
Sincerely, 
Robert R, Hamilton 
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APPENDIX C 
Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company 
OF SPRINGFIELD. ILLINOIS 
Policy No. Iowa 2-ELA 216 
Effective Date July 1, 1964 Expiration Date July 1, 1965 
Limit of liability - $50,000 each occurrence. 
The term of this policy shall be as shown under the effective date and expiration date and for such succeeding annual periods there­
after, as the required renewal premium is paid according to the provisions of the Basic Policy. 
This is to certify that who is a member of the Iowa Education Association, 
is entitled to the insurance coverage set forth and described herein and in the Basic Policy filed in the office of the Education Associa­
tion designated herein, the terms «nd conditions of which by this reference are made a part hereof. A copy of the Basic Policy is 
also on file with the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Iowa for public inspection. 
The Company agrees with the Association (herein called the Policyholder), named in the declarations made a part hereof, in con­
sideration of payment of the premium and subject to the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions and other terms of this policy: 
INSURING AGREEMENTS 
I. Coverage—liability. 
To pay on behalf of each and every insured member of the Association (hereinafter called the insured) all sums which he shall 
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time result­
ing therefrom, sustained by any person, and as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of 
use thereof, arising out of an occurrence in the course of his duties as an instructor, member of a faculty or teaching staff. 
II. Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments. 
As respects such insurance as is afforded by the other terms of this policy the Company shall: 
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or destmctlon and seeking damages on account 
thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the Company may make such investigation, negotiation and 
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems e:g>edlent; 
(b) pay all premiums on bonds to release attachments for an amount not in excess of the applicable limit of liability of this 
policy, all premiums on appeal bonds required in any such defended suit, but without any obligation to apply for or furnish 
any such bonds; 
(c) pay all expenses incurred by the Company, all costs taxed against the insured in any such suit and all interest accruing 
after entry of judgment until the Company has paid, tendered or deposited in court sudi part of such judgment as does not 
exceed the limit of the Company's liability thereon; 
(d) pay expenses incurred by the insured, in the event of an accident causing bodily injury, sickness or disease, for such im­
mediate medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of the accident; 
(e) reimburse the insured for all reasonable expenses, other than loss of earnings, incurred at the Company's request. 
The amounts incurred under this insuring agreement, except settlements of claims and suits are payable by the Company in 
addition to the applicable limit of liability of this policy. 
in. Policy Period. 
This policy applies only to occurrences during the policy period. 
EXCLUSIONS 
This policy does not apply; 
"(a) to the ownership, maintenance or use, including loading and unloading, of any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, water-
craft or aircraft, wÛle away from premises wherein school sponsored and supervised classes of instruction are conducted. " 
(b) to bodily injury to or sickness, disease, or death of (1) any employee of the insured while engaged in the employment of 
the insured, if benefits therefor are either payable or required to be provided under any Workmen's Compensation law; or (2) 
any residence employee of the insured while engaged in the employment of the insured has in effect on the date of the occur­
rence a policy providing Workmen's Compensation benefits for such employee; 
(c) to injury, sickness, disease, death or destruction caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured, except by 
corporal punishment of any pupil administered by or at the direction of the insured in the course of the insured's duties as an 
instructor, member of a faculty or teaching staff, if the administration of corporal punishment is not prohibited by state law; 
(d) to Injury to or destruction of property used by, rented to, or in the care, custody or control of the insured; 
( e) to the rendering of any dental, medical, nursing or surgical services or the omikion thereof. 
CONDITIONS 
1. Limits of Liability. The limit of liability stated in the declarations is the limit of the Company's liability for all damages, 
Including damages for care and loss of services, arising out of one occurrence. 
2. Notice of Occurrence. When an occurrence takes place written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the 
Company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable. Such notice shall contain particulars sufficient to identify 
the insured and also reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place and circumstances of the occurrence, the 
names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses. 
3. Notice of Claim or Suit. If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the 
Company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative. 
4. Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured. The insured shall cooperate with the Company and, upon the Company's request, 
shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance 
of witnesses and in the conduct of suits. The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume 
any obligation or incur any expense other than for such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative 
at the time of the accident. 
Form No, ELA-2-9-55 la. 
5. Action against Company. No action shall lie against the Company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall 
have fully complied with aU the terms of this policy, or until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been 
finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the inwed, the claim-
end and the Company. Any person or organization or the 1m^'representative thereof who has secured such judgment or writ­
ten agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under tms policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy. 
Nothing contained in this policy shall give any person or organization any right to join the Company as a co-defendent in any 
action against the insured to determine the insured's liability. Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the insured's 
estate shall not relieve the Company of any of its obligations hereunder. 
6. Other Insurance. If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this policy the Company shall not be liable under 
this policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the 
total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss. 
7. Suborgation. In the event of any payment under this policy, the Company shall be subrogated to all the insured's right of re­
covery therefor against any person or organization and the insured shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do 
whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
8. Changes. Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any other person shall not effect a waiver or a change 
in any part of this policy or estop the Company from asserting any right under the terms of this policy; nor shall the terms of 
this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a part of this policy, signed by the President, a Vice-
President, the Secretary or an Assistant Secretary of the Company, and countersigned by an authorized representative of the 
Company. 
9. Policy Period. All periods of insurance shall begin and end at 12:01 A.M., at the location of the insured's residence. 
10. The Basic Policy which by reference is made a part of all individual policies, together with the individual policy, shall con­
stitute the entire contract between the parties. A copy of the Basic Policy shall be deposited in the office of the Education 
Association named herein and shall be open for inspection at all reasonable times. A copy of the Basic Policy is on file with 
the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Iowa for public inq)ection. 
11. Cancellation. This policy may be canceled by the Association by mailing written notice stating when thereafter such cancel­
lation shall be effective. This policy may be canceled by the Company by mailing to the Association at the address shown 
in this policy written notice stating when not less than thirty days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. The mail­
ing of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice and the effective date of cancellation stated in the notice shall 
become the end of the policy period. Delivery of such written notice either by the Association or by the Company shall be 
equivalent to mailing. Earned premiums shall be computed pro rata. Premium adjustment may be made at the time can­
cellation is effected and, if not then made, shall be made as soon as practicable after cancellation becomes effective. The 
Company's check or the check of its representative mailed or delivered as aforesaid shall be sufficient tender of any refund of 
premium due. 
12. Terms of Policy Conformed to Statute. Terms of this policy which are in conflict with the statutes of the State wherein this 
policy is issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes. 
13. Premium, Inspection and Audit. The Company shall be permitted to examine and audit the Association's books and records 
at any time during the policy period and any extension thereof and within one year after the final termination of this policy, 
as far as they relate to the premium basis of this policy. 
Upon termination of this policy the earned premium shall be computed in accordance with the Company's rules, rates, rating 
plans, premiums and minimum premiums applicable to this insurance. If the earned premium thus computed exceeds the 
estimated advance premium paid, the Association shall pay the excess to the Company; if less, the Company shall return to 
the Association the unearned portion paid by such Association, but in any event the Company shall retain the minimum annual 
premium stated in the-Declarations. 
MUTUAL AGREEMENTS 
1. Membership and Voting Notice; 
The insured is notified that by virtue of this policy, he is a member of the Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company of Spring­
field, Illinois, and is entitled to vote either in person or by proxy at any and all meetings of said Company. The Annual 
Meet ings  are  held in  i ts  Home Off ice  at  Springf ie ld ,  I l l inois ,  on the second Saturday of  October at  the  hour of  10:00 A.  M. ,  
unless the Board of Directors shall elect to change the time and place of such meeting, in which case, but not otherwise, due 
notice shall be mailed to the insured at the address disclosed by this policy at least ten (10) days prior thereto. 
2. No Contingent Liability: 
The holder of this policy incurs no liability other than the Deposit Premium or Premium Paid; the Company having accumu­
lated, and now ha^ng bitact, a free surplus equal to the paid-up capital and surplus required of a domestic Stock Insurance 
Company transacting the same kind of insurance. This is in accordance with the Company's Articles of Incorporation and 
By-Laws. 
3. Mutual Participation: 
The insured is by virtue of this policy a member of the Company, subject to the Articles of Incoi^oration and By-Laws refer­
ence to which is had, and shall be entitled to such unabsorbed Deposit Premium or Dividend as may be legally declared by 
the Board of Directors. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company has caused this policy to be signed by its president and 
secretary at Springfield Illinois, and countersigned on the declarations page by a duly authorized agent of the Company. 
President Secretary 
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A Proposed Bill for Legislative Adoption 
An Act relating to the tort liability of cities, towns, 
counties, school districts and other governmental sub­
divisions of the State of Iowa. 
Be It Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Iowa: 
Section 1. Definitions. As used in this Act, the 
following terms shall have the following meanings: 
"Municipality" shall mean city, town, county, or school 
district. 
"Governing body" means the council of a city or town, 
county board of supervisors, local school board, and other 
boards and commissions exercising quasi-legislative, quasi-
executive, and quasi-judicial power over territory comprising 
a political or municipal governmental subdivision of the 
State of Iowa. 
"Tort" means every civil wrong which results in injury 
to person or property and includes, but is not restricted to, 
actions based upon negligence, breach of duty, and nuisance. 
Sec. 2, Tort Liability. Except as otherwise provided 
in this Act, every municipality is subject to liability for 
its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents 
acting within the scope of their employment or duties, 
whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function. 
Sec. 3. Exceptions. The liability imposed by section 
two (2) shall have no application to any claim enumerated in 
this section. As to any such claim a municipality shall be 
liable only to the extent liability may be imposed by the 
express statute dealing with such claims and, in the absence 
of such express statute, the municipality shall be immune 
from liability. 
1. Workmen's Compensation Claims. Any claim for injury 
to or death of any person covered by the Workmen's Compensa­
tion Act. 
2, Tax Claims. Any claim in connection with the 
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collection and assessment of taxes, 
3. Accumulations of Snow and Ice. Any claim based on 
snow or ice conditions on any highway or public place, except 
where the condition is affirmatively caused by the negligent 
acts of the municipality. 
4. Execution of law. Any claim based upon an act or 
omission of an officer or employee, exercising due care, in 
the execution of a valid or invalid statute, ordinance, or 
officially adopted resolution, rule or regulation of a 
governing body. 
5. Discretionary acts. Any claim based upon the per­
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty, whether or not the discretion be abused, 
6. Other immunity. Any claim against a municipality as 
to which the municipality is immune from liability by the 
provisions of any other statute or where the action based 
upon such claim has been barred or abated by operation of 
statute or rule of civil procedure. 
Sec. 4. Maximum liability. The liability of a munici­
pality arising out of any tort claim within the scope of this 
Act shall not exceed the following limits: 
1. Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) when the 
claim is one for death by wrongful act or omission and fifty 
thousand dollars ($50,000) to any claimant in any other case; 
2. Three hundred thousand dollars($300,000) for any 
number of claims arising out of a single occurrence. 
No award for damages or any such claim shall include 
punitive damages. 
Sec. 6. Disposition of multiple claims. Where the 
amount awarded to or settled upon multiple claimants exceeds 
three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000), a party may apply 
to the district court to apportion to each claimant his 
proper share of the total amount limited by subsection two 
(2) of section four (4). The share apportioned to each 
claimant shall be in the proportion that the ratio of the 
award or settlement made to him bears to the aggregate awards 
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and settlements for all claims arising out of the occurrence. 
Sec. 7. Notice of claim. Every person who claims dam­
ages from any municipality for or on account of any loss or 
injury within the scope of section two (2) shall cause to be 
presented to the governing body of the municipality within 
thirty days after the alleged loss or injury a written notice 
stating the time, place and circumstances thereof and the 
amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Failure to 
state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded 
shall not invalidate the notice; but in such case, the 
claimant shall furnish full information regarding the nature 
and extent of the injuries and damages within fifteen days 
after demand by the municipality. No action therefore shall 
be maintained unless such notice has been given and unless 
the action is commenced within one year after such notice. 
The time for giving such notice shall include a reasonable 
length of time, not to exceed ninety days, during which the 
person injured is incapacitated by his injury from giving 
such notice. 
Sec. 8. Notice--wrongful death. When the claim is one 
for death by wrongful act or omission, the notice may be pre­
sented by the personal representative, surviving spouse, or 
next of kin, or the consular officer of the foreign country 
of which the deceased was a citizen, within one year after 
the alleged injury resulting in such death; but if the person 
for whose death the claim is made has presented a notice that 
would have been sufficient had he lived, an action for wrong­
ful death may be brought without additional notice. 
Sec. 9. Liability insurance. The governing body of any 
municipality may purchase a policy of liability insurance 
insuring against all or any part of liability which might be 
incurred by such municipality or its officers, employees and 
agents under the provisions of section two (2) hereof and may 
similarly purchase insurance covering torts specified in 
section three (3). Such insurance may provide protection in 
excess of the liability limits specified in section four (4), 
If the municipality has the authority to levy or cause to be 
levied taxes, the premium costs of such Insurance may be 
levied in excess of any millage tax limitation imposed by 
statute. Any independent or autonomous board or commission 
in the municipality having authority to disburse funds for a 
particular municipal function without approval of the govern­
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ing body may similarly procure liability insurance within the 
field of its operation. The procurement of such insurance 
constitutes a waiver of the defense of governmental immunity 
to the extent of the liability stated in the policy but shall 
have no effect on the liability of the municipality beyond 
the coverage so provided. 
Sec. 10. Defenses. A municipality shall be entitled to 
the benefit of the defenses of contributory negligence, 
supervening cause, and all other defenses available to a 
private party-defendant in like circumstances, to the same 
extent that such defenses are available to private parties in 
such circumstances. 
Sec. 11. Indemnification. The governing body may defend 
any of its officers and employees, whether elected or appointed 
and, except in cases of malfeasance in office or willful or 
wanton neglect of duty, may save harmless and indemnify such 
officers and employees against any tort claim or demand, 
whether groundless or otherwise, arising out of an alleged 
act or omission occurring in the performance of duty. Any 
independent or autonomous board or commission of a municipali­
ty having authority to disburse funds for a particular 
municipal function without approval of the governing body may 
similarly defend, save harmless and indemnify its officers 
and employees against such tort claims or demands. This 
section is intended to confer power in addition to that con­
ferred by sections three hundred sixty-eight, A point one 
(368A.1), and that conferred by sections three hundred twenty-
one point four hundred ninety-five (321,495) to three hundred 
twenty-one point four hundred ninety-seven (321.497). 
Sec. 12. Compromise of claims. The governing body of 
any municipality may compromise, adjust and settle tort 
claims against the municipality for damages under section 
two (2) and may appropriate money for the payment of amounts 
agreed upon. When the amount of a settlement exceeds twenty-
five hundred dollars, the settlement shall not be effective 
until approved by the district court. 
Sec, 13, Payment of judgments. When a judgment is 
entered against or a settlement is made by a municipality for 
a claim within the scope of section two (2), payment shall be 
made and the same remedies shall apply in the case of non­
payment as in the case of other judgments against the 
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municipality. If the municipality has authority to levy or 
cause to be levied taxes and the judgment or settlement is 
unpaid at the time of the adoption of the annual budget, it 
shall budget an amount sufficient to pay the judgment or 
settlement together with interest accruing thereon to the 
expected date of payment. Such tax may be levied in excess 
of any millage limitation imposed by statute. 
Sec. 14. Prior claims. This Act shall have no applica­
tion to any claims arising prior to"its effective date. 
Sec. 15. This Act, being deemed of immediate importance, 
shall be in full force and effect upon publication in the 
, a newspaper published at Iowa, and 
the , a newspaper published at , Iowa. 
Explanation 
In the 1963 case of Moore v. Murphy. 119 N.W, 2d 759, 
three of the justices of the Supreme Court of Iowa, in a con­
curring opinion, served courteous warning upon the munici­
palities of Iowa, that the commonlaw doctrine of local govern­
mental immunity would shortly become a thing of the past, as 
has happened in recent years in several of the surrounding 
midwestern states. In the 1964 case of Bover v. Iowa High 
School Athletic Association the Court upheld, for the time 
being, the remaining vestiges of the immunity doctrine. In 
1963 the Supreme Court of Minnesota did abolish the doctrine 
in that state and their Legislature, which was then in session, 
immediately enacted a bill, which has worked well there and, 
which served as the model for this bill. The bill primarily 
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does three things : 
1. It defines the areas of tort liability and immunity 
for municipalities. 
2. It fixes liability limits within the areas of 
defined liability. 
3. It authorizes purchase of insurance to protect 
against such liability. 
The purpose of this bill is to respond to the Court's 
courteous admonition by legislatively clarifying the status 
of the immunity doctrine in the same manner as was done in 
Minnesota. 
